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CHRISTOPHER LAYNE
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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE GROUP
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reflections
ON THE QUARTER

IRAQ AND IRAN AT WAR: THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The Iraqi-Iranian war presented an intriguing but dangerous puzzle to diplomats, politicians, scholars, and the average citizen. Here were two Islamic countries warring on each other at the height of the so-called Islamic Revolution. Here were two members of OPEC destroying each other's oil facilities, risking huge revenues and future markets. Armies possessing sophisticated conventional weapons were grappling: their tactics tortuous, their objectives obscure. Though the reduction in oil supplies to the market equaled that of 1978-1979, neither panic nor a substantial change in prices was in evidence. Ally of Iraq for the moment, the Soviet Union professed neutrality while facilitating the supply of arms to both sides. The former ally of Iran, the United States, looked after the Straits of Hormuz and strove to contain the war, in the process bidding once again for the release of the hostages in Teheran. The conflict thus appeared to be both profound and contradictory; its outcome uncertain, its meaning for Americans ambiguous.

The war was a consequence of the Iranian Revolution and of the policies of its revolutionaries, which isolated Iran and weakened her army while simultaneously threatening her neighbors. Not all of Iran's Arab neighbors, however, could be expected to suffer such assaults with the perplexed passivity of, say, the United States. This was especially the case with Iraq — not as wealthy as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the Emirates but more populous and, thanks to the Soviet Union, much better armed. Iraqi-Iranian relations were also highly sensitive, compassing territorial and ethnic quarrels. For years, Baghdad and Teheran had argued over the Shatt-el-Arab waterway common to both and essential for waterborne Iraqi oil exports. The struggle was complicated by the endemic Kurdish desire for independence of both Iran and Iraq, a desire kept alive in Iraq by Baghdad's misgovernment and the shah's support. For its part, Baghdad had harbored opponents of the shah, such as the Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1975, the shah and the Iraqis

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reached agreement at last, the Iranian claim to part of the Shatt-el-Arab being recognized. Teheran's assistance to the Kurds was terminated and Iraqi-Iranian tensions eased.

The improvement of Iraqi-Iranian relations had a direct effect on the fortunes of the ayatollah. Long a guest of the Baghdad government in his years of exile, Khomeini had been expelled from Iraq in 1978 at the shah's insistence and was forced to go to France — to his advantage as it turned out. Hence, the ayatollah's call for an overthrow of Saddam Husain — whose Sunni-dominated regime was preaching a secular ideology in a country with a large Shiite population — constituted an act of revenge as well as an act of provocation. That Khomeini's call was taken seriously in Baghdad was not surprising, except to observers unfamiliar with the divisions within Islam, divisions brought to fever pitch by the triumph of the Shiites in Iran. What was surprising was that the Iranians were antagonizing countries such as Iraq at a time when Iranian military forces were so disarrayed. The officer corps had been purged; many units were preoccupied with the Soviet border or engaged in combatting rebellions in the north; the expensive, American-supplied arsenal had been allowed to decay. Nor could Iran expect diplomatic assistance. Relations with Moscow were fragile and those with the United States antagonistic, owing to the hostage crisis.

In Baghdad, the Iranians also found a government eager to cut a more dashing figure in international affairs. Under Saddam Husain, Iraq had sought to lead the Arabs in opposition to the Camp David Accords. This had become ensnarled by the fiasco of the merger with Syria, putting Baghdad and Damascus once again at each other's throats, despite their similar, self-professed ideologies (Baathism). A quick and devastating blow against Iran might revive the Iraqi quest for leadership, especially in the critical Persian Gulf.

The men in Baghdad cherished a few illusions of their own. The big miscalculation concerned the possibility of a swift and decisive campaign. Iraq had enough military equipment on hand from the Soviet Union and sufficient political leeway, despite Syrian opposition and Saudi nervousness about undertaking a "smash and grab" attack. Its war objectives were apparently the recovery of the concessions of 1975 and a heavy blow to the ayatollah's prestige. But Iranian resistance proved greater than expected; the Iraqi oil complexes and even Iraq's French-built nuclear facility were attacked. The Iraqis responded in turn with their own assaults on Iranian installations. Baghdad's call for a

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cease-fire after its initial victories was dismissed out of hand by the ayatollah, who proclaimed Holy War.

His initial military operations modestly successful, but still without the political fruit of Iranian submission, Saddam Husain had to improvise. Iraqi forces were dispatched to "liberate" the Iranian oil region, called Khuzistan by Teheran and Arabistan by Baghdad. The ethnically Arab, Persian-speaking residents of this area may have had their grievances against the ayatollah, but they did not rise in revolt to welcome the liberating legions of Saddam Husain. Anxious to avoid heavy casualties, yet unable to deliver a crushing blow, the Iraqis waged a war of artillery barrage rather than one of maneuver. To do battle, armies must find each other. The Iraqi-Iranian war began to resemble a grappling match between the slow and the disorganized.

While military observers were entertained by the ineptitude of the combatants, the diplomats — especially in the West — were more anxious than amused. The immediate stakes for the United States and its allies concerned the war's impact on oil. Their stocks of crude oil higher than ever, economic activity still reeling in recession, the Western countries and Japan suffered no immediate dislocation from the stoppage of Iraqi oil shipments and the near cessation of an already diminished Iranian oil production. It was feared that the threat of war or an Iranian attack on the tankers might choke off the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf. Despite some initial confusion, President Carter managed to convey American and allied determination to keep the straits open, by force if necessary, and the tanker traffic continued.

Another potentially difficult situation was also headed off: the widening of the war to involve other countries. After a brief pause, the Arab Gulf States and Jordan rallied to the probable winner, Iraq. But it occurred to Riyadh that Saudi support of Iraq might expose the kingdom to Iranian retaliation. Washington sent AWACS planes as a gesture of reinforcement, and the Saudis muted their approbation of Baghdad. Here, too, the dimensions of the conflict were curbed — at least temporarily.

Though confined geographically and not yet painful economically, it was still evident that the longer the war went on, the greater the chances that Western interests would be damaged. Either the war would eventually widen to include more countries or the oil inventories would be drawn down and, with the ensuing scramble for spot market supplies, the 1978-1979 price explosion

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would be repeated. In one sense, however, Western interests had already been damaged badly. Coming so soon after the proclamation of American security interests in the Persian Gulf — the Carter Doctrine — a war clearly of potential threat to those interests had been launched, yet Washington had been powerless either to prevent it or to stop it. Indeed, critics of the doctrine could complain that by declaring in advance of American readiness to sustain the Rapid Deployment Force, the president had added another incentive for the Iraqis — and the Soviets — to rearrange the strategic map before the Americans could organize themselves. At this point, the 1,400 U.S. soldiers airlifted to an expensive exercise in the Egyptian desert, a thousand miles from the battlefield, seemed a sign of weakness rather than of strength.

There were other indications of a critical lack of leverage. Washington could not prevent the king of Jordan from an enthusiastic partnership in the logistics effort to resupply the Iraqi forces through the port of Aqaba. This effort brought together the American-favored moderate in Amman with the Soviet-favored radical in Baghdad and led to a brief military confrontation between Amman and another Soviet favorite, Syria — the enemy of Iraq.

The Soviet arms stockpiled in Aden and Ethiopia now took on an ominous role. Moscow could pretend to neutrality in the war, while stoking the fire at one remove through convenient arms caches in other countries, delivered under the good offices of the American friend in Jordan. Despite U.S. calls for an end to the war and Washington's own proclamation of neutrality, the UN Security Council remained paralyzed and, in Teheran, the United States stood accused as the instigator of the Iraqi attack.

Unable to affect the course of policy of Baghdad and mired still in the hostage crisis, the Carter administration began a hasty exploration of options. One was an alliance with Iraq, in effect choosing Iraq as a replacement for the Iran of the shah as the new "influential" of the Persian Gulf. A second was to use the war as a device to gain the release of the hostages; a precursor, in the best circumstance, to renewed U.S.-Iranian cooperation. Third was an approach to Moscow, invoking the presumed desire of the other superpower to control tensions in the Persian Gulf area.

The first notion, alliance with Baghdad, suggested an apparently insurmountable ignorance of Iraq itself. The Iraqi regime was itself unstable, the product of a dozen conspiracies, and its

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taste for internal bloodletting was infamous even by local standards. Incapable of allying itself for any length of time with any state, Iraq, though dependent on Soviet arms supplies, had been growing restive over Moscow's policies. Lately, despite Soviet protest, Saddam Husain had massacred the Iraqi Communists.

Moreover, there were permanent sources of discord within the Iraqi state. The Sunni-Baath dictatorship ruled by force over a divided population, of which the largest group was Shiite in faith, while one of the important minorities, the Kurds, inhabited the areas where the oil was found. The appeal of the Ayatollah Khomeini for a rising of Iraqi Shiites against the Sunnis of Baghdad found followers. Thus, Saddam Husain's attack on Iran was an act of internal repression as well as international aggression.

The idea of an American tilt toward Iraq on the grounds that it was a probable winner overlooked the short and narrow gait of the horse. It was astonishing that Washington, having just emerged from the disaster of the shah's downfall, would contemplate an alliance with another "narrowly based," unpopular regime whose record on human rights put SAVAK into the category of the distinctly second rate. But the decisive argument against favoring Baghdad was probably concern over the fate of the hostages in Teheran.

The Iranian military plight appeared to offer an opportunity to trade the hostages for some sort of American assistance. More precisely, if Teheran would return the hostages, the United States would deliver arms already "in the pipeline" from the time of the shah, support the territorial integrity of Iran, and release Iranian assets frozen when the hostages were seized. The price of freedom for the Americans would be a tilt toward Teheran of considerable benefit to the Iranian war effort.

Had it not seemed such an obvious reward for hostage taking, and had it not been so clearly associated with the president's electoral calculations — thus suggesting to the Iranians an element of desperation — this approach might have worked. In the final days of the campaign, when even the Islamic Republican Party favored a deal, a familiar pattern surfaced, the product of a familiar American mistake. As in the past, when the United States began to negotiate over the hostages' release, U.S. concessions seemed to stimulate a contest of the appetites in Teheran. The conditions eventually attached to the deal led to a legal and political quagmire: the president could not assign the shah's wealth to Iran nor call quits to American claims against Iran without addi-

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tional authority, which was either remote from his grasp or unlikely to be granted by Congress.

Lacking the means or rationale to approach Iraq and frustrated once again in its approach to Iran, the United States had only one choice left: an approach to the USSR. The idea that the superpowers might act in concert to control a local conflict capable of damaging them both had been sullied ever since its incorporation into the summit agreements of 1972-1973. It was fine to agree that Washington and Moscow wished to avoid nuclear confrontation. Nonetheless, quite a lot of regional violence could occur before this dreaded apparition would force American and Soviet policymakers into an agreeable course of action. The record of Soviet actions in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa also suggested that the Kremlin's incentive for ending the struggle would not appear until the Soviet-sponsored side seemed to be losing.

In the autumn of 1980, President Carter was in no position to take risks for this kind of dubious invocation of détente with the Soviets. Not much of a case existed anyway. Western, not Soviet, interests were primarily at risk through the war. The chief source of Soviet leverage was its supply of arms to Baghdad: for Moscow to risk its already fractious relationship with the Iraqi regime, considerable compensation would be required. The Iranians, not the Americans, might be able to offer such compensation. That, however, would establish the Soviets as the arbiter of conflict in the Gulf, hardly a desirable outcome for the United States. So, an approach to the USSR risked considerable political cost, lacked compelling motives for Soviet cooperation, and would contribute at the very least to the notion that Moscow was the real power in the Persian Gulf.

The Iraqi-Iranian war has thus exposed the prevailing insecurity in the Persian Gulf region since the ouster of the shah. The local states apparently lack the strength or the wisdom to control their conflicts. The Americans lack the influence and the Soviets the sense of responsibility to do so, either alone or together. This vacuum, as it were, is being filled by violence, and one can speculate already on the consequences of that violence for the United States.

First of all, the war will probably accelerate the shift of American policy from its nearly exclusive concern with the Arab-Israeli conflict to a concern with re-establishing a secure Persian Gulf. In this shift, the Palestinian grievances may be seen as only

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one (and perhaps not the most probable) cause of a disruption in oil supplies. The question is whether American relationships with Egypt and Israel can be used to good effect in creating a new security structure for the Gulf, even if the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.

Second, the schism among the Arabs — the PLO responsive to Syria and other supporters of Iran, while Jordan and Saudi Arabia back Iraq — may diminish support for the PLO in the Gulf, contributing to a renewal of the much-discussed "Jordanian Option": that is, to regard Jordan as the negotiating partner for the disposition of the West Bank.

Third, American military force does have a useful role in the Gulf: to shore up the crucial but militarily weak Saudi Arabia, to keep the Straits of Hormuz open. But a more impressive military capability is required if the United States is to sustain the Carter Doctrine and influence the complexion of future events. This capability is unlikely to be sustained by the slow-moving Rapid Deployment Force. Some combination of local facilities, U.S. forces in the region, and U.S.-European cooperation will have to be created. This, is turn, requires considerable political groundwork, necessarily based on a shared analysis of the threat. The war may contribute to the achievement of such a consensus.

Fourth, the war may create an opportunity for a renewed American relationship with Iran. A critical choice confronts the Islamic Republic launched by Khomeini. Lacking organization and realistic authority at home, isolated abroad, the ayatollah's republic is growing more insecure with each passing day. To avert disaster, the Iranians may have to strengthen a professional military authority — a "Napoleon," if one can be found — an act that would have incalculable consequences for the rule of the mullahs, or repair to the superpowers for assistance, or both. The price of dealing with Moscow may be too high; dealing with Washington may have to await passage of considerable time. In either event, the war is unburdening Teheran of the illusion that the Islamic Republic is invulnerable to the consequences of its actions. The evident willingness of the Iranians to put an end to the hostage situation, though still colored by a desire to "punish" Washington, offers a glimmer of hope that Teheran has begun to appreciate anew the traditional policy of alliance with the West.

Finally, the war offers the United States and its allies an opportunity to display a sense of cooperation and discipline heretofore lacking on the issue of energy. A sense of competition aggra-

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vated by panic has marked Western reaction to the 1973-1974 and 1978-1979 oil crises, leading OPEC to the natural conclusion that the traffic will bear an ever higher transfer of wealth from the consumers to the producers. The oil shortfall occasioned by the war has been cushioned thus far by the vast oil inventories accumulated in Europe, the United States, and Japan, largely as a consequence of the 1979 panic. The prudent management of these inventories and the prevention of a frenzied rush for diminished supplies can introduce a much-needed atmosphere of mutual respect — between the United States and its allies, between them and OPEC. Energy "burden sharing" will be the necessary companion to a renewed sense of Western confidence in the control of its destiny, in itself a prerequisite to the establishment of a more secure Persian Gulf.

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1914 REVISITED: A REPLY TO MILES KAHLER*

by Christopher Layne

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages in Teheran, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated that the international situation was ominously reminiscent of July 1914.[1] Almost simultaneously with Schmidt's statement, *The Observer* published an editorial entitled "How Far Is the World from Sarajevo?"[2] Both Schmidt and *The Observer* argue that the world has moved perceptibly closer to a major war because of superpower conflicts in unstable regions of the Third World — especially in the Middle East and Africa — and suggest that these areas of instability may be to the world of the 1980s what the Balkans were to pre-1914 Europe. To this danger, Schmidt, *The Observer,* and others in Europe have added another: that America is not up to the responsibility of dealing with international events in a world gripped by Sarajevo-like tension. This view has found clear expression in the Schmidt-Giscard axis (and the resultant call for a "strong and independent Europe") and in various European initiatives to mediate between the United States and the Soviet Union. Schmidt and Giscard evidently believe that it is the duty of Europe — possessed of a wisdom born of centuries of experience in great-power politics — to tutor an America that seems to lack the maturity to fulfill its role as world power. This desire to avoid "another 1914" has produced a policy of Euro-pretension: Europe is trying to assume the political role of mediator between, and equal of, the superpowers. A politically disunited and militarily weak Western Europe, however, lacks the resources necessary to play this role successfully. Thus, the

* I thank Professor Paul Seabury, University of California, Berkeley, for encouraging me to undertake this project; his patient counsel and valuable criticisms have sustained me throughout each draft of this paper. I also thank Professor F. H. Hinsley, Master of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Professors Kenneth Waltz and Walter McDougall of the University of California, Berkeley, who read drafts and offered suggestions. Special acknowledgment is due Professor Waltz; anyone familiar with his work on international relations theory will note his influence in shaping my own views.

[1] "Nerves," *The Economist,* April 26, 1979, p. 13.

[2] April 27, 1980.

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consequence of Euro-pretension is damage to the Western alliance at a time when the best hope for surmounting the current crisis lies in Western unity.

In America, too, there are those who are concerned that the Soviet-American rivalry may cause another Sarajevo. Some, such as Cyrus Vance and Thomas Hughes, urge that the United States play down the rivalry with the Soviet Union and pay more attention to the changes wrought by the emergence of a supposedly complex, interdependent international system.[3] Others, such as Donald Zagoria and Robert Legvold, point to the importance of devising "rules of the game" to moderate the Soviet-American competition in the Third World.[4] They warn against viewing Third World turbulence as an extension of the Soviet-American rivalry; they warn against involvement in regions where U.S. interests are only marginal. Stanley Hoffmann counsels that America must not overplay the China card: to do so would give the Soviets reason to feel they are being "encircled," or could cause America to become entangled in a Sino-Soviet conflict where American interests are not at stake.[5] Finally, there are those, such as George Kennan, who openly argue that America should abandon the burdens of world power and retreat to the supposed safety of isolation.[6]

These voices from America and Europe fear that present trends in the superpower relationship may lead to a situation where we find, as did Europe in 1914, that we have almost unconsciously "slithered over the brink" into a major war. In a recent article, "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy," Professor Miles Kahler[7] has fashioned these strands of thought into a coherent form. Kahler did not invent the 1914 analogy, but he has given it shape. It is not surprising that in a time of serious international tension, the apparition of 1914 has been conjured in an attempt to inject a sense of balance and perspective into the conduct of international affairs. After all, the Great War occupies a unique place in the historical mythology of the Western world. That war, triggered by an incident minor in proportion to the consequences it produced, seems indicative of the

[3] Hughes, "Carter and the Management of Contradictions," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978; Vance, "Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World," address to the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, May 1, 1979, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, June 1979, pp. 16-19.

[4] Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979; Legvold, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," ibid.

[5] "Muscle and Brains," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1979-1980.

[6] "From Containment to. . . Self-Containment: A Conversation Between George F. Kennan and George Urban," in Martin F. Herz, ed., *Decline of the West?* (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, 1978).

[7] *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1979-1980.

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inherent irrationality of great-power rivalries and of the dangers of shortsighted statesmanship.

It is true that in the past twelve to eighteen months we have seen extreme international tension and a concomitant confusion about the deeper significance of what is happening. In such circumstances, statesmen and analysts of international events employ historical analogies in an attempt to gain the sense of certainty and concreteness usually lacking when they scan the events of the present and when they seek to predict the course of future events. Although analogies can be useful tools, they can also distort one's analysis of the present if they are not used carefully. As Professor Robert Jervis notes, people tend to pay more attention to what has happened than to why it has happened.[8] Consequently, historical "lessons" are often applied to cases that are different in critical respects from the past event. Today's policymakers, political scientists, and historians are so obsessed with discovering and using the "lessons of the past" that these lessons invariably play some part in the decisionmaking process. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that lessons drawn from past events rest both on the sound theoretical foundation necessary for a correct interpretation of historical data and on an accurate perception of the current realities. The 1914 analogy in vogue today is deficient in these respects.

The underlying basis of the 1914 analogy is the view that great-power rivalries are not an inherent feature of international politics; rather, great-power rivalries are seen as the result of a failure to empathize with an adversary's aspirations and a failure to accommodate those aspirations. This point is critical, for much of the current debate on Soviet-American relations is really a debate about the realities of international politics. The chief weakness of the 1914 analogy — a flaw that pervades Kahler's presentation — is a failure to appreciate properly the importance of the structure of the international political system in accounting for rivalry among great powers. In his exposition, Kahler also fails to give due consideration to the very different effects produced in a multipolar international system (such as existed before 1914) compared to those in a bipolar international system (since 1945). These failures in theoretical conceptualization are reflected in Kahler's three basic arguments about the applicability of the 1914 analogy to the current international situation.

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[8] *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 228.

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Kahler argues:

1. Great-power tensions are the result of mutual misperceptions. Thus, such conflicts are largely illusory and can be ended by bridging gaps of misunderstanding. This view is reflected in Kahler's discussion of the Eyre Crowe–Thomas Sanderson "debate" on German intentions which took place in Britain before 1914. Kahler argues that the United States must not make the same mistake with respect to assessing Soviet intentions that Crowe made in assessing German intentions: it is wrong to assume that the adversary is "irreducibly hostile and [cannot] be appeased."[9]

2. Another important cause of great-power conflict occurs when great powers become "entangled" in security arrangements with other great powers. As a result of such arrangements, Kahler argues, a great power may find itself drawn into a conflict in which its own interests are not at stake. Here, Kahler sees a parallel between the Anglo-French Entente before World War I and American policy toward China today: "The China card presents some of the same attractions for the United States that the Entente offered Britain. The dangers are similar — involvement in conflicts on the Asian mainland that may not affect American interests and a threat to the increasingly tenuous relationship with the Soviet Union."[10] Kahler also argues that great powers may be drawn into conflicts of marginal importance to their own interests through the manipulations of small powers or proxies: "the superimposition of renewed Soviet-American competition . . . and the confusion of that rivalry with festering local quarrels may prove the most dangerous similarity with the 1914 case."[11]

3. A third cause of great-power conflict can be the efforts of embattled great-power ruling elites to preserve their domestic political position by diverting internal political conflict onto the international stage through recourse to war. Here, Kahler echoes Fritz Fischer's analysis of the events that drove Germany to war in 1914. Prior to 1914, Kahler argues, "International security mirrored domestic insecurity, and foreign policy provided a means of escape." He fears that a similar pattern of events may occur today: "The remaining domestic impetus toward risky behavior could produce a crisis with great potential for escalation and enormous obstacles to negotiation, rooted in the political requirements of each state."[12] Like Fischer, Kahler adopts the position that great-power conflicts sometimes are rooted in domestic political imperatives and are not always the result of international political factors.

II

In the course of his article, Kahler has occasion to refer to Professor James Joll's phrase "the unspoken assumptions." Before analyzing Kahler's arguments in detail, it will be useful to speculate on the unspoken assumptions that underlie the 1914 analogy. Much of what Kahler has to say, especially with regard to current Soviet-

[9] "Rumors of War," p. 394.
[10] Ibid., p. 381.
[11] Ibid., p. 378.
[12] Ibid., p. 389.

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American relations, is apparently influenced by a theoretical view of international politics that is not openly acknowledged. This is not an esoteric point: our theories about how the world operates shape our view of policy. Theories have very pragmatic uses: "evidence about another state's foreign policy cannot make sense without the use of some framework of beliefs."[13] The 1914 analogy appears to be premised on the classical Liberal view of international politics. This view holds that there is a natural harmony of interests among states: conflict and rivalry are aberrations caused by misperception or lack of good will, or they are the products of the flawed domestic political structures of certain states. Chancellor Schmidt's repeated calls for a "superpower dialogue" to resolve the causes of Soviet-American tension reflect this view. Miles Kahler also accepts this view in his endorsement of Sanderson's pre-1914 views on the desirability of seeking accommodation with one's adversary, and in his acceptance of the views of Fritz Fischer.

Schmidt, Cyrus Vance, and Kahler would have us believe that the Soviet-American rivalry could be obviated if the United States were more willing to compromise with Moscow. Thus Kahler maintains: "Bargaining over influence may be more advantageous than spurring competition. . . . Rather than the pattern of counter-intervention sought by Henry Kissinger in Angola, the United States would do well to specify which types of influence in which countries are objectionable."[14] Similarly, Kahler urges the United States to empathize with the strategic and domestic problems faced by the Soviets. Thus, "Soviet fears of encirclement should be taken seriously. . . . For Soviet leaders obsessed by Bismarck's *cauchemar des coalitions*, the China card is the nightmare that might drive them to extremes."[15] Similarly, he urges that the United States understand the importance of preserving the internal political stability of the Soviet Union: "The survival of your opponent may save your life."[16] Kahler's repeated references to the "renewed" rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union are a clear indication that he sees the confrontation between the two superpowers as something other than a phenomenon that inevitably results from the nature of the international political system. To characterize relations between the

[13] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, p. 161. Also see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 1-17.

[14] "Rumors of War," p. 395. It is curious that Professor Kahler does not argue that the Soviets, too, should show a willingness to compromise and manifest a reciprocal empathy with America's concerns.

[15] Ibid., p. 381.

[16] Ibid., p. 394.

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superpowers as "renewed" rivalry is singularly naive. One can admit that there are times when American diplomacy could be more subtle, or more empathetic with the other side's situation, and still sense that Kahler has missed something very important about the nature of the world and about the implications of that something for American foreign and strategic policy in the 1980s.

III

The 1914 analogy deals with the Anglo-German rivalry before 1914 as the analog of today's rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. This analogy does not stand up under close analysis. Despite the assertions of Kahler and others to the contrary, we live in a bipolar world. A bipolar international system imposes constraints on superpowers different from those imposed on great powers in a multipolar system. Some of these will be explored below. It is obvious that in a multipolar world comprising five to nine great powers, the Anglo-German rivalry, though important, was not the only important great-power rivalry. By contrast, in a bipolar world, the Soviet-American rivalry is by definition central. With these differences in mind, my analysis will follow Kahler in focusing primarily on the dynamics of pre-1914 Anglo-German relations as a device for assessing relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.[17]

Kahler argues that Britain became "entangled" in World War I because of the entente with France. The implication of this argument is that Britain became involved in a war in which her own interests were not directly at stake because of the commitment to France (and, by extension, to Russia) and, also, that Britain's "tilt" toward France caused the tensions between Britain and Germany. This interpretation is very misleading.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain's preeminent position in the international system was seriously challenged. Her worldwide political and economic interests were threatened by traditional rivals such as France and Russia, by an increasingly powerful Germany, and by the rise of the two new great powers outside Europe, the United States and Japan. Britain faced strategic threats to her far-flung imperial interests: Russia menaced

[17] The focus of this article is pre-1914 British policy because Professor Kahler has equated the position of the United States today with that of Great Britain prior to the outbreak of World War I. On British grand strategy from 1900 to 1939, in the context of international political theory, see my essay "British Grand Strategy, 1900-1939: Theory and Practice in International Politics," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1979.

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her in the Far East, Persia, and India; French colonial claims in Africa clashed with British interests. In confronting these challenges, Britain was forced to face two unpleasant facts. First, as the only European great power not belonging to an alliance system, she was isolated strategically; secondly, Britain's strategic commitments were far too extensive for the resources available to meet those commitments. Sir Herbert Butterfield has pointed out that key to understanding the foreign policy of a nation are the fears that statesmen have for their nation's security.[18] During the pre-1914 period, British statesmen were driven by two particular fears. One was that an isolated Britain would find herself at the mercy of a hostile coalition of European powers. This feeling was expressed plaintively by Spencer Wilkinson: "We have no friends and no nation loves us."[19] The other was that Britain would be unable to defend the empire in the face of her rivals' increasing power. By the end of the Boer War, as Michael Howard has noted, Britain was "isolated, not particularly splendidly, in a world of highly armed states, with a navy whose supremacy still depended on the divisions among her adversaries and an army incapable of taking the field against any single one of them."[20]

The British strategic predicament at the turn of the century dictated the policy of entente with France, and with Russia. The realignment of British policy from isolation to entente was triggered by a concern with tensions along Britain's imperial periphery. Overextended strategically, Britain saw only one answer: she would have to compromise some interests in order to reduce the number of potential enemies and, perhaps, embrace some of her rivals as allies. Such a policy would have the beneficial simultaneous effects of reducing British strategic commitments and, through the acquisition of allies, of indirectly increasing British strength. Originally, the entente with France was not directed against Germany. Lord Lansdowne, the foreign secretary, viewed the entente only as a settlement of the outstanding colonial disputes separating Britain and France and as a means of ending Britain's diplomatic isolation. Yet, some eighteen months after the signing of the Anglo-French Entente, Lansdowne and the Unionist Party were no longer in power. It remained for the new Liberal foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to define what was implicit in Lansdowne's policy: a shift in British policy from an imperial to a European orientation. While Lansdowne may have "never

[18] "Sir Edward Grey in 1914," *Historical Studies*, vol. 5, 1965, p. 2.
[19] Quoted in Zara Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 23.
[20] *The Continental Commitment* (London: Temple Smith, 1972), pp. 12-13.

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fully understood the consequences of his own diplomacy," Grey, and his Foreign Office advisers, did.[21]

Under Grey's direction, British policy was founded on several premises. First, there was a growing appreciation of the German threat. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, the British had become uneasy over Germany's increasing power. By 1902, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selbourne, warned: "the German navy is very carefully built up from the point of view of a new war against us."[22] In the first decade of this century, Britain had good reason to be concerned about the Germans: she was being challenged by a potentially more powerful adversary whose military, industrial, economic, and technological strength would continue to increase while Britain became progressively weaker. Germany's potential for European hegemony, and the suspicion of Germany engendered by its attempts to break the Entente during the Moroccan Crisis (1905-1906), reinforced the anti-German bias with which Grey came to office.[23]

Grey believed that the entente with France was crucial because it kept Britain from diplomatic isolation, and because it provided the bridge to a basic goal of his diplomacy: rapprochement between Britain and Russia. On the former point, Grey noted, just before becoming foreign secretary, that Britain could not improve relations with Germany if that meant the impairment of good relations with France. The fear of British isolation and German hegemony were paramount in Grey's thinking: "we are running the risk of losing France and not gaining Germany, who won't want us if she can detach France from us."[24] Long before coming to office, Grey had recognized the importance of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement: "I think a bold and skillful Foreign Secretary might detach Russia from the number of our active enemies without sacrificing any very material British interests."[25] Grey viewed the British entente with France as the key to a reconciliation with Russia, France's partner in the Dual Alliance: "an agreement with Russia was the natural complement of the agreement with France."[26]

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[21] Steiner, *Britain and the First World War*, p. 23.

[22] Quoted in George Monger, *The End of Isolation* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1963), p. 82.

[23] H. C. G. Matthew, *The Liberal Imperialists* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 210.

[24] Sir Edward Grey to J. A. Spender, October 14, 1905, quoted *ibid.* pp. 209-210.

[25] Sir Edward Grey to Buxton, December 31, 1895, quoted in Matthew, *Liberal Imperialists*, pp. 204-205.

[26] Quoted in Beryl Williams, "Great Britain and Russia, 1905 to the 1907 Convention," in F. H. Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 133.

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The Anglo-Russian entente was important because Russia posed the most serious threat to Britain's imperial interests. When the Liberals took office at the end of 1905, it was clear that Britain lacked adequate resources to defend her imperial interests from the Russian menace. This was a critical consideration because Grey and his fellow Liberal imperialists occupied an ambivalent position in the Liberal government. They were committed to the pursuit of a great-power policy that necessitated the expenditure of large sums of money on military forces; yet, they were a minority in a cabinet, and a party, that was committed to the expenditure of large sums of money on radical social reforms at home. To strike a balance between these competing political imperatives, it was necessary to reduce tensions with Russia in order to limit overall military expenditures and to free those resources available for such purposes in order to meet the German danger. This tied into two other strands of Grey's Russian policy. First, rapprochement with Russia indirectly improved Britain's position in relation to Germany by presenting the possibility of an Anglo-French-Russian combination in opposition to German expansion in Europe. As Grey noted, "An entente between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could be done."[27] Secondly, just as Britain worried about a possible French defection into the German orbit, she entertained similar worries about a Russo-German rapprochement. Fear of the desertion of her potential allies — with Britain's consequent isolation — spurred London to go far to accommodate Russia (and France) in order to preserve the ententes.

The Anglo-Russian Entente linked resolution of the tensions between the two powers in Asia to the problem of containing Germany in Europe; it was the logical culmination of the shift of Britain's strategic focus from the imperial peripheries to Europe, a shift initiated by Lansdowne in 1904. The price for both ententes was to commit Britain to uphold the European interests of France and Russia. Yet this was not a situation of "entanglement" as Professor Kahler argues. These commitments were the price Britain had to pay in order to gain allies and to ensure her own security. The ententes did not end Britain's conflicts with Russia and France; however, they subordinated those tensions to the common need to contain Germany. If one admits that the German threat to Britain before 1914 was real, it becomes difficult to dissent from the broad thrust of British policy during the pre-World War I period. There *was* a possi-

[27] Quoted in Williams, "Great Britain and Russia," p. 134.

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bility that the ententes would involve Britain in a European war "in whose cause Britain had no interest, and over which public opinion and the majority of the cabinet were unprepared to fight."[28] The situation in the Balkans raised such a possibility. Yet, if such a war were to result in a German victory over France, British interests would indeed be jeopardized. As Sir Edward Grey told the King, "it might be necessary for England . . . to fight for the defence of her position in Europe and the protection of her own future and security."[29]

In August 1914, Britain went to war not because of an "entangling" entente with or a "moral obligation" to France, nor in defense of Belgium's neutrality, but because her own vital security interests were at stake.[30] A German victory over France would have radically altered the distribution of power in Europe. Germany would have gained political and economic hegemony over Europe, and this would have had serious implications for Britain's survival as a great power. A German victory in the West would have left Germany in occupation of the Low Countries and the French Channel ports; this alone would have posed an immediate strategic threat to Britain's security. Britain would have entered the war to prevent these outcomes even if there had been no entente with France, no Anglo-French staff conversations, and even if the Germans had not invaded Belgium. Given Germany's near victory in 1914-1918, despite the combined exertions of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States,

[28] K. A. Hamilton, "Great Britain and France, 1911-1914," in Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 336-337.

[29] Quoted in Hamilton, "Great Britain and France," p. 337.

[30] The moral obligation was supposedly the result of the Anglo-French naval conversations. As a result of these talks, the French withdrew the bulk of their fleet into the Mediterranean, relying on the Royal Navy to defend the North Sea, the Channel, and the Atlantic. In return, the Royal Navy withdrew its capital ships (with the exception of three battle cruisers) from the Mediterranean, expecting that the French Navy, with the aid of the remaining British naval forces, would be able to maintain control of the Mediterranean. See P. Halpern, *The Mediterranean Naval Situation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Samuel Williamson, *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

Even before they decided that Britain would go to war if Germany invaded Belgium, the British cabinet had decided to warn Germany that the appearance of the German fleet in the Channel would be regarded as a casus belli. (See Ekstein and Steiner, "The Sarajevo Crisis," in Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy*.) As Steiner notes: "It was only after most of the waverers had reluctantly concluded that Britain had to intervene that men began to look for a pretext to explain their volte-face. The issue of Belgium was all important because the radical conscience needed a *raison d'etre*. Their followers could not be told that Britain had entered the war to uphold the balance of power. A German attack on France involved British interests. The Cabinet had resisted this conclusion for many years; ministers now cloaked their final choice in moral terms. The treaty obligation to Belgium provided the necessary justification." (*Britain and the First World War*, p. 237. Also see Trevor Wilson, "Britain's 'Moral Commitment' to France in August 1914," 64 *History* 380.)

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it is difficult to argue that the British overestimated the potential of the German threat. Britain's policy prior to 1914 tells us something about Britain's weakness during that period and about the operation of a multipolar international political system. Britain's policy was dictated by her weakness and strategic overextension. In such a situation, a state can improve its security in two ways. It can seek to add to its strength by internal measures (i.e., increased defense spending) and by external measures (i.e., by acquiring allies). In the decade prior to 1914, Britain had to attract allies, and that meant strategic and political concessions to France and Russia. In a multipolar world, great powers are approximately equal in strength; thus, in a closely contested competition, the addition or defection of a great power as an ally can make a big difference in the distribution of power. Britain's freedom of diplomatic maneuver, then, was sharply curtailed; for if Britain had tried to make it up with Germany, this might have pushed Russia or France (or both) into the German camp, leaving Britain isolated. Britain's pre-1914 policy was forced on her because of her increasing weakness relative to the other great powers. The corollary of weakness is an increasing loss of freedom of action. British policymakers were all too well aware of their diminishing freedom of maneuver; they were hardly sanguine about the circumstances that forced Britain's commitments on her, nor were they sanguine about the implications of those commitments.

Kahler argues that the American "tilt" toward China under the Carter administration is similar to Britain's "break from isolation" via the entente with France. One wonders how this can be true. In 1904, Britain was isolated in the sense that she did not belong to either of the European alliance systems. Yet, in 1972, when President Nixon first visited Beijing, and in 1979, when America extended formal diplomatic recognition to China, the United States was hardly isolated. America belongs to several multilateral alliances (including NATO and ANZUS) and has bilateral security arrangements with some two score nations, as well. Britain's move toward France and Russia led inevitably to estranged relations between Britain and Germany. When Nixon and Kissinger first played the China card there was no consequent estrangement between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, because Nixon and Kissinger made it clear to both Moscow and Beijing that the United States would follow an even-handed approach in its relations with them, the reverse was true: the Sino-American rapprochement made the Soviets much more accommodating toward the United States. It is not the Sino-American rela-

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tionship itself that has contributed to the recent chill in Soviet-American relations; rather, the way in which the United States has conducted that relationship has heightened Soviet-American tensions. Kahler, with Stanley Hoffmann, maintains that current U.S. policy toward China is likely to enhance Soviet fears of encirclement and, also, that America may find herself obligated to intervene in China's behalf in a future Sino-Soviet conflict.

Britain was forced to seek the ententes because of her increasing weakness in relation to Germany. There is no parallel here with the current Soviet-American relationship. If America is weak in relation to the Soviet Union, it is a weakness of a most peculiar sort. The United States has been surpassed by a nation whose GNP is barely more than half its own. America and the West are being challenged by a nation whose industrial sector is in disarray and whose agricultural sector is a disaster area. Compared with other states, the Soviet Union would, in any case, be a superpower; however, in comparison with the United States, only American unwillingness to compete seriously with the Soviet Union has enabled the Soviets to equal, then surpass, overall U.S. military strength. Thus, it is clear that while China may be able to play a useful role in the Soviet-American balance by compelling the Soviets to divert resources and forces that might otherwise be deployed against the West, the potential future role of China is no greater than that—useful. America does not need China for security in the same way that Britain needed France and Russia for security prior to 1914.

America can meet the Soviet challenge from her own internal resources and obviate the risks of "entanglement" that are involved in an entente-like relationship with China, if the American leadership and the American electorate are convinced of the necessity of making such an effort. It is also doubtful that the United States can purchase significant additional security by entering into an entente with China. China is not a superpower; her military strength does not begin to approach that of the United States or the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, Kahler may well be right in cautioning that America's relationship with China should not be permitted to entangle Washington in Sino-Soviet disputes that are of only marginal interest to the United States. Kahler, however, misses the most important point: a nation that either cannot (Britain prior to 1914) or will not (America from 1965 to the present) provide adequately for its security through internal efforts has little choice but to accept the risks of alliance in order to gain the strategic benefits, however slight, offered by an alliance.

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The constellation of power in the international system ensures that America and China, no less than Britain, France, and Russia, will be viewed by their common adversary as being linked in a strategic combination against that adversary — regardless of whether such a combination is formalized, or even actively pursued. In this respect, the world today is like that of 1914: Germany was then, and the Soviet Union is now, invariably regarded with distrust and suspicion because of their power, potential, and geographic position. The powerful military machines of Wilhelmine Germany and Soviet Russia might legitimately be regarded by their possessors as defensive in nature; yet, the mere fact of their existence poses a threat to other states. This, of course, is the classic security dilemma, which is a consequence of the anarchic, "self-help" nature of the international political system. Robert Jervis has concisely summed up this dilemma: "Gaining security often inadvertently threatens others."[31] It is not the possession of armaments that is the cause of the problem; rather, great-powers have fundamentally conflicting interests, and in a world where there is no hierarchic authority to guarantee the security of all, it is irrational for any state not to provide itself with the means for ensuring its own security and for protecting its interests. In 1914, Germany may have felt threatened with encirclement (and justifiably so, in a strategic sense), just as today the Soviet Union may feel threatened with encirclement by America and China (with equal justification, but arguably with less cause for concern). This, however, only raises the issue; it does not dispose of it. If Britain had been neutral during the pre-1914 period, Germany would hardly have felt any less threatened, nor would she have had any less reason to view Britain as a potential threat to her security. For France and Russia, as well as Britain, each had their own reasons to confront Germany; France and Russia needed no prompting from Britain to regard Germany as a threat. Similarly, America and China have their separate reasons for confronting the Soviet Union. Even if the United States and China had no formal relations at all, this geostrategic situation would rouse in the Soviets a fear of "encirclement."

America and China do have one common interest that could prompt the United States to intervene in a Sino-Soviet dispute: namely, the prevention of a Soviet attack aimed at destroying China's military potential. Apparently, the possibility of such Soviet action

[31] *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma* (Los Angeles, University of California, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, Working Paper No. 4, April 1977), p. 1. (Published under the same title in *World Politics*, January 1978.)

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arose early during the Nixon administration.[32] Even though America and China had only occasional and informal relations at that point, the U.S. government acted swiftly to warn the Soviets that the United States would not remain indifferent to such an attack. The United States needs no other security tie to China. China exists, and the Soviets are extremely afraid of her; consequently, they deploy substantial conventional forces specifically against China. That really is the extent of China's usefulness to the United States for the foreseeable future. The China threat will exist for the Soviets whatever the American relationship to China may be. Thus, the United States can reap the benefits of this situation (chief among them being that during the period of American weakness that must exist during much of the 1980s, even if America rearms rapidly, any diversion of Soviet resources will help) without being unnecessarily provocative toward the Soviets.

The Sino-American connection contains the seeds both of opportunity and danger. Because of the China threat, the Soviets deploy some 25 per cent of their ground forces and 20 per cent of their tactical-air forces on the Sino-Soviet border, and these are supported by theater-nuclear forces comprising SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers. If these forces were not deployed against China, they would likely be deployed against the West. Nevertheless, as Edward Luttwak notes, it is strategically unsound for the United States and NATO to depend on the Sino-Soviet military balance as a way of preserving a semblance of balance between Soviet and Western forces. To link one's security to a nation as weak as China does not constitute strategic wisdom; it has the appearance of being, as Luttwak says, "a tactical 'quick-fix.' " Western strategic reliance on China brings only small military benefits and entails significant political risks. One of those risks is that the Soviets will react to any significant Western attempt to upgrade China's military capabilities. The Soviets could move against China directly or, in Korea or Southeast Asia, indirectly. Possible involvement in Sino-Soviet hostilities, then, is a major risk inherent in security ties between the West and China.

There are other reasons to question the wisdom of such security ties. A major one is the internal political stability of China. Pragmatists are in power today, but how long will they be able to retain power? Will China continue to pursue policies of modernization, with substantial Western assistance, or will she fall back into

[32] See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 183-191.

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revolutionary chaos? Also, one cannot ignore the nagging question, Might not future generations have cause for regret if the West should give China a boost toward true superpower status? Against these considerations, one must weigh the consequences of a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement. This is a possibility so long as the pragmatists remain in power. Ideological factors played a major role in the Sino-Soviet split. With China's passage through the stage of "revolutionary infantilism," the ideological impediment to rapprochement has been removed. The possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement raises a possible analogy with the events of 1917. It can be argued that, like Germany in World War I, the Soviet Union today is striving for hegemony over the Eurasian heartland. If this is so, the "eastern front" in today's struggle is China. If Moscow believes that its policies are resulting in a Chinese and Western encirclement of the Soviet Union, then it is logical to expect the Soviets to attempt to break out of that encirclement. Thus, the Soviet Union might seek to exploit Chinese ambivalence about the West in an endeavor to force Beijing into a separate settlement — a modern-day Brest-Litovsk.

For the United States and the West, the ultimate question is, How much would be lost by "losing China" again? One can also frame the issue in terms of what the West might gain, and with what risks, by entering into an anti-Soviet entente with China. It is important to realize that the problem here is not the Soviet fear of encirclement. The Soviet Union is not likely to shed her fear of encirclement regardless of the objective status of relations between China and the West. For the United States, the issue is one of weighing the costs and benefits of an entente with China. The only reason that the United States and the West need such a relationship with China is because of their present weakness in relation to the Soviet Union. Obviously, the optimum solution for the United States would be to restore the military balance with the Soviet Union and thus obviate the need to rely on ties with China. Today, however, America is weak, and until that weakness is remedied, we have little choice but to accept the risks involved in an entente with China. States always run these risks when they make alliances, rather than internal efforts, in order to improve their strategic situation. As we become stronger, we will need China less. At that point we can afford to "lose China." Yet, paradoxically, as the United States needs China less, she may well need us more. This is especially true if one assigns the fundamental causes of the Sino-Soviet split to a clash of geostrategic inter-

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ests, rather than to ideological factors. Under these conditions, through skillful diplomacy, the United States ought to be able to manage the Sino-Soviet split to good advantage, and at minimum risk.[33]

IV

Another aspect of Kahler's 1914 analogy is the contention that great powers tend to become "entangled" in wars because those powers are often manipulated into such entanglements by small states, or through proxies. This position, however, is open to question. The United States and the Soviet Union are no more likely to be victims of such manipulations today than were the great powers prior to 1914.

One constant feature of international politics is the uneven distribution of power and capabilities among states. Throughout history, great powers have behaved imperially and have engaged in the task of "managing" the international political system because they have had both the power and the interest to do so.[34] It is clear, both logically and historically, that weak states exercise rather little influence over strong states. One prerogative of great power is the possession of considerable choice about where to become involved, when to become involved, and how deeply to become involved. One penalty of weakness is that one is not likely to enjoy a similar degree of choice. A state that enjoys a relatively high degree of power can exert a high degree of influence and control over other states; a state that is relatively weak is likely to be the object of that control and influence.

In the pre-1914 era, great-power rivalries took place on two levels: the European level (Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkans, the German drive for Mitteleuropa) and the colonial-imperial level (Fashoda, Persia, India, China, Afghanistan). In neither case were the great powers' conflicts "superimposed" on local or regional disputes. In Europe, for example, the conflict in the Balkans directly involved vital interests of several of the great powers, and the combination of the alliance system and prevailing strategic doctrine and military technology ensured that those powers not directly involved also had vital interests at stake. At the colonial-imperial level, however, the existence of peripheral areas of marginal importance pro-

[33] See Edward N. Luttwak, "Against the China Card," *Commentary*, October 1978, p. 37, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "China, Soviet Strategy, and American Policy," *International Security*, Fall 1980, p. 24.

[34] See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 194-210.

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vided an arena where the great powers could play out their rivalries without running the risks involved in Europe-centered competition. The colonial peripheries diverted attention away from the intractable problems of Europe and toward Asia and Africa, where there was considerable margin for compromise and maneuver. The existence of these peripheries was also an important reason why Britain was able successfully to reorient her strategic and diplomatic policies before 1914. This situation, then, was a healthy one, especially since the link between the European and colonial arenas was quite tenuous, at least until the Moroccan crises of 1905-1906 and 1911. Even then, despite the tensions engendered by German attempts to break the Anglo-French Entente through diplomatic pressure, Berlin had not the slightest intention of starting a European war over Morocco. In colonial disputes prior to Morocco, including Fashoda, European statesmen assumed that war over colonial issues would remain limited and would not develop into a general European war.

Today, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union enjoys the luxury of being able to divest itself of imperial responsibilities as Britain did prior to 1914. In the bipolar world, in contrast to the pre-1914 era of multipolarity, there are no peripheries insofar as the superpowers are concerned. The United States and the Soviet Union alike must be concerned with any change (or potential change) in the distribution of power, anywhere in the world. This is because such changes may affect the tangible security interests of the superpowers and, also, because so much of contemporary strategy is dependent on each superpower's perception of the other's intent and resolve. Under these conditions, it is doubtful that either superpower would find it feasible to pursue a long-term strategy of divesting itself of regional security responsibilities. Ultimately, the defense of one's interests must depend upon one's own willingness and ability to intervene in that defense.

It is doubtful that either superpower can depend on regional powers of limited strength to protect its vital interests against serious challenge. Thus, one must question the efficacy of the Nixon Doctrine if one believes that doctrine represents a long-term strategy (as opposed to a short-term expedient designed to see America through the period of physical and psychological weakness caused by the Vietnam war). *If the United States is committed to a policy of devolution as a long-term strategy, this implies a sub silentio decision by America to yield her imperial responsibilities (or, if one prefers, her role in managing the international system).* Such a step —

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in effect, an abdication of great-power foreign policy and an adoption of a policy of continental or hemispheric defense — might be viable, but the costs of such a policy would be very high, indeed. For this reason, such a policy should not be adopted by default or inertia; the magnitude of the stakes involved dictates that such a step be fully considered.

Today, we confront a Soviet-American rivalry that is more dangerous than pre-1914 great-power struggles because it is more pervasive; yet, at the same time, the present rivalry is more easily manageable than the pre-1914 rivalries because the critical decisions are made exclusively by the two superpowers. The lack of peripheries in a bipolar world, coupled with the anarchic, self-help nature of international politics, makes it inevitable that competition between the superpowers will be continuous. Superpower disputes today assume the same level of importance as the great-power disputes in the European arena before World War I. The potential for serious conflict is heightened because superpower competition is not subject to the mediatory influences of multipolarity and Concert diplomacy, nor can it be diverted to geographic regions of lesser importance. Kahler takes Brzezinski to task for his endorsement of the utility of the superpowers engaging in modern-day "Fashodas" as a means of testing their respective power and resolve without risking a major war. Believing that "Fashodas" are "irrational and pointless," Kahler rejects this view. Yet, in the pre-1914 world, the fact that "Fashodas" could occur was an important safety valve, diverting great-power conflicts into a less dangerous arena than Europe. Brzezinski's error does not lie in his praise for the utility of "Fashodas"; superpower tensions *would* be less dangerous if we could have modern-day "Fashodas." Rather, he fails to realize that the conditions of a bipolar world make it impossible to have Fashoda-like crises. For indirect superpower confrontations — conducted through clients and proxies — do not release tensions from the central superpower conflict, and direct superpower confrontations carry a high risk of escalating into major war.

Small powers may be able to take advantage of extant great-power rivalries and exploit them to their own advantage, but there is no reason to believe that small powers can entangle great powers in conflicts when the great powers do not believe their own interests are involved. To use several of Kahler's examples, one may ask why it was that Britain found herself in constant conflict with Russia during the last half of the nineteenth century. It is reasonable

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to assume that it was Britain's national interests — to keep the Russians out of Constantinople and away from the mountain passes into India — that accounted for this Anglo-Russian competition. Britain and Russia were not cleverly maneuvered into conflicts by the Ottoman sultan nor by the emir of Afghanistan (though certainly these worthies tried to exploit Anglo-Russian tensions to their own advantage). Similarly, it is indeed difficult to accept the notion that a calculating Serbia dragged Russia, and Europe, helplessly into a war in which Russian and other great-power interests were not at stake. Serbia was the cutting edge of Russian policy in the Balkans, not the reverse. Equally, today the superpowers have not "superimposed" their conflict upon regional disputes. Superpowers are involved in regional conflicts because they believe their own interests to be engaged. Generally, in a test of wills between a superpower and a "local," it is the superpower that manipulates the local party, not the other way around.

Kahler also misapprehends the role of proxies in superpower conflicts. Proxies are not "reappearing" as an instrument of superpower conflict; they have been an integral part of that conflict since 1945 and have been especially important as an instrument of Soviet strategy. This is largely because for most of the post-1945 period the Soviet Union was in a position of strategic inferiority vis-à-vis the United States, and there was the belief, which must have weighed heavily on the Soviets during the period of their strategic weakness, that a direct U.S.-Soviet clash would inevitably result in strategic-nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland. The change in the military balance, however, coupled with improvements in weapons technology and possible changes in attitudes toward the use of force, might render proxies less important. It is probable that the Soviets were forced to rely on proxies during much of the post–World War II period because they lacked the ability to project conventional military force on a global scale. Now that this is changing, they (like the United States, which has traditionally had such a capability) are likely to rely much less on the use of proxies.

V

In setting forth the 1914 analogy, Kahler argues that domestic political instability is a second major cause of war between great powers. He thus adopts a view that had been popularized by Fritz Fischer.[35] Kahler endorses Fischer's interpretation of the events

[35] *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967), *The War of*

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that led Germany into the First World War; he also maintains that there is a parallel between those circumstances and certain events today.

Wars, Fischer argues, frequently are caused by political instability within states and by flawed domestic political structures. This view is open to serious question. War in the international system, as distinct from civil war, is an adversary relationship *between two or more states*. One cannot explain the outbreak of war in the international system by focusing on one state in isolation. The argument of the Fischer school that the old order in Germany was particularly responsible for the outbreak of World War I is not convincing. The "old order" was in power in other states besides Germany, including Great Britain. Yet, attempts to apply the Fischer hypothesis to the pre-1914 policies of Britain have been conspicuously unsuccessful.[36] It is worth remembering that in July 1914, two members of the old order, Bethmann-Hollweg and Sir Edward Grey, clearly perceived that prolonged conflict or military defeat would undermine the social, political, and economic structures of their respective nations.[37] These men would not have led their nations into war had they not been convinced that international political conditions had placed the state's security interests in jeopardy.

No doubt the debate on Fischer's hypothesis will go on. It seems clear, though, that the Fischer school loses the argument with respect to the causes of World War I. The best explanation of German policy before 1914 is that it was essentially determined by Germany's objective strategic and diplomatic position.[38] Even Fischer seems to recognize this when he points to the factors that shaped German policy: "the anxiety about being outstripped by the grow-

Illusions (New York: Norton, 1975), and "World Policy, World Power and German War Aims," in H. W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1972). Two works by disciples of Fischer are V. R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (London: Macmillan, 1973) and Imanuel Geiss, "Origins of the First World War," in Koch, ed., *Origins*.

[36] Donald Lammers, "Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War: 1914," *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 12, 1973; Michael Gordon, "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and German Cases," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 46, 1974.

[37] Grey's comment about the "lights going out in Europe" is well known. For a fuller treatment, see Steiner, *Britain and the First World War*, pp. 128-170 (chap. 7, "The Domestic Contest"). On Bethmann-Hollweg, see Egmont Zechlin, "Cabinet Versus Economic Warfare in Germany: Policy and Strategy During the Early Months of the First World War," in Koch, ed., *Origins*, and Konrad Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," 2 *Central European History* 48.

[38] As Zechlin has noted, "It was quite unrealistic to expect that any power shift in favour of Germany and satisfying her need for security as a Great Power would have been, no matter what its nature, compatible with the British concept of the balance of power." ("Cabinet Versus Economic Warfare," p. 171.)

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ing military strength of Russia and France . . . the emergence of the concept of *Mitteleuropa* as a counterpoise to America and Russia."[39] Germany did not decide to go to war because her leaders were seeking to preserve their dominant position in domestic politics. The German decision for war, and the strategy that Germany employed at the outset of the war, was shaped by the reality of the international political situation that Germany confronted. This is not to deny, of course, that internal political considerations are important in explaining the specific policies a state adopts in response to its position in the international system. A *system-level* analysis enables one to understand the "givens" that constrain state behavior in the international system. *Unit-level* analysis allows one to examine how statesmen react to those "givens" at any particular time. States find themselves in conflict because of the nature of the international political system, and analysis of a state's domestic political process allows one to understand how that state's decisionmakers cope with the conflicts engendered by the international system. The Fischer approach cannot explain the existence of the pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry or the present-day Soviet-American rivalry; the Fischer approach is useful for explaining how British and German, or Soviet and American, statesmen have dealt with the conflicts involving their respective nations.

The remainder of this section will focus on Kahler's application of the Fischer thesis to the relationship between American domestic politics and American foreign policy. Kahler also discusses the Fischer thesis in the context of the domestic politics/foreign policy nexus in the Soviet Union. The Soviet aspect of the problem is well-known. It has been argued that demographic and ethnographic changes in the Soviet population, coupled with declining industrial and agricultural productivity and increasing political unrest in the satellite nations, will destabilize the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, the Soviets might resort to war with the West in an attempt to break such a domestic political impasse.[40]

Serious domestic instability could well affect a state's foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, domestic political instability is not "the cause" of tension and rivalry between great powers. Such tension and rivalry are a consequence of the structure of the international political system. A balanced American policy toward the Soviet Union will take both these factors into account and will rec-

[39] "German War Aims," in Koch, ed., *Origins*, p. 137.

[40] Indeed, it is this scenario that triggers war in Sir John Hackett's *The Third World War* (New York: Macmillan, 1978).

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ognize that the fundamental source of conflict between the superpowers is the international system. A prudent policy, however, will also recognize that unwise American policies toward a domestically unstable Soviet Union can exacerbate normal tensions and, conceivably, can produce a situation that would cause the Soviets to go over the brink. Consequently, U.S. policy must reassure the Soviets that America does not seek to destroy, or even to modify, the Soviet system. It is not in our strategic interest, no matter how satisfying it might be emotionally, to challenge the political legitimacy of the Soviet regime. We should also find ways to reaffirm to the Soviets that we recognize their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Finally, our economic ties with the Soviet Union should be structured to bring the United States maximum political advantages rather than maximum profits. It is in our national interest to ensure that the Soviet economy does not totally collapse. It should be our objective to see that the Soviet Union keeps its economic head above water — barely — for the Soviets must not be so hurt economically that they might be tempted to engage in reckless acts. At the same time, we certainly do not want to lighten their economic load in a way that allows them to allocate scarce resourecs from civilian to military uses.

In applying the Fischer analysis to the United States today, Kahler makes two contradictory points. On the one hand, he argues that Washington could find its foreign policy paralyzed, as it was during Watergate: "U.S. foreign policy during our most recent domestic crisis — Watergate — resembled the British model of 1914. . . . Policy stumbled, attention turned inward."[41] On the other hand, Kahler is worried that a future American government, like Germany in 1914, might be impelled to go to war in an effort to resolve a serious domestic political deadlock: "The means to break a debilitating political stalemate at home through military action would be available to a future American president — always, of course, at the risk of Soviet response."[42] One is inclined to agree with Kahler's conclusion about the danger of U.S. foreign policy becoming paralyzed — albeit for reasons quite different from his — while rejecting his argument that "the pressure upon a future president to 'do something' — the Mayaguez syndrome — is likely to increase for fear of political losses."[43]

Kahler's analogy between the possible future paralysis of

[41] "Rumors of War," p. 388.
[42] Ibid., p. 389.
[43] Ibid.

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American foreign policy and the so-called paralysis of British foreign policy before 1914 is not precise. British foreign policy was not "paralyzed" during the July crisis, or at any time during the 1900-1914 period. Under the British system of government, the foreign secretary was largely immune to either cabinet or parliamentary restraint so long as he was supported by the prime minister. While Grey was not "paralyzed" in his conduct of foreign policy, however, domestic political constraints did impair the effectiveness of British policy in several important respects. The Radical Liberals in the cabinet, the "doves" of their age, were powerful enough to prevent a frank discussion of Britain's international situation. The Radical Liberals were able to threaten credibly to bring down the government (and they would have carried out that threat) rather than accept a realistic foreign policy. Their power within the cabinet, and their support on the Liberal backbenches in Parliament, ensured that no open discussion of British policy would take place. From time to time, the Radical Liberals in Parliament sought, without success, to curtail drastically Grey's latitude to conduct British foreign policy. As Professor K. G. Robbins[44] has pointed out, however, many of Grey's critics were protesting not so much against the foreign secretary's broad powers as they "were in fact protesting against the changes in the international system which reduced Britain's freedom of manoeuvre" and necessitated the ententes with France and Russia. There could be no open discussion about the diplomatic objectives of Grey's policy, or about the military means required to support British diplomacy; consequently, the effectiveness of British foreign policy and its credibility as a deterrent were seriously impaired.

Watergate, and its aftermath, has had a similar effect on U.S. foreign policy. Fear of executive power has both hindered the conduct of American foreign policy and prevented a realistic appraisal of America's strategic options. To a degree, Watergate merely speeded up the process that saw dovish elements, within Congress and elsewhere, gain the dominant voice in the shaping of American foreign policy. *The attack on the foreign policy powers of the executive branch — which began with Vietnam and culminated with Watergate — is reminiscent of the attacks that the Radical Liberals made on Sir Edward Grey's powers before World War I. The dovish elements in America are objecting at least as much to America's post-1945 international position, which necessitated that the United*

[44] "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties," in Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy*, p. 4.

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States follow an active great-power policy rather than its traditional isolationist and moralistic foreign policy, as they are protesting against the foreign-policymaking powers of the executive branch.

The examples that the Kahler cites to support the other half of his argument — that an embattled U.S. government might resort to foreign adventures in an attempt to consolidate its internal political position — can be explained on other, more compelling grounds. It can be argued convincingly that the *Mayagüez* decision was made because American policymakers perceived that there was a need to re-establish American credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike after the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. The analysis that led to action at that time and place was perhaps faulty, but the decision, whether correct or not, was made on the basis of international political considerations rather than domestic factors. Similarly, Kahler argues that a future president might be tempted to use force in the Persian Gulf to break a domestic political impasse caused by a severe energy shortage. But why place such a hypothetical action in the context of domestic politics? A secure supply of energy, at reasonable prices, is a vital national security interest of the United States (and of Western Europe and Japan, as well).

Echoing Fischer's view of Wilhelmine Germany, Kahler raises the specter of an America being led into conflict with the Soviet Union by a national leadership under pressure "to do something." Such pressure, he assures us, is likely to come from the "stridently nationalist" Republican Party.[45] The pejorative "stridently nationalist" is a curious characterization. What does it mean? Is it "nationalist" for a political party to reaffirm that the duty of the U.S. government is to preserve America's global position and vital interests? Is a strong reaction to developments that threaten our national interests, and a call for policies to counter that threat, a manifestation of "stridency"? If so, perhaps we ought to be grateful that we have not only a "stridently nationalist" Republican Party but such "stridently nationalist" Democrats as Senators Jackson, Moynihan, and Nunn and Paul Nitze. Perhaps, after four years of a moralistic-idealistic foreign policy, there is a need for change — a need to face up to the realities of international politics, redress America's physical weakness, and re-establish America's resolve to act in defense of her interests. Let it be clear, this need is dictated by international political considerations, not domestic ones.

[45] "Rumors of War," p. 389.

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Kahler's arguments suggest another parallel between the policies of the Radical Liberals in Britain before World War I and the position of the doves in the United States today. Like the Radical Liberals, the doves believe in the reduction of defense expenditures. Like the Radical Liberals, the doves are extremely hostile to overseas security commitments. The British Radical Liberals were suspicious of the ententes and opposed any British "continental commitment"; the American doves favor drastic reductions in U.S. strategic commitments in Europe and Asia. Both groups have overlooked an important corollary of their position: strategic isolation implies that a state will have to make greater internal efforts to ensure its security. It might be sensible to favor reductions in arms expenditures. It might be sensible to be an isolationist. But it is not sensible at all to be both reductionist and isolationist simultaneously.[46] In 1914, many of the younger Radical Liberals had a strong sense of the moral superiority of their position. They came to feel that their views on social reform and foreign policy were thwarted by "the governing classes." By 1914, they had ceased attacking the specifics of the government's policy and, instead, mounted a general attack on the very structure of British government and society. In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, America has undergone a similar experience. The result has been the masochistic denigration of America's legitimate national interests.

One is forced to conclude that the Kahler version of the Fischer thesis is quite wide of the mark. America's political climate at home is not likely to create a situation in which an administration would resort to war to enhance its domestic political position. *Domestic political considerations have had precisely the opposite effect on U.S. policy. Since Vietnam, American administrations have hesitated to employ national power abroad because of a fear that such a policy would reopen the domestic schisms created by Vietnam.* If American foreign policy is being adversely affected by domestic political factors, it is not because a reactionary political elite is engaging in foreign adventurism prompted by pressure "to do something" in order to hold on to power. On the contrary, U.S. policy is being harmed by a powerful domestic bloc which believes that America can, and should, *do nothing*.

VI

The most interesting aspect of the 1914 analogy is Kahler's argument on the causes of great-power conflict. Kahler contends

[46] See Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary," p. 6.

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that these conflicts result from misperceptions of the adversary's intentions and from a failure to empathize with the adversary's position as the adversary views it. These points are discussed in the context of the pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry and the internal British policy debate about that rivalry, and Kahler sees a close parallel with current Soviet-American relations and the continuing debate in U.S. policymaking circles about the nature of Soviet intentions. "The response of the hegemonic power in each case," Kahler maintains, "has been outrage at any suggestion that the existing balance of forces could be regarded as unjust or subject to change."[47] If, in fact, responsible leaders in Britain before 1914, or responsible American leaders today, reacted to such developments with genuine "outrage," and with nothing else, then one would be entitled to question their comprehension of the dynamics of international politics. Because of the security dilemma, great powers are inevitably destined to experience clashes of interest. By definition, a dilemma cannot be resolved; it can only be dealt with. Perhaps passion can never be separated entirely from interests, but mature statesmen do not react to events stemming from the security dilemma solely from a sense of "outrage." Instead, they ask, What is the problem? Surely any statesman, whether in pre-1914 Britain or in America today, not gravely concerned about possible changes in the international distribution of power would be failing to discharge his obligation to ensure the well-being of his state. Such concern is legitimate, prudent, and a far cry from "outrage."

In the years before 1914, Britain was confronted with a threat from Germany that was serious and imminent. At a time when the old European system of great powers was being transformed into a system dominated by several world powers, Germany had no choice but to seek world-power status if she were to keep pace with Britain, the United States, and Russia. Germany could acquire world-power status only by achieving hegemony in Europe; but German hegemony would have posed a lethal threat to British security. Other factors — the naval race, colonial disputes, and clumsy German diplomacy — may have heightened tensions between Britain and Germany, but they did not cause those tensions. Yet, despite the geopolitical background to Anglo-German tensions, Kahler maintains that a more forthcoming British attitude toward Germany would have enabled the two nations to resolve their differences and avoid war. "Tentative rapprochements were dismissed out of hand by the

[47] "Rumors of War," p. 376.

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Foreign Office and the worst light was placed on every German deed."[48]

This reading of events has two flaws: it is not accurate, and it is based on an "unspoken assumption" that betrays a rather naive view of international politics. Two historical inaccuracies undermine Kahler's analysis. He seems to assume that the Anglo-German rivalry somehow triggered World War I, and this is just not true. It is true, though, that Britain and Germany attempted, if not a rapprochement, at least a détente. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, Britain and Germany were able to reach agreements on the Baghdad Railway and on German investment in the Ottoman Empire. They also agreed on the distribution of the Portuguese territories in Africa in the event of a collapse of the Portuguese Empire. During the 1912 Balkan Crisis, Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg were able to collaborate diplomatically to prevent the outbreak of a general European war. The Haldane mission to Berlin in 1912 was an indication that both nations were interested, in principle, in seeking an accommodation. If Britain and Germany failed to reach a comprehensive agreement prior to 1914, then, it was not for want of effort. Why did these efforts fail? Here, we are thrown back to the key unspoken assumption that pervades Kahler's analysis: namely, that rivalry and conflict among great powers are not an inherent result of the dynamic of the international system. It was that dynamic which foredoomed the Anglo-German attempts at rapprochement. Britain could not give Germany the free hand in Europe that Berlin demanded because that would have resulted in German hegemony on the Continent. Also, the British feared that any move in the direction of reconciliation with Germany would result in the defection of Russia or France, or both, to the German camp; Britain would then be dangerously isolated. Germany, for her part, was unwilling to meet Britain's desideratum with respect to naval construction without a pledge of British neutrality in the event of war between Germany and France and Russia. Naval construction was Germany's only bargaining chip, and Berlin was not willing to give it up unless Britain made concessions that Germany felt were necessary for her security in Europe. In short, Anglo-German agreement failed, not because of British "outrage" at Germany's increasing power, nor because German policy was shaped by the domestic political needs of a reactionary elite; there could be no agreement

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 378.

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because the conflicting security interests of each state were ultimately incompatible.[49]

The "debate" between Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Sanderson on the nature of Germany's pre–World War I intentions does have one striking similarity to the current American debate on Soviet intentions. Sanderson's "relaxed view of German intentions" and his advice that Britain appease Germany because "a great and growing nation cannot be repressed" bears strong resemblance to the view of Soviet intentions that is held by such as Cyrus Vance and George Kennan.[50] While the Crowe-Sanderson "debate" is indeed a useful framework for analyzing current Soviet-American relations, several historical points should be kept in mind. First, when Sanderson wrote his reply to Crowe's memorandum (in January 1907), he had been retired from the Foreign Office for two years and had retained no influence. Indeed, while Grey thought that Crowe's memorandum was important enough to be circulated to the cabinet, he did not regard Sanderson's memorandum as being sufficiently important to merit similar treatment.[51] The view articulated by Sanderson, moreover, did not command the same amount of support within the Foreign Office that the Vance-Kennan position commands in some American policymaking circles today. In fact, Sanderson was quite alone in his view of Germany. If we take the word "debate" to signify an intelligent discussion of divergent views, then, there was no debate on German intentions by British policymakers before 1914. The view articulated by Crowe — that German power was a menace to British security — was shared by the entire British foreign and defense policy establishment.[52]

Kahler argues that the Crowe position was based both on "outrage" at increasing German power and on the belief that German policy was motivated by "simple hostility to Britain or a ceaseless striving for world hegemony."[53] In light of Kahler's endorsement of Fritz Fischer's views on German pre–World War I policy, this is very puzzling. Kahler seriously contradicts himself. *Fischer argues*

[49] Steiner, *Britain and the First World War*, pp. 48-78.

[50] See H. W. Koch, "The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed Opportunity or Myth," 54 *History* 378, Richard Langhorne, "The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912-1914," *Historical Journal*, vol. 14, 1970, and Steinberg, "The German Background to Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914," in Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 218-219.

[51] See D. W. Sweet, "Great Britain and Germany, 1905-1911," in Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 218-219.

[52] As Zara Steiner notes, "It is important to realize . . . that Grey and almost all of his senior officials shared a common view of Britain's diplomatic position." ("The Foreign Office 1905-1914," in Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy, p. 24.*) Steiner makes this point repeatedly in *Britain and the First World War.*

[53] "Rumors of War," p. 377.

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that Germany deliberately provoked World War I in order to stabilize her internal political situation (and to redress a deteriorating international position). But if Germany deliberately caused World War I, how can Kahler blame Crowe for being suspicious of German intentions? If Fischer's characterization of German policy is correct, Crowe could hardly be blamed if he *had* regarded German policy as irreducibly hostile and if he *had* reacted with "outrage" to Germany's "ceaseless striving for world hegemony." In fact, though, Crowe did possess much of that empathy for the other side's position which Kahler seems to prize so highly. Crowe, and his colleagues in the Foreign Office, did not want war; they did want to stop the other side before it became so powerful that it endangered British interests.[54]

Sir Eyre Crowe's analysis of the Anglo-German conflict was astute. It was Germany's objective position and potential power that threatened Britain: "History shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen out of the momentary predominance of a neighbouring state at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence, the danger being directly proportionate to the degree of its power and efficiency, and to the spontaneity or 'inevitableness' of its ambitions."[55] Crowe did not argue that Germany's ambitions were immoral: "It would be taking a narrow view of the function of political criticism to judge this [German] theory of national self-assertion as if it were a problem of morals to be solved by the casuistical application of the principles governing private conduct in modern societies."[56] German policy, acknowledged Crowe, could be the product either of a deliberate attempt to achieve hegemony or of a confused and vague policy manifesting itself in the guise of erratic opportunism. But: "the element of danger in one case [a deliberate policy of hegemony] enters, under some disguise, into the second [a policy of erratic opportunism]; and

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[54] In a masterly article, Richard Cosgrove has pointed out that Sir Eyre Crowe was not responsible for inculcating an "anti-German" attitude in the Foreign Office. Fear of Germany was already widespread when Crowe first reached a position of influence in the Foreign Office in 1906. Cosgrove also points out that while Crowe was respected by his colleagues for his intellect and facility of expression, he was not, for various reasons, on close terms with his superiors at the Foreign Office. Thus, in a very real way, Crowe's numerous memos in the pre-1914 period, "long thought to demonstrate his power and influence, in reality symbolized his isolation." ("The Career of Sir Eyre Crowe: A Reassessment," *Albion*, Winter 1972, p. 197.)

[55] "Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, 1 January 1907," in G. P. Gooch et al., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (London: HMSO, 1928), vol. 3, app. A (p. 397).

[56] Ibid., p. 405.

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against such danger, whether actual or contingent, the same general line of conduct seems prescribed."[57] It was agreed, then, that the German state had every right to pursue its own interests: "There are no existing German rights, territorial or other, which this country could wish to see diminished. Therefore, so long as Germany's action does not overstep the line of legitimate protection of existing rights she can always count upon the sympathy and goodwill . . . of England."[58] Neither did Crowe argue that Germany's naval build-up was unjustifiable: "nor is it for British Governments to oppose Germany's building as large a fleet as she may consider necessary for the defence of her national interests."[59] The remedy for Britain, as Crowe pointed out, was not to argue that Germany's pursuit of her interests was illegitimate or immoral; rather, Britain was to take steps to secure *her own* interests. Britain should behave toward Germany "with unvarying courtesy and consideration in all matters of common concern, but also with a prompt and firm refusal to enter into any one-sided bargains or arrangements, and the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe."[60]

Crowe recognized that the conflict between Britain and Germany concerned fundamental issues; it had little to do with the presence of good will or malevolence on either side. In holding this view, he mirrored the attitude of the Foreign Office as a whole. From Grey on down, the Foreign Office recognized that Britain was a status quo power par excellence, standing to lose more than any other great power from a redistribution of power in the international system: "Few of these men believed any longer in the fixity or security of Britain's world stance."[61] British policymakers were at one in regarding Germany as the power most likely to overturn the status quo. In such circumstances, Crowe was justified in asking, as he did, which British concessions might satisfy Germany but not weaken Britain relative to Germany. He pointed out that "dialogue," or attempts to buy off Germany with unilateral concessions, would not deflect the German challenge to Britain's position:

> For there is one road which, if past experience is any guide to the future, will most certainly not lead to any permanent improvement of relations with any Power, least of all Germany, and which must therefore be abandoned: That is the road paved with graceful British concessions — conces-

[57] Ibid., p. 417.
[58] Ibid., p. 417.
[59] Ibid., p. 418.
[60] Ibid., p. 419-420.
[61] Steiner, "The Foreign Office, 1905-1914," p. 24.

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sions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their being set off by equivalent counter-services. The vain hopes that in this manner Germany can be "conciliated" and made more friendly must definitely be given up.[62]

Today, the United States and the Soviet Union are separated by differences that are quite as fundamental as those separating Britain and Germany before World War I. It would be foolish for U.S. policymakers to argue that the Soviet Union is not legitimately entitled to pursue what she perceives as her vital interests; it would be naive for our policymakers to rest their case on the argument that the Soviet military build-up is immoral or unjustified. As a superpower, and as a sovereign state, the Soviets can be expected to take measures that they believe are necessary to ensure their own security.

The "1914 analogy" is profoundly misleading when applied to the present world situation. For it suggests that wars occur because great powers fail to empathize with their rivals' ambitions (or because of great-power misunderstandings), that great powers become entangled in regional disputes where their interests are not engaged, and that great powers embroil themselves in international rivalries as a means of resolving internal political disputes. "August 1914" does stand as a warning, but the lessons to be learned are rather different from those deduced by Kahler and others. The outbreak of the Great War was not a case of war by accident, nor was it an example of political irrationality. The miscalculation of 1914 lay in the fact that each of the great powers believed that it could achieve a swift military victory. The surprise of 1914 came in November, when the war became stalemated on all fronts. The irrationality of World War I did not occur in 1914, but in 1916 and afterwards, when the great powers rejected a compromise peace and continued to accept a carnage in the trenches that no conceivable war aim could justify. The lessons of 1914 are conventional and well-known: (1) the use of force must be rationally related to political objectives, and (2) pre-emptive, first-strike military strategies and technologies tend to produce unstable situations and high risk of escalation.

While the events of 1914 remind us of the folly of strategic irrationality, they are also a reminder of a more fundamental lesson: great-power conflicts are a consequence of the structure of the international political system. Great-power conflicts are not illusory; they result from the clash of fundamental political and security interests of rival states. Indeed, the most egregious flaw of the 1914 analogy is that it obscures this fact. In stressing empathy and understanding

[62] "Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe," p. 419.

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as key to resolving great-power conflict — be it the pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalry or the present Soviet-American variety — the 1914 analogy shifts our frame of reference in thinking about international politics. The 1914 analogy suggests that we think in terms of who is responsible for the tensions that exist between rival great powers. In fact, the important question is what is responsible for those tensions. By focusing on *what,* rather than who, we remind ourselves that so long as both states remain powerful, so long as both states retain the desire to survive — and succeed — in the international political arena, the Soviet-American rivalry will be an inescapable part of international political life. The Soviet-American rivalry is inherent in the nature of the international political system. The Soviet-American rivalry is *not* caused by misunderstandings, clumsy diplomacy, or by domestic political pressures in either state. These factors may indeed aggravate that rivalry, but the rivalry will still continue even if communications are perfect, diplomacy is skillful, and the domestic situations in both states are stable. With these considerations in mind, the situation of pre–World War I Britain may provide a useful parallel for America today.

Like Britain prior to 1914, the United States today is a status quo power; it is the United States that will lose the most from a redistribution of power in the international system. Just as the British in 1914 could see whence the challenge to their position came, so it is clear today that the challenge to American interests comes from the Soviet Union. If there are Americans who are concerned about the implications of Soviet policy — and well they should be — the remedy is to recognize that it is *legitimate* for the United States to defend her own vital interests and *justifiable* for the United States to take military measures to ensure her security. It is a delusion of the most dangerous sort to believe that "dialogue" or "bargaining for influence" or "empathy" for the other side's position will sweep away the fundamental causes of the Soviet-American rivalry. The words of Sir Eyre Crowe come back with startling freshness: "Men in responsible positions, whose business it is to inform themselves and to see things as they really are, cannot conscientiously retain any illusions on this subject."[63]

[63] Ibid.

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SOVIET NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION POLICY: DILEMMAS AND CONTRADICTIONS*

by Joseph L. Nogee

The issue of nuclear proliferation has been on the foreign policy agenda of the superpowers since the beginning of the atomic age. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have over the years pursued a variety of strategies to stop the spread of the bomb. In recent years, the problem has acquired greater urgency because of the global spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. While the Carter administration took bold (some would say inadvisable[1]) measures to cope with the problem, the Soviet Union has moved slowly. The Kremlin's hesitant stance and the contradictions in Soviet nuclear proliferation policy raise the question of how seriously the Kremlin takes the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The Soviet government claims with a great deal of justification that it opposes and has long opposed the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1958, when the issue was first introduced before the United Nations in the form of the Irish resolution, the Soviets were quick to endorse the idea. We know, moreover, that nonproliferation was one of the purposes behind Soviet interest in a nuclear test ban during the 1950s. When Nikita Khrushchev wrote to Zhou Enlai on April 4, 1958, justifying the Soviet decision to suspend atomic testing, he argued that "if the tests are not terminated now, other countries may develop nuclear weapons within a certain space of time."[2] Today, there is no more ardent advocate of the nonprolifera-

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[1] For a critique of the Carter policies, see Thomas L. Neff and Henry D. Jacoby, "Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979.

[2] Quoted in Christer Jonsson, *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 89.

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tion treaty than Moscow. As one analyst of Soviet policy wrote recently, "The Soviet Union has been considerably more consistent and effective than the United States [in] promoting policies to prevent nuclear spread."[3] Indeed, many see the Soviet Union today as a conservative world power that genuinely fears the political and military consequences of nuclear diffusion.

Yet, clearly, Soviet behavior has not always worked against the spread of these weapons. To begin with, the Soviet Union directly helped a non-nuclear-weapons state acquire the bomb. Though Soviet nuclear assistance to China was abruptly terminated in 1959, no one doubts that Beijing relied heavily upon that assistance to detonate its own explosion. Other policies at variance with the Soviet image as a strict "nonproliferationist" are the Kremlin's initial opposition to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); its one-time efforts to weaken IAEA controls; its foot-dragging on the nonproliferation treaty; its failure to condemn India's nuclear explosion; its support of peaceful nuclear explosions; its encouragement of the fast-breeder reactor and the development of a plutonium economy; its baiting of South Africa and Israel; its refusal to accept international inspection for its own peaceful nuclear facilities; and its unwillingness to reduce substantially its own nuclear stockpile. Many of these actions are justifiable on other grounds, but they are hardly compatible with stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

What can one make of this record? A general survey of Soviet nonproliferation policy reveals a history of inconsistencies and contradictions, the Kremlin completely reversing itself at times. It has applied different standards to different countries, some countries being viewed as more menacing than others. Some of Moscow's rhetoric has evidently been designed for propaganda only, though not infrequently Moscow intended its words to be taken at face value. With respect to substance, Moscow's proposals have ranged from the impractical to the realistic.

Though a rationale behind Soviet behavior exists, it should not be surprising to find fluctuations and contradictions in Soviet nuclear proliferation policy. For, after all, such fluctuations have characterized virtually all aspects of Soviet foreign policy (and not just Soviet policies).[4] One must remember that nonproliferation is

[3] Gloria Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports," *International Security*, Summer 1978, p. 83.

[4] See, for example, Toby Trister Gati, "Soviet Perspective on Nuclear Nonproliferation," *California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy*, November 1975, pp. 2-3.

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only one of the Kremlin's foreign policy objectives, and never has it been the primary one. When we examine proliferation policy in the context of other issues, we find a greater consistency and continuity than is otherwise apparent. Sometimes, the effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons was fully compatible with larger goals: Moscow's campaign to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from acquiring the bomb or even getting its finger on the trigger is an example of a policy that fulfills more than objective. In other cases, incompatibilities exist: the Soviet desire to enhance its energy base by the use of plutonium, for example, is not compatible with nonproliferation efforts. Soviet perception of the proliferation threat, then, is conditioned by the larger context of strategic perceptions, interests, and priorities.[5]

As might be expected, Soviet policy toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons evolved and was modified to fit the changing requirements of Soviet foreign policy. In broad terms, the evolution of Soviet nuclear proliferation policy can be divided into three general periods: the first includes the 1940s and the 1950s, from the discovery of the bomb until the schism with China; the second covers the 1960s, when the Kremlin focused on the dangers posed by China's acquisition of nuclear weapons and by West Germany's potential acquisition of such weapons; the third began in the 1970s, when Moscow's perception of the requirements for a general nonproliferation regime moved closer to Washington's.

Throughout the first period, covering the postwar Stalin, the Malenkov, and the early Khrushchev administrations, Soviet concern with proliferation was only incidental to the larger problem of countering the nuclear superiority of the United States. Some Soviet proposals during this period (e.g., a complete ban on nuclear weapons and, later, a halt to nuclear-weapons tests) were related to stopping nuclear expansion by their chief adversary. In short, nuclear diplomacy in the decade and a half after the war was largely a propaganda battle.[6]

During this period, the Soviet Union had not yet formulated a clear-cut strategy regarding proliferation. Nowhere was Soviet uncertainty more evident than in the almost three years of negotiations over the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an outgrowth of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace"

[5] Roman Kolkowicz et al., *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), p. 83.

[6] For an analysis of Soviet nuclear policy during this period, see my *Soviet Policy Toward International Control of Nuclear Weapons* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961).

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proposal before the United Nations in December 1953. Initially, Moscow declined even to help draft a statute for the IAEA. Only after a dozen countries started negotiations on a charter did Moscow reverse itself and agree to participate. Even then, its dual role as an atomic power and a self-appointed champion of the Third World led to a pattern of contradictory positions on such questions as the composition of the Board of Governors and the extent of IAEA controls.

When the Soviet Union decided, in January 1955, to provide atomic assistance to friendly governments, it failed to impose a strict system of controls over the recipients of assistance. China's announcement in 1958 of its intention to produce nuclear weapons undoubtedly came as a surprise to the Soviets. Perhaps equally or more unsettling to the Kremlin was Mao Zedong's deprecation of the dangers of a nuclear war when, in the summer of 1958, he threatened to wrest the offshore island of Quemoy from a Taiwan then supported by the United States. As Benjamin Lambeth notes, "the Soviets were rudely awakened to the onerous possibility that in some future crisis, in which China possessed its own atomic bombs, the way out might not be so easy, and Moscow might then be dragged into a catalytic nuclear confrontation with the United States because of some irresponsibility on the part of its allies in Peking."[7] Between the summers of 1958 and 1959, all atomic assistance to China was suspended and, later, terminated. The rift with China was a major factor in the evolution of Soviet nuclear policy.

In the second period, nonproliferation moved up in the hierarchy of Soviet objectives. What had earlier seemed a possibility, in the decade of the 1960s became a reality. In 1960, France joined the nuclear-weapons states, followed by the People's Republic of China in October 1964. Moscow's concern then shifted to Germany, a potential nuclear power.

The first big step toward stopping the spread of nuclear weapons came with the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. This treaty, resulting from the change in U.S.-Soviet relations that followed the Cuban missile crisis, signaled that Moscow and Washington were developing a common interest not only in inhibiting the dissemination of atomic weapons, but in building the framework for a more stable international order. Another important building block in that framework was the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into being at the end of the decade. As it did in the IAEA negotiations, Moscow struggled between its desire to reach

[7] Kolkowicz et al., *Soviet Union and Arms Control*, p. 89.

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an agreement and its determination to use the nuclear issue as a weapon against the West. Consummation of an NPT was delayed several years while the Soviet Union demanded that NATO abandon its plan for a multilateral nuclear force and that Western Europe accept IAEA instead of EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) safeguards as conditions for an agreement. It was evident that Moscow was using both issues for waging a propaganda war against NATO, particularly West Germany.[8] Ultimately, on both issues the Soviet position prevailed, and the NPT was signed on July 1, 1968.

Under the terms of the NPT, the nuclear-weapons states undertake "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons . . . directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist . . . any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons."[9] Further, "Each non-nuclear-weapon State . . . undertakes not to receive the transfer . . . of nuclear weapons . . . [and] not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons." The non-nuclear-weapons states that ratify the treaty must accept IAEA safeguards over all their nuclear activities to prevent "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." All parties agree that any fissionable fuel or equipment capable of manufacturing fissionable fuel given to a non-nuclear-weapons state must be subject to IAEA safeguards. As compensation to the non-nuclear-weapons states, which assume the greater burden under this arrangement, the treaty provides for the "fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Also, the "benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapons states . . . on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge . . . for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible." The nuclear-weapons states commit themselves "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date."

The Problems of a Nonproliferation Regime

The nonproliferation treaty is the legal basis for what is today referred to as a nonproliferation regime. One of the basic

[8] See Gerhard Wettig, "Soviet Policy on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966-1968," ORBIS, Winter 1969.

[9] The text is in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1968* (Washington: GPO, September 1969), pp. 461-465.

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assumptions behind the concept of a legal regime is that nuclear proliferation can be stopped by persuading states to accept a legal obligation not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation is presumed to be (or on its way toward becoming) a norm of international law. Some Soviet and Western sources consider nonproliferation to be a rule of international law now.[10] Since states are not bound by rules that they do not accept, the fundamental strategy of a legal nonproliferation regime is to persuade all potential nuclear-weapons states to sign and ratify the NPT.

A nonproliferation regime can be established on bases other than law — on politics or technology, for example. Political pressure might be a suitable means to achieve the desired objective. Conceivably, states can be coerced into denying themselves the proscribed bombs. Although, as I will discuss shortly, this has not been the principal Soviet approach, some aspects of Soviet behavior have suggested a political nonproliferation regime. The Kremlin has required all the countries of the East European socialist bloc (including Romania) not only to sign and ratify the NPT, but to accept measures that would make the covert acquisition of the bomb extremely difficult.[11] A Soviet predilection toward the political approach was suggested in the early 1960s by V. S. Emelyanov (then deputy chairman of the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Council of Ministers), who noted "Nonproliferation is no problem, each side takes care of his own."[12] Presumably, the Western powers (to whom the remark was made) would control their clients as the Soviet Union was then doing. There are, of course, problems with coercion. How does one control such states as India, Brazil, South Africa, or Israel? The Kremlin could neither stop China from building the bomb nor compel Cuba to sign the NPT.

Coercion is not the only *political* approach to nonproliferation. Another tactic is to induce states to eschew nuclear arms by assuring them that their security interests can be met without recourse to such weapons. If nations feel secure, or if they are given a security guarantee by a nuclear-weapons state, then they might well be inclined to avoid the enormous expense of acquiring nuclear

[10] The Soviet Memorandum on Questions of Ending the Arms Race and Disarmament (September 28, 1976) stated, "The obligation to renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a rule of international law." (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1976* (Washington: GPO, December 1978), p. 634.

[11] For example, the nuclear reactors built with Soviet assistance are the type from which it is extremely difficult to divert fissionable fuel.

[12] Bertrand Goldschmidt, "A Historical Survey of Nonproliferation Policies," *International Security*, Summer 1972, p. 75; Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports," p. 90.

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weapons (and their associated delivery systems). A feeble effort in this direction was attempted by the three nuclear-weapons signatories in a UN Security Council resolution adopted on June 19, 1968. The Security Council, noting "the concern of certain . . . States that . . . appropriate measure be undertaken to safeguard their security," voted that "aggression against a nonnuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council . . . would have to act immediately." It welcomed "the intention expressed by certain States [the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union] that they will provide or support immediate assistance . . . to any nonnuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act . . . in which nuclear weapons are used."[13] However inadequate this guarantee might be, it illustrates an attempt to deal with the problem of security. Undoubtedly, a more useful guarantee would be a direct commitment from a superpower to a potential victim. Germany and Japan, for example, can afford to eschew nuclear arms because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella; but such guarantees are rare, particularly from the Soviet Union. According to some sources, in the 1960s India unsuccessfully sought an explicit U.S. and Soviet guarantee against nuclear blackmail by China.[14]

Technological control is yet another basis for creating a nonproliferation regime. The idea, here, is to prevent nations from building the bomb by denying them the materials and technology necessary to do so. The NPT obligates parties not to acquire nuclear explosives, but it does not prohibit them from acquiring the means to do so. Technically, the NPT safeguards cannot stop a government from illegally diverting fissionable fuel used in nuclear reactors to military purposes. IAEA safeguards consist essentially of examination of records to verify accountability for materials, and, periodically, inspections of critical installations are undertaken in order to make sure that the records accurately reflect what is going on. Should these procedures reveal an unaccountable loss of fissionable fuel, all that the IAEA could do would be to warn the other NPT parties of the violation (a situation that has not yet occurred).

Today, three components of the nuclear fuel cycle directly threaten to undermine efforts to impede nuclear proliferation: (1) uranium-enrichment facilities, which extract the fissionable isotope U-235 from natural uranium (U-238); (2) reprocessing plants,

[13] *Documents on Disarmament*, 1968, p. 444.
[14] Frank T. J. Bray and Michael L. Moodie, "Nuclear Politics in India," *Survival*, May-June 1977, p. 11.

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which extract plutonium — also a fissionable fuel — from spent nuclear fuel; and (3) breeder reactors, a type of nuclear reactor that uses plutonium as a fuel and that in the course of its operations produces more fuel than it consumes. An essential tactic of technological control is to prevent a non-nuclear-weapons state from physically acquiring any of these types of facilities. Unfortunately for the advocates of this approach, several non-nuclear-weapons countries (FRG, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Japan) already have or are planning to build an enrichment or reprocessing plant.

In recent years, the United States has turned toward a technological solution to the problem of proliferation. Influenced by the findings of the Ford-Mitre report, the Carter administration undertook a vigorous effort to discourage worldwide the use of plutonium for peaceful purposes. This policy was reflected in the Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Although the Soviet Union does not condemn the concept of technological control, it does differ sharply with the United States over the question of using plutonium as an energy source. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has vigorously condemned the 1975 deal between the FRG and Brazil that will eventually give Brazil control over a complete fuel cycle, including facilities for uranium enrichment.

The NPT has been in force now for more than a decade, long enough for the two superpowers to assess its prospects and limitations. It is clear that the Soviet Union is prepared to rely more heavily upon the safeguard provisions of the IAEA than is the United States. But there has been significant movement in the Soviet position during the decade. Three developments in the 1970s profoundly affected Soviet policy: (1) the oil crisis of 1973; (2) the Indian nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974; and (3) the cultivation by France and Germany of a world market for reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Each of these developments has undermined nonproliferation efforts.

The oil crisis stimulated global interest in atomic energy as an alternative to fossile fuels. Worldwide, that meant more nuclear reactors. In the Soviet Union, the recognition of the vulnerability of industrialized economies to energy shortages only encouraged an already existing tendency to develop plutonium as a fuel. India's detonation of a fission device in the Rajasthan desert illustrated the inadequacy of a nonproliferation regime that failed to provide incentives for all the near-nuclear nations to sign the NPT. In addition to India, important nonsigners include Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and Spain. Particularly disconcerting to

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the Kremlin was the rash of announced sales of enrichment and reprocessing technologies by France and Germany. Since the mid-1970s, sales have been announced to Brazil, Iran,[15] South Africa, Pakistan, and South Korea. The Kremlin could hardly fail to note that these sales were to countries whose foreign policies ranged from benign to anti-Soviet.

So, while the Soviet Union was itself challenging the nonproliferation regime through its cultivation of plutonium, the Kremlin concomitantly wanted to close the loopholes leading to proliferation. Out of these diverse tendencies has emerged a policy, embodying each of the three approaches to a nonproliferation regime discussed above. The main elements of this policy can be summarized as follows: a demand for worldwide adherence to the NPT; promotion of strict controls over nonsignatories to the NPT; and encouragement of the breeder reactor and a plutonium economy.

Soviet Support for the NPT

In its rhetoric, the Soviet Union has strongly supported the NPT and urged universal adherence to it. In this sense, the heart of Soviet policy today is reliance upon a legal regime. A typical statement was made in *Pravda* in May 1976 when the United States and the Soviet Union extended the test ban treaty to include large underground tests:

> As is known, power reactors produce plutonium, which can be used to create weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . is an important instrument in averting the danger of a nuclear war. . . . The nonproliferation treaty could play a still greater role if all states that have nuclear industries or facilities or intend to have them in the near future would sign it. However, today some states that possess significant military potential and have nuclear weapons or real possibilities for creating them are not treaty signatories. For this reason, it is necessary to take further steps to widen the circle of signatories.[16]

Precisely what these "further steps" might be has never been made clear, but the Soviet media has regularly demanded that all states sign and ratify the NPT. The Soviet press has been cautious about publicly condemning NPT holdouts, usually avoiding naming Third World nations, though it is known to want India's accession very

[15] Shortly after the return to Iran in 1979 of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian government cancelled contracts with France and West Germany for the construction of up to fifteen nuclear power stations. See the *New York Times*, December 4, 1979.

[16] I. Dmitriyev, "Use the Atom's Energy for Peaceful Purposes," *Pravda*, May 30, 1976, in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (CDSP), vol. 28, no. 22, p. 1.

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much. It has not, however, refrained from publicly criticizing those states in the "hostile camp." Chief among these objects of censure have been South Africa, Israel, and the West European members of EURATOM. The slowness with which the five nonweapons EURATOM states ratified the NPT obviously disturbed the Soviets. When Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg completed ratification in 1976, the obviously pleased Soviets described it as "an important event." But the issue remained as negotiations between the IAEA and EURATOM over the implementation of IAEA safeguards dragged on for years. In May 1978, *Pravda* voiced its displeasure over the delay:

> Circumstances exist . . . that impede the treaty's [NPT] becoming the universal instrument of an international policy of nonproliferation. The position of the nonnuclear member countries of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), in particular, gives cause for considerable concern. For a prolonged period of time now, they have been using all manner of delay tactics to slow the practical implementation of effective inspection of its atomic industry by the Agency. In so doing, the representatives of EURATOM are gaining special privileges for themselves.[17]

These were bland criticisms compared with the invective unleashed against South Africa and Israel. "Israel's nuclear capabilities are no secret," *Izvestiya* complained in 1976, "and the Israeli militarists' craving for nuclear arms is widely known." "The RSA [Republic of South Africa] has not signed the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which more than 100 states have now subscribed . . . If nuclear weapons were to appear in the hands of the racist regime in Pretoria, this would create an immediate threat to the security of the African states . . . and would increase the nuclear threat to all mankind."[18] Not infrequently, the Soviet media refers to an "RSA–Israeli militarists alliance" supported by NATO, and demands their adherence to the NPT.

There is an interesting inconsistency between the stridency of Soviet propaganda against South Africa and Israel and the objective of securing worldwide adherence to the NPT. If, in fact, the Kremlin did want South Africa and Israel to sign the NPT, then it would be expected to give some consideration to the security concerns of both states. An unremitting demonstration of hostility by the USSR would seem to be counterproductive, and yet that is exactly what has taken place. Indeed, the Soviets have not made any concessions to Israeli or South African security needs that would

[17] I. Melnikov, "Atom Should Serve Peace," *Pravda*, May 13, 1978, in *CDSP*, vol. 30, no. 19, p. 17.

[18] R. Moseyev, "Israel's Atomic Ambitions," *Izvestiya*, November 26, 1976, in *CDSP*, vol. 28, no. 47; *Izvestiya*, August 9, 1976, in CDSP, vol. 29, no. 32, p. 6.

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encourage the two states to sign the NPT. To the contrary, in 1976 the Soviet bloc successfully urged the IAEA to permit the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate as an observer in the IAEA general conference.[19] Since the PLO can hardly be considered a "near nuclear power" (which Israel is), this action strongly suggests that the goal of a nonproliferation regime is subordinate to the Soviet Union's Middle East policy.

A general Soviet insensitivity to the security concerns of the nonsignatories to the NPT can be discerned. Moreover, Moscow's numerous assurances to NPT signatories, indicating that the Soviet Union would assist them if they became victims of aggression, have never been anything but vague. A general analysis of the proliferation problem in the journal *International Affairs* argued that the Security Council resolution of June 17, 1968, was "a major step toward providing security guarantees for the treaty's nonnuclear participants."[20] It is doubtful, however, that many members of the United Nations — particularly the near-nuclear states — would find much comfort in that resolution. More recently, the Soviet Union has again moved in that direction with the introduction before the General Assembly of a proposal for an international convention to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapons states.[21]

Those countries receiving Soviet nuclear assistance have been especially vulnerable to pressure to accede to the NPT, and the Kremlin has not been hesitant to use its influence. Moscow has taken pride in the fact that all of the Warsaw Pact countries are NPT signatories. Countries outside the Soviet bloc have generally been required to adhere to the NPT as a condition for nuclear assistance. Libya, for example, signed under Soviet pressure, though she has yet to ratify. Finland, another recipient to Soviet aid, is a signatory. Two other beneficiaries of Soviet nuclear aid are nonsignatories, but they are exceptions that prove the rule. Cuba, though outside the NPT, has agreed to put all of its reactors under IAEA inspection — a position that is functionally close to signing.[22] India, also outside the NPT, has been forced to accept stringent safeguards on materials supplied by the Soviet Union. According to Gloria Duffy,[23] Soviet

[19] Tass, September 9, 1978, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), September 11, 1978.

[20] Y. Tomlin, "Non-Proliferation Problem," *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1974, p. 35.

[21] See Tass, December 2, 1978, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), December 4, 1978.

[22] Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "The Cuban Nuclear Power Program," *Cuban Studies*, January 1979, p. 27.

[23] "Soviet Nuclear Exports," p. 98.

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pressure on India has been greater than anyone would have expected. In general, there is little doubt that under existing conditions no member of the Soviet East European bloc could construct a bomb; Soviet controls are too direct. With regard to Libya and Cuba, however, the situation may be different. As noted above, IAEA safeguards are basically precautionary. Were Libya or Cuba to seize or overtly divert fissionable materials to military purposes, the Soviet Union might not be able to interfere.

India is a special case that illustrates an inconsistency in Soviet policy. There is no doubt but that the Soviets were unhappy with India's nuclear explosion in 1974 and since then have urged India to sign the NPT. Yet, the Kremlin could never bring itself to condemn openly India's 1974 test, let alone resort to the invective unleashed against South Africa when that country was reported to be planning a nuclear test in 1977. The Tass announcement of the Indian blast reported only that it was a "peaceful explosion" carried out as part of a research program, and a few days later, Tass quoted Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as saying that India would not produce an atomic weapon.[24] Of course, the Soviets knew better. They have all along recognized that peaceful nuclear explosives are the same as military explosives. Indeed, on occasion the Soviets even admit that India does have the bomb.[25]

Demand for Strict Controls over Nonsignatories

In addition to promoting as wide a membership as possible in the NPT, the Soviet Union has been an energetic advocate of extending IAEA safeguards over the nuclear industries of countries that refuse to sign the NPT. Under the terms of the NPT, the nuclear-weapons states are obligated to ensure that IAEA safeguards are established over any facility that uses the fissionable fuel that they provide. In August 1974, a group of nuclear-exporting countries, including the Soviet Union, agreed on a list of nuclear materials and equipment (known as the "Zängger list") whose delivery to any non-nuclear-weapons country would entail the establishment of IAEA safeguards. But there was a major weakness in this arrangement: the safeguards apply only to the particular installations that use the imported materials and do not extend to all the nuclear facilities of the importing state.

[24] Tass, May 18, 1974, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), May 20, 1974, and Tass, May 23, 1974, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), May 28, 1974.
[25] See *Voprosy istorii*, January 1975, in CDSP, vol. 27, no. 25, p. 6.

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This inadequacy in the NPT system was graphically exposed in June 1975 when West Germany and Brazil (a nonsignatory to the NPT) announced agreement on a multibillion dollar deal that included the sale of a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Over the course of several years, Brazil would receive eight large atomic power stations as well as installations for uranium enrichment and for the extraction of plutonium through reprocessing spent fuel. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were disturbed by the agreement, for it marked a breakthrough in the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology and will ultimately give Brazil the capability to produce on short order fissionable fuel for nuclear weapons. Moscow has bitterly condemned this "deal of the century," the Soviet press contending that it is a product of the West German monopolies' desire for Brazil's abundant uranium reserves.[26] Soviet and American concern was further aroused by the March 1976 agreement between France and Pakistan regarding the sale of a plant for processing irradiated nuclear fuel. Like Brazil, Pakistan is a nonsignatory to the NPT.[27]

As a nonsignatory, France is not even legally obligated to impose IAEA controls over any equipment sent to a nonnuclear state. Germany, of course, is. France, however, has announced its intention to observe the safeguards provisions of the NPT as if France were a member, and its agreement with Pakistan did provide for control over the delivered equipment, as did Germany's agreement with Brazil. These control provisions are entirely unsatisfactory to the Soviets, however, because they want control to extend over the entire nuclear industries of importing countries. "The Soviet Union," according to an authoritative spokesman, "would like to see all exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology abide, in their nuclear export policy, by the most stringent rules which help close completely any loopholes for the spread of nuclear weapons."[28] What the Soviets are seeking is known as "full-scope" IAEA controls.

Stimulated by concern over the threat of proliferation inherent in the growing international commerce in nuclear technol-

[26] *Pravda*, April 17, 1977, in CDSP, vol. 29, no. 16.

[27] American pressure resulted in the cancellation of the French sale to Pakistan in August 1978. The press, however, reports that Pakistan does plan to build a uranium-enrichment plant and Zia ul-Haq admits that "Pakistan is close to it." *New York Times*, September 23. 1979.

[28] R. Zheleznov, "Atomic Power and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *International Affairs*, February 1977, p. 50.

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ogy, the leading nuclear-export nations met (in secret) during 1975 and 1976 to formulate guidelines for the export of nuclear materials and equipment. Known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (also the London Club, after the location of its first meetings), the original members included Canada, France, Great Britain, Japan, West Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Subsequently, they were joined by Czechoslovakia, Belgium, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and Poland. The early meetings of the group divided into two schools, one seeking a more rigorous set of rules for exporters than the other. Great Britain and the Soviet Union were among those demanding the most stringent safeguards. A set of guidelines, finally agreed upon on September 21, 1977, were further refined in January 1978 and transmitted to the IAEA for its approval. Under these guidelines, the nuclear exporters have agreed to —

1. provide "formal governmental assurances" that the material or facilities will not be used to produce any nuclear explosive device, whether a weapon or a supposedly "peaceful" nuclear explosive.
2. place the material or facilities under "effective physical protection" to prevent theft or sabotage.
3. accept international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the material or facilities being imported and any similar items produced locally using the same type of design.
4. agree that the same rules will apply to any re-export or sale of imported nuclear materials to a third country.[29]

These guidelines, however, do not include "full-scope" safeguards, which would cover all a recipient's nuclear facilities no matter how or when acquired. An article in *Pravda* pinpointed the weakness of the London guidelines from the Soviet perspective:

the principles elaborated in London envisage IAEA control only over deliveries of nuclear materials which are implemented in conjunction with commitments on the part of the recipient countries that these materials will not be used to create weapons of mass destruction. But unfortunately, these principles do not demand that countries which are not parties to the nonproliferation treaty place all their nuclear activity under international control when importing materials, equipment and technology. In other words, nonnuclear countries can indirectly utilize the imported materials and equipment in nuclear activity which has already been carried out and which is not under international control.

It is perfectly obvious that only complete control over all the nuclear

[29] Sandra Stencel, "Nuclear Proliferation," *Editorial Research Reports*, March 17, 1978, p. 206.

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activity of such countries can insure to the maximum extent a strict regime for the nonproliferation of the most dangerous weapons.[30]

According to this critique, opposition to full-scope controls comes from "military-industrial circles of the Western states."

One solution would be for those countries that believe in full-scope safeguards to refrain from selling nuclear materials to any country not accepting them. That would, of course, widen the market for those sellers, like France, that are more promiscuous in their selling policies. Moscow is not so enthusiastic about demanding full-scope safeguards that it is prepared to adopt an embargo policy on its own. It continues to sell heavy water to the Indians for their reactors.

One of the central issues now facing nuclear exporters is whether or not to stop altogether the export of uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, if it is not already too late to do so. France, in December 1976, and Germany, in June 1977, announced their intention not to export reprocessing plants in the future. Joseph Nye believes that this reflects a consensus among the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[31] The Soviets have not taken an absolute position against the transfer of this technology, though they obviously have deep reservations about the wisdom of engaging in this trade. A recent commentary noted that

the trend in some nonnuclear countries, including those which are at the initial stage in the development of their atomic power industry, to build up an industry for uranium enrichment and the processing of irradiated fuel with plutonium extraction may be fraught with danger in terms of nuclear weapons proliferation. Let us bear in mind that even the most developed states have just started using plutonium as a secondary fuel, which is why the keenness of some nonnuclear states to obtain plants for processing heat-generating elements must evoke legitimate questions and even serious concern.[32]

Moscow's behavior corresponds closely with its rhetoric: the Soviet Union goes to considerable lengths to prevent any re-

[30] I. Dmitriyev, "To Create a Reliable Barrier," *Pravda*, July 8, 1977, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), July 12, 1977.

[31] Joseph S. Nye, "Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, p. 613.

[32] R. Zheleznov, "Atomic Power and Non-Proliferation," p. 51. Recognizing that the demand for enrichment and reprocessing facilities will likely increase in the future, particularly among the developing countries, the Soviet Union has suggested the creation of multinational regional centers for these facilities. Presumably, the existing nuclear-weapons states would be the location of facilities serving regional centers. See I. Dmitriyev, "The Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes," *Pravda*, May 30, 1976, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), June 2, 1976.

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cipients of its technology from obtaining physical control over those materials and facilities that could undermine a nonproliferation regime. (Countries that have ordered or received reactors from the Soviet Union are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, East Germany, Hungary, Libya, Poland, and Romania.) The reactor exported by the Soviet Union is a light-water reactor, which is the kind least suited to the production of plutonium. On-line refueling is not possible with light-water reactors; that is, in order to refuel or extract irradiated fuel from a light-water reactor, the installation must first be shut down. This would give the IAEA (and the USSR) ample warning of any attempt to divert fissionable materials to military uses.

Nor do the Soviets permit any members of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) to possess uranium-enrichment or reprocessing facilities. All natural uranium in Eastern Europe is sent to the Soviet Union for enrichment, and spent fuel is transferred back to the Soviet Union where it is reprocessed and the waste stored. Thus, when it comes to restricting the shipment of dangerous technology abroad, Moscow observes the rule that "each one takes care of his own."

Encouragement of the Breeder-Reactor and Plutonium Economy

Currently, there is no proliferation issue on which the United States and the Soviet Union disagree so completely as that involving the use of plutonium for peaceful purposes. Complicating the problem for the United States is the fact that Western Europe and Japan side with the USSR on this issue. Since early in the atomic age, the Soviets have been enthusiastic and optimistic crusaders for the application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, particularly electricity. They claim the world's first atomic power station, which began operation on June 27, 1954, in the city of Obninsk. Even before the oil crisis of the 1970s, V. S. Emelyanov,[33] deputy chairman of the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, argued that "the world enters a new era in which basic energy will be derived from nuclear processes." Prophetically, his article was entitled "Nuclear Reactors Will Spread." In the 1960s, the Soviets saw atomic energy as the answer to the uneven distribution of organic fuels in their country, a result of the lack of oil, coal, or natural gas in vast regions west of the Ural Mountains. A decade later, their views were further enhanced by the specter of a global depletion of oil and gas.

[33] In C. F. Barnaby, ed. *Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Humanities Press, Pugwash Monograph 1, 1979), p. 68.

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Atomic energy has several advantages over fossil fuels. The Soviets have calculated that nuclear power will reduce the unit cost of electricity by eliminating the enormous transportation costs of organic fuels. Nuclear power is also ecologically preferable; it does not pollute the atmosphere or harm the environment. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has always maintained that peaceful nuclear facilities are safe. Despite the evidence provided by Zhores Medvedev to the contrary, Moscow denies that any dangerous accident has ever occurred.[34] (Only very recently have Soviet officials publicly raised questions concerning the potential ecological damage of nuclear power installations.)[35] The clinching argument for atomic energy, however, is the availability of fuel. As one *Pravda* correspondent summed it up, "An atomic station with a capacity of 1 million kilowatts consumes 30 tons of slightly enriched uranium a year. About 2.5 million tons of coal is needed to operate a thermal station of this size. By putting into full operation the reactors commissioned during the current 5-year plan [the tenth] we will save approximately 45 million tons of fuel a year by 1980."[36]

But uranium, too, is a finite fuel, and it is this consideration that drives Moscow (and many other countries with far fewer energy sources than the Soviet Union) to plutonium and the breeder reactor. Estimates of the amount of uranium available to the Soviet Union differ. Itself a major producer of uranium, the Soviet Union also has exclusive rights to Czechoslovak uranium, which ranks among the world's largest deposits. In addition, Hungary and Bulgaria produce small quantities for export to their larger neighbor. One source reports that as of 1977 the Soviets had built up a stockpile estimated at 200,000 tons.[37] Notwithstanding these reserves, the Kremlin apparently fears a long-term shortage. Last April, the academician A. Aleksandrov[38] wrote that "according to estimates, the planet has about 4 million tons of relatively cheap uranium suitable for power engineering purposes — that's not so very much. . . . it turns out that, all told, there is no more of this relatively cheap uranium than there is of petroleum." Theoretically, breeder reactors

[34] Apparently, there was a disaster in the Ural Mountains in 1957 or 1958. See Clyde W. Burleson, *The Day the Bomb Fell on America* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 25-44. Also Zhores A. Medvedev, *Nuclear Disaster in the Urals* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979). For a critique of Zhores, see the *New York Times*, October 30, 1979.

[35] *New York Times*, October 15, 1979.

[36] V. Shilov, "Light from the Atom," *Pravda*, August 4, 1977, in CDSP, vol. 29, no. 31, p. 10.

[37] Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports," p. 104.

[38] "The Prospects for Power Engineering," *Izvestiya*, April 11, 1979, in CDSP, vol. 31, no. 15, p. 2.

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can expand the power produced by a given amount of uranium by as much as 100 times. Because the liquid-metal fast breeder produces more fuel than it uses, according to a U.S. government report, it is "a virtually inexhaustible resource for generating electricity."[39] Apparently, the Soviets share this optimistic assessment.

Research in the Soviet Union on fast-breeder reactors began in 1949, and by the early 1960s, development had reached the point where work was begun on the first breeder reactor. In the late 1960s, a small reactor began operation in Dmitrovgrad in Ulyanovsk Province. The Soviet Union also built the world's first large fast-breeder reactor, with a capacity of 350,000 kilowatts, at Shevchenko in the Transcaspian region of Kazakhstan. That reactor began operation in 1973.[40] Throughout the decade, Soviet scientists maintained great expectations for the fast breeder. As early as 1970, A. Petrosyants, chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, wrote: "Construction of atomic plants on the basis of 'fast' reactors [breeders] is the general trend in the further development of atomic-power engineering in our country."[41] Almost a decade later, Soviet scientists continued to affirm that "at present the most promising branch of atomic power engineering appears to be that which is connected with fast-neutron reactors."[42] This statement expresses intentions, not accomplishments. In fact, nuclear energy in the Soviet Union has developed much more slowly than intended. Under the tenth five-year plan, approximately 20 per cent of new capacity for energy was scheduled to be nuclear. Even at that, in 1980 nuclear power will account for only 1 per cent of total energy production.[43] Nonetheless, the Soviets are committed to the fast breeder.

There has been virtually no discussion in the Soviet press about the relationship between the widespread use of breeder reactors and the effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. In a rare admission, *Pravda* recently acknowledged that the breeder reactors pose "difficulties," the chief of which is that "the operation of such reactors results in the expanded reproduction of plutonium, the

[39] Comptroller General, "Nuclear Reactor Options to Reduce the Risk of Proliferation to Succeed Current Light Water Reactor Technology." Report to the Congress of the United States, May 23, 1979. See, also, Spurgeon M. Keeney, Jr., Chairman, *Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices,* Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (the Ford-Mitre report) (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977), p. 9.

[40] *Pravda,* March 27, 1977, in CDSP, vol. 29, no. 13, p. 25.

[41] *Pravda,* October 13, 1970, in CDSP, vol. 22, no. 41, p. 18.

[42] N. Basov and L. Feoktistov, "Lasers and the Power Engineering of the Future," *Pravda,* February 4, 1979, in CDSP, vol 31, no. 5, p. 10.

[43] Tyrus W. Cobb, "The Soviet Energy Dilemma," ORBIS, Summer 1979, pp. 356-366.

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basis of nuclear weapons. The development of world power engineering on such a basis would put many hundreds of tons of plutonium into international circulation. The possibility of its 'leakage' that arises in this connection clearly runs contrary to the interests of security and the prevention of nuclear war."[44] On this issue, the Soviets continue to attempt to square the circle. They want a plutonium economy and they want a nonproliferation regime. At this stage, they appear willing, unlike the United States, to undermine the latter in order to promote the former. Like the French, with whom they negotiated an agreement in 1977 to cooperate in breeder research, the Soviets are giving priority to their energy needs.

On balance, then, current Soviet policy supports a nonproliferation regime on some counts — support for the NPT (including vigorous IAEA controls), full-scope safeguards over nonsignatories who receive nuclear aid, curtailment of exports of enrichment and reprocessing facilities — but undermines it in other areas, most notably in the development of the fast-breeder reactor. Other facets of Soviet policy that undermine nonproliferation efforts are support for peaceful nuclear explosions and the sale of nuclear technology to politically volatile and extremist regimes (e.g., Libya). Indeed, the growing Soviet involvement in the commerce of nuclear materials and services threatens to encourage the spread of nuclear capabilities. The time is rapidly approaching when the Soviet Union — in concert with other nuclear powers — is going to have to give an even higher priority to nonproliferation as a foreign policy objective or, alternatively, to develop a strategy for living in a highly proliferated world.

[44] Basov and Feoktistov, "Lasers," p. 10.

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SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES IN THE EIGHTIES: THE PARAMILITARY DIMENSION*

by John J. Dziak

Until recently, Western discussions of the Soviet threat to U.S. and West European security interests have tended to focus on the purely military aspects of the problem. Our fixation on quantitative military indices, whether conventional or nuclear, is underscored by the seemingly perpetual MBFR and SALT processes. Of late, however, the threat posed by Soviet intelligence and security services appears to have been rediscovered, and a concern with the plethora of activities of the KGB, GRU, DGI (Cuba's Dirección de General Inteligencia), and others is once more being manifested beyond the confines of Western security services. This recognition that the problem transcends a strictly military dimension, though tardy, is indeed welcome.

Determination of our counterintelligence requirements in the 1980s, however, should not be bounded only by the espionage activities of the KGB's First Chief Directorate and its subcontractors. There is an aspect of the problem that falls between the military threat and the intelligence/security threat, yet partakes of both. For want of a better term, I have labeled this the "paramilitary dimension." It is that area of activity closely related to or in conjunction with military operations but which, because of the political sensitivity of the objectives sought and of the methods employed, are either controlled or monitored by the Soviet intelligence and security services. At issue here is a facet of Soviet "active measures" beyond the periodic kidnapping or assassination by the First Chief Directorate's "Wet Affairs" Department or the deception operations of the Disinformation Directorate. My concern in this brief survey is

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed as representing official positions of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency or the U.S. Department of Defense.

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with the role and operations of special-purpose troops who, during crises or wartime, would be deployed under the control of the intelligence and security organs of the USSR on highly sensitive missions.

"Active Measures" and Military Operations

Traditionally, "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) have been a feature of aggressive Soviet security operations from the earliest years of the Soviet state. Western counterintelligence possesses numerous case studies of assassinations, kidnappings, fabrications, deceptions, and disinformation ploys employed in the pursuit of Soviet political objectives. This unusual category of extralegal activities is complemented in military affairs through "special designation" (*spetsnaznacheniya* or *spetsnaz*) units charged by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with missions too sensitive for regular military formations.

It is useful to recall that the Party, from its earliest years in power, saw fit to create special categories of military forces subordinate not to the line military but rather to the various state security and interior organs. Collectivization and the breaking of the peasantry was enforced with the bayonets of OGPU troops. Leadership security was and still is provided by the elite troops of the KGB's Kremlin Kommendatura. NKVD, NKGB, and "SMERSH" forces not only penetrated the Soviet military during World War II to ensure loyalty, but were deployed in the Red Army's rear to prevent "unauthorized" retreats. As the war progressed in Moscow's favor, these same forces served as the Party's means for reimposing Soviet control in the reconquered territories and for introducing Soviet-style socialism to Eastern Europe.

In addition, after the Nazi invasion of 1941 the Central Committee created a "Central Staff of the Partisan Movement," which conducted guerrilla, espionage, sabotage, and assassination operations behind German lines.[1] Apparently, three groups exercised strong influence over the Partisan Movement: the General Staff's Chief Intelligence Directorate, the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB, and the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate (GUKR NKO, or SMERSH), headed by General Abakumov, an NKGB officer. Two of these three were part of the state security apparatus. SMERSH it-

[1] Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, *Survey of Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (Washington, 1947), Record Group 319, 350.05, FW259, National Archives, declassified from Secret, pp. 33, 163. It is interesting to note that the current KGB chief, Yuriy Andropov, served with the Partisans during World War II.

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self, though nominally subordinate to the Commissariat for Defense, was directly answerable to Stalin.[2] Thus, central political control was an operative reality. Actual day-to-day operations of the Partisan Movement were controlled by NKVD Major General Pavel Sudoplatov, known as the "master of special detachments" in the German rear.[3] After the war, he was a senior official in the MGB.

The Partisan experience had a profound impact on subsequent Soviet planning and organization for special operations against the newly designated enemy following Germany's defeat — the United States. The MGB carefully drew upon the talents of officers who served in Sudoplatov's "special detachments" to help build an underground infrastructure "to establish combat operations for weakening the network of military bases of the American command in Europe."[4]

During World War II, special security troop units had other functions, as well. State communications were too important to be entrusted solely to the Communications Commissariat or to the General Staff's GRU. Special signal units subordinated to the security organs provided redundant and secure communications nets for such Party leadership echelons as the Politburo, the State Committee of Defense, and the STAVKA (Supreme High Command). They also served intercept functions, providing the General Staff with tactical and strategic intelligence derived from German military communications. According to General G. K. Tsinev, KGB deputy chairman, state security agencies (including military counterintelligence) performed yeoman services in this regard: "More than 4,000 communications on the enemy and his plans were received during the war from operative groups of military counterintelligence agencies and the NKVD operating in the enemy's rear. Around 1,500 of these were transmitted to the General Staff, more than 600 to the long-range air command, and more than 400 to the commanders and military councils of the fronts."[5]

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[2] Office of Naval Intelligence, *Espionage, Sabotage, Conspiracy: German and Russian Operations, 1940 to 1945. Excerpts from the Files of the German Naval Staff and from Other Captured German Documents* (Washington, April 1947), D498.1, 12236-a, declassified from Confidential, app. 1, p. 18.

[3] Nikolai Khokhlov, *In the Name of Conscience* (New York: McKay, 1959), p. 31.

[4] Ibid., p. 127. Khokhlov was a member of Sudoplatov's Partisans during the war and later moved into MGB "wet affairs" activities.

[5] General G. K. Tsinev, "Guarding the Interests of the Armed Forces of the USSR: Soviet Military Counterintelligence is Sixty Years Old," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 24, December 1978, pp. 26-31. Tsinev was promoted to the rank of General of the Army shortly after his article went to press. Two other senior KGB officials received promotion to the same four-star rank at that time (December 13, 1978): General V. A. Matrosov, KGB Border Guard chief, and General S. K. Tsvigun, KGB first deputy chairman. There are now a total of four officials with the rank General of the Army in the

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Tsinev points out that these special units served even more exotic missions, such as deception and disinformation: "Operating in close contact with the Red Army General Staff and taking advantage of various opportunities of the moment, military counterintelligence agencies systematically misled the fascist command and its intelligence services relative to the plans and intentions of the Soviet Command and to the situation on various sectors of the front. From the end of 1941 until March of 1943 alone, 80 radio stations captured by Soviet Cheka agents from German secret agents were used to transmit false information to the enemy."[6] He might have added that the radio deception operations of these special security units played a big role in crushing Hitler's "Operation Citadel" at Kursk in the summer of 1943, the true strategic turning point of the war on the eastern front. Similarly, they supported the subsequent major Soviet offensives culminating in the Battle of Berlin and the collapse of Germany.

These were not the only missions of Soviet *spetsnaz* units during World War II. Crack and fanatical NKVD units made the German capture of Rostov a costly one, turning that city into a deathtrap.[7] Around the same time (summer 1942) and in the same frontal area, Stalin loosed Beria and his NKVD troops where they soon set up a parallel NKVD Staff for the "defense" of the North Caucasus, rivaling the military's and even threatening General Malinovskiy (later minister of defense) with house arrest.[8] On Stalin's personal orders, Beria and his troops then went about deporting and murdering the various minority peoples of the region (Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Ingushi, Balkars, Volga Germans, and so on).

Other *spetsnaz* groups were frequently reported to be in control of advanced weapon systems, such as the Katyusha multiple rocket launchers. The tradition of assigning special weapons to the control of the security forces and *not* the regular military was reported to have carried over into the postwar years, especially with respect to nuclear munitions. Some sources feel that KGB troops still

KGB, Andropov having received his four-star rank in 1976. Similarly, Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolai Shchelokov was promoted to General of the Army in 1976. All of these men appear to be members of Brezhnev's *banda* (or "mafia"), intimates dating back to Brezhnev's days as Party boss of Dnepropetrovsk. Tsvigun has the added link of being Brezhnev's brother-in-law.

[6] Ibid. Tsinev gives no operational specifics in this regard. David Kahn, however, seems to have identified one of these principals as the double Abwehr agent MAX, who fed heaps of misleading data on behalf of the Soviets to the ever gullible Germans. See David Kahn, *Hitler's Spies* (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 313-317, 368-369.

[7] John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 370-371.

[8] Ibid., pp. 378-379.

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control nuclear stockpiles and other highly sensitive installations.[9] Brezhnev appears to have continued the practice of retaining the services of military forces other than those of the Ministry of Defense.

The Soviet leadership is not one to fret over cost-effectiveness or problems of duplication when it comes to Party security and the expansion of Party power. Nor has it ever evinced any concern with unhappiness in regular military quarters over the presence of rival military units whose political clout is underwritten by Party fiat. As early as 1924, a fusion of two CHEKA units resulted in a Division of Special Designation, later renamed (in 1926) the Dzerzhinskiy Detached Motorized Infantry Division of Special Designation.[10] Still later, it was renamed the First Dzerzhinskiy Motorized Infantry Division and continues, to this day, to serve as the security police's own special troops charged with suppressing uprisings or rebellions against the Party leadership.[11] As such, it is probably subordinated to the Ninth Directorate of the KGB, known also as the Bodyguards, Government Guards, and Kremlin Kommendatura.[12] A fairly recent Soviet book on the Dzerzhinskiy Division has it subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).[13] Most likely, the Dzerzhinskiy Division is a KGB unit; at the very least, it would remand to KGB authority at Andropov's will, as is the case with other MVD internal security divisions and Gulag and prison operations. Emigrés and defectors have reported that this unit, or others like it, has sensitive external missions beyond that of leadership protection. Such missions would be undertaken in periods of international tension, crises, or actual war.

An insight into the internal use of such forces was provided in early 1953 during Beria's attempted putsch following Stalin's death. After fusing the MVD and MGB into one massive security organ, Beria had at his disposal not only the traditional secret political police and regular militia (civil police), but several hundred thousand internal security troops, border guards, and elite elements, such as the Dzerzhinskiy Division. Not hesitating to play such aces, he deployed the Dzerzhinskiy Division and a sister unit, the Second Motorized Infantry Division, to Moscow, thereby attempting to con-

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[9] Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder: Westview, 1979), p. 221.

[10] Peter Deriabin, *Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1972), pp. 258, 265.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. See, also, Deriabin, *The Secret World* (New York: Doubleday, 1959) and John Barron, *KGB* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974).

[13] I. G. Belikov et al., *Imeni dzerzhinskogo* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976).

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trol the seat of all power.[14] At the same time, he "arranged" for the army troops of the Moscow Military District to be sent to Byelorussia for exercises. However, he made the supreme error of sending his divisions back to their barracks before he could outmaneuver his rivals. In a counterconspiracy, Beria's Politburo peers arranged for the showcase unit of the Moscow Military District, the Kantemirovskaya Armored Division, to deploy its tanks and troops in Moscow.[15] With no *spetsnaz* forces to oppose them, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, and others confronted Beria and arrested him on June 26, 1953. He was executed six months later. The leadership had gone to great lengths to involve the regular military in the Beria affair, not merely by the use of the Kantemirovskaya Division, but by having Marshal Konev act as one of Beria's interrogators. Here was a case where the Party used the military against the security forces rather than the reverse, which was, and is, the norm.

Deriabin feels that something equally weighty may have occurred in 1967 when the Supreme Soviet announced a special award for the Kantemirovskaya Armored Division, but declined to give a reason for the honorific.[16]The award followed the terse announcements of the sudden and unexpected deaths of at least fifteen senior KGB, MVD, and military officers, including two KGB generals (one of whom was the Chief of the Third Directorate, responsible for military counterintelligence). Was the Kantemirovskaya used against KGB *spetsnaz* troops? If so, the Party has developed more than one praetorian guard. More recent developments, however, suggest that the KGB-MVD axis still maintains a monopoly in these matters with the full confidence of the Party leadership.

The Party, therefore, has seen fit to create elite military formations subject to direct Party control, through the security services, for sensitive missions. Until the end of World War II, these missions primarily had an internal security focus, but with the extension of Soviet power into Central Europe after the defeat of Germany, *spetsnaz* units gradually took on external tasks. It was not until the massive expansion and modernization of Soviet military power following the "revolution in military affairs" in the post-Stalin period, however, that the extent and direction of these tasks took on new meaning for Western observers.

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[14] Deriabin, *Watchdogs of Terror*, pp. 328-329.

[15] Ibid., pp. 332-333. This division still serves as a showcase unit for parades and visiting dignitaries. It was used by the Party leadership in the late 1970s to show off the T-72 main battle tank to Western observers.

[16] Ibid., p. 346.

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The Military Build-up, Power Projection, and the Security Services

The strategic significance of the Soviet military build-up of the 1960s and 1970s is underscored by (1) the end of the U.S. strategic-nuclear monopoly and (2) the shift from the traditional continental focus of the Soviet armed forces toward a global reach. In retrospect, the Soviets had to achieve the former (i.e., acquire strategic parity — at a minimum) before it could proceed with the latter: the projection of Soviet conventional power.

According to the Soviets, the Party's political strategy is determined by an assessment of the "correlation of forces," which shifted significantly in the USSR's favor during the late 1960s–early 1970s when the USSR achieved strategic parity with the United States.[17] The shift in the strategic balance was hastened by what the Soviets perceive as a "general crisis of capitalism," referred to by Brezhnev at the Twenty-fifth CPSU Congress in 1976.[18] The political strategy of the Party is both to sustain the shift in the strategic balance and to continue to reap the benefits of capitalism's crisis, a crisis in which Soviet military power is claimed to have played a significant role. Further, senior political-military figures assert that as a result of all this a much greater "external" role for the Soviet armed forces is demanded.[19]

The projection of Soviet conventional power under an umbrella of strategic strength was not the result of purchasing a capability and then searching for a mission to justify it. Soviet military doctrine and the Party's military equipment policy simply does not work that way. In a political system that prides itself on central planning, a command economy, and centralized hierarchical political control, little happens in the realm of power accretion that is accidental.[20] Within the limits of economic, technological, and institutional constraints, the purposeful pursuit of goals characterizes Soviet leadership style. Plan and doctrine precede and determine capability.

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[17] See G. Arbatov, in *Izvestiya*, June 22, 1972; N. V. Podgornyy, in *Izvestiya*, February 13, 1975; and M. A. Suslov, in *Pravda*, April 23, 1975.

[18] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976.

[19] General A. A. Yepishev, "This Historic Mission of the Army of the Socialist State," *Kommunist*, no. 7, May 1972, p. 62; Marshal A. A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 5, May 1974, pp. 30-47.

[20] For an expansion of this theme, see my article "The Institutional Foundations of Soviet Military Doctrine," *International Security Review*, Winter 1980, and my study "Soviet Perceptions of Military Doctrine and Military Power," Washington: National Defense University, 1979 (mimeo.).

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Soviet Intelligence and Security Services

CHEKA	All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage
GRU	Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
GUKR NKO	Armed Forces Counterintelligence Directorate
KGB	Committee of State Security
MGB	Ministry for State Security
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NKGB	People's Commissariat for State Security
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
OGPU	United State Political Directorate
SMERSH	*smert shpionam* ("death to spies"), popular name for GUKR NKO

In the early 1960s, Khrushchev's Soviet Union did not possess the military capability to capitalize on "wars of liberation," an element of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. The military inability to underwrite the 1962 Cuban adventure underscored Soviet strategic weakness as well as power-projection inadequacies. The correctives to these weaknesses were actually under way before the 1962 missile crisis and gained impetus under the Brezhnev regime following the coup against Khrushchev in 1964.

That the Soviets fully intended to address the expansion of their power-projection capability once the strategic-nuclear equation was corrected can be seen in an important Soviet work on military doctrine and strategy. Marshal Sokolovskiy's seminal work *Voyennaya strategiya* [Military Strategy] was the unclassified declaration of the famous "special collection" of military writings published in the classified General Staff journal *Voyennaya mysl'* [Military Thought]. The "special collection" reflected an "ordered" ferment in military thinking (initiated by the Party) that presaged the new stage of military doctrine.[21] In 1968, the third edition of Sokolovskiy's *Voyennaya strategiya* was issued, and, as in the previous two editions (1962, 1963), a large section was devoted to the nature of modern war, especially "just wars," such as wars of national liberation. In the earlier editions, it was declared that the Soviet Union had the "duty to support the sacred struggle of oppressed peoples and their just wars of liberation against imperialism"; this included not only ideological and political help but material aid as well.[22] However, the third edition added the following: "The USSR will render, when it is

[21] Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 223-225.

[22] For the three editions in one volume, see Harriet F. Scott's translation with commentary: *Soviet Military Strategy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975).

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necessary, *military support as well* to people subject to imperialist aggression."[23]

This was the first instance of a prominent Soviet strategist writing in an authoritative work clearly indicating that Moscow intended to become *militarily* involved in wars of national liberation. If this statement had been posited in the earlier editions, its pertinence would have been automatically blunted by the lack of forces and mobility to make it credible. By the late 1960s, however, the expansion both of strategic-strike forces and of general-purpose forces was already under way, lending ominous substance to Sokolovskiy's declaration. By 1972, when General Yepishev confidently proclaimed "external missions" for the Soviet military, the USSR was the strategic-nuclear equal of the United States, and the USSR's new, conventional power-projection forces were appearing in increasing numbers beyond the continental confines of Eurasia. Under its new nuclear umbrella, the General Staff could deploy its projection forces in a highly visible manner freed from the constraints of 1962.

But the General Staff does not exercise exclusive claims in projecting Soviet power and influence abroad. Politics and Party political strategy determine everything, including military affairs. Sokolovskiy himself stressed this point when he quoted Lenin: "politics is the reason and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military points of view to the political."[24] In the Soviet experience, the principal instrument of the Party, and hence of politics, is the KGB. Whether known as the "Action Arm," "Sword and Shield," or "Most Trusted Cadre" of the Party, it has an exclusive charter as the cutting edge for projecting Soviet power. For this charter, it draws not only on the traditional instruments of "active measures" in its First Chief Directorate, but also on those "special purpose" formations honed in World War II.

What are the forces available to the KGB for military and quasi-military missions in the 1980s? A review of those forces is given below, though not necessarily in priority order:

(1) The KGB's own armed forces, the Border Troops, comprise 200,000 to 300,000 men.[25] They are organized as a Chief Directorate, though unnumbered, of the all-union KGB and are equipped with tanks, self-propelled

[23] V. D. Sokolovskiy, ed., *Military Strategy*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), p. 222. (Emphasis added.)

[24] Ibid., p. 24.

[25] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979-1980* (London: 1979), p. 11, lists 200,000 KGB Border Troops. John Barron gives a figure of 300,000. (*KGB*, p. 85.) The former figure appears too low, especially in view of the steady build-up of forces on the lengthy Sino-Soviet frontier.

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guns, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and ships. Considered an elite force, they receive the more politically reliable conscripts in the semi-annual call-up. Answerable directly to KGB headquarters in Moscow, the Border Troops are in no way subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff.

Aside from completely sealing the Soviet frontier, their use in World War II suggests something of their other current and projected missions: absorbing and holding an invasion until regular ground forces are deployed; preventing "unauthorized" retreats by the regular military; providing rear-area security, fighting guerrillas and rebels; deporting "unreliable" and "traitorous" elements of the population; imposing Party control in reconquered and newly conquered territories; and helping to weed out and execute or deport anticommunist elites in newly conquered territory. They were and would be assisted in these measures by MVD Internal Security Troops. Indeed, since the late 1960s, the bulk of the fighting along the Sino-Soviet frontiers has been borne by KGB Border Troops. A clue to another external mission is provided by Barron: Border Troop officers served as advisers to Hanoi during the Vietnam War.[26]

(2) Among KGB-subordinated elements, we must also include the troops of the Ninth, or Guards, Directorate. Charged with physical protection of high-level Party and state leaders and their families, the Ninth Directorate also guards the Kremlin and critical government offices and facilities throughout the country. Defectors and émigrés have reported that the Guards Directorate controls elite troop formations of regimental size and greater. Deriabin (who was a KGB Guards officer) specifically identifies the First Dzerzhinskiy Motorized Infantry Division as one such organization whose task is the suppression of rebellions against the Party.[27] The Soviets have publicly identified the Red Banner Dzerzhinskiy Division as subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but, as seen earlier, this would not prevent it from "chopping" to the KGB in crises.[28] They devote considerable space to the combat role this division played in World War II as a "special unit." Rumors have persisted for years that Guards Directorate *spetsnaz* units have sensitive external missions, and the Dzerzhinskiy Division appears to be one such unit.

(3) Troops of the KGB's Eighth, or Communications, Directorate may fall into the category of *spetsnaz* units (sometimes called *Osnaz* for *Otryad Osobogo Naznacheniya,* Detachment of Special Designation). However, their missions are exclusively those of communications security, communications intelligence, and the maintenance of special state communications. Other than supporting special overseas operations of other *spetsnaz* units, they apparently would have no direct political action or combat role.

(4) The KGB's Third Directorate (Armed Forces Counterintelligence) is charged with penetrating the Soviet military from the highest to the lowest levels in order to ensure loyalty and to prevent the armed forces from being subverted or from turning on the Party. Its World War II predecessor, SMERSH, performed similar tasks and carried out special combat missions of particular sensitivity, as well. Will the Third Directorate also be used in

[26] *KGB*, p. 85.
[27] *Watchdogs*, p. 265.
[28] Belikov, *Imeni dzerzhinskogo.*

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special combat missions? General Tsinev, KGB deputy chairman, suggests in a tantalizing hint that it will: "military counterintelligence agents will continue to apply every effort to reliably protect the Soviet Armed Forces against the subversive activities of intelligence agents of the imperialist nations, various kinds of foreign anti-Soviet centers, and hostile elements."[29]

(5) The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) deploys approximately 260,000 Internal Security Troops organized into Motorized Rifle Divisions with tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, etc.[30] As with the KGB troop formations, these forces are *not* subordinate to the regular military. Akin to a praetorian guard, MVD divisions have the primary mission of ensuring the continuation of CPSU control (the Dzerzhinskiy Division, mentioned earlier, allegedly is one of these units). They are known to have been used to quell internal uprisings that went beyond the capacity of the civil police (Militia). In World War II, they worked closely with NKVD units in the rear of the Red Army, participated in imposing Soviet rule in reconquered and newly conquered territories, and waged counterguerrilla operations against anti-Soviet Partisans in the Baltic and Galicia regions (with operations against the Partisans continuing into the late 1940s). In addition, refugees reported that MVD troops participated in crushing the Hungarian revolt in 1956.

A recent case of MVD foreign involvement is that of first deputy minister of the MVD, Lt. General V. S. Paputin. Paputin is reported either to have died during the coup against Afghan strongman Amin in December 1979, or to have committed suicide after botching the affair.[31] His death was announced by Moscow to have occurred on December 28, one day after Amin's execution. Earlier, Paputin was reported to have been in Kabul immediately before the coup as part of an official Soviet delegation meeting with Amin. Was the number-two MVD man a principal in the affair? (More on this later). Equally interesting are Paputin's links to Brezhnev. Both Paputin and his boss, MVD Chief General N. Shchelokov, have been identified as members of Brezhnev's *banda*, dating back to Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk days.[32] Still another MVD official, Lt. Gen. Churbanov, promoted to first deputy minister after Paputin's death, also belongs to the *banda*.[33] Gen. Shchelokov received his four-star rank along with Andropov in 1976 and is a voting member of the Central Committee. Paputin was a candidate member of that body. Thus, Paputin, a leader of a security organ that controls nearly a quarter million elite troops, a candidate member of the Central Committee, and an insider in Brezhnev's ruling clique, died in circumstances possibly related to Soviet "active measures" in Kabul. An interesting event!

(6) Both the KGB and the GRU maintain links with and training facilities for Third World liberation groups and foreign terrorists.[34] The links

[29] "Guarding the Interests of the Armed Forces," p. 31. (Emphasis added.) As an aside, the current head of the General Staff's Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Ivashutin, is a former Third Directorate chief, SMERSH officer, and KGB deputy chairman.

[30] IISS, *The Military Balance, 1979-1980*, p. 11.

[31] *Washington Post*, January 4, February 18, and March 14, 1980.

[32] *Daily Telegraph* (London), April 30, 1979.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Barron, *KGB; Daily Telegraph*, November 20 and July 16, 1979; Leonard Schapiro, "The Soviet Union and the PLO," *Survey*, Summer 1977-1978, pp. 193-207.

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between these activities and the operations of Soviet *spetsnaz* forces are murky and difficult to define. The most instructive precedent available here is the case of Partisan chief, NKVD General Sudoplatov, who, after World War II, was ordered to change his operations to "active measures" (sabotage, assassination, and terrorism) against the West.

(7) The *regular* Soviet military also maintains *spetsnaz* forces with sensitive strategic missions beyond Soviet frontiers, especially in Western Europe. Principal among these would be the eight divisions of airborne troops under the direct command of the General Staff in Moscow.[35] Either full airborne divisions, or units thereof, are designated as Special-Purpose Airborne Troops (*Spetsnaznacheniya Vozdushno-Desantnykh Voysk*) and are targeted against key political, military, command and control, transportation, and industrial targets in the enemy's rear. It is generally believed that, depending on the sensitivity of the operation, control of such units may very well be under the KGB.

Indeed, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the seizure of the Prague airport and of Prague itself was carried out by *spetsnaz* airborne units under KGB orders.[36] They not only secured vital points until relieved by the slower ground forces, but arrested Dubcek and dispatched him, as a prisoner, to Moscow. Similar missions were carried out against other "enemies" on KGB lists. Virtually the same tactics were repeated in Kabul in December 1979. *Spetsnaz* units from airborne, and probably from other special-purpose elements, were already in Kabul and Bagram airfield at the time of the coup (December 27). Working with Soviet military advisers to the Afghan Army, they employed a number of deceptions to neutralize real or potential opposition from the Afghans.[37] One respected Soviet specialist, Professor John Erickson of Edinburgh University, believes the Soviets did exactly the same things as in Prague. He feels a "special assignment" brigade of the 105th Airborne Division "under the direction of the KGB" spearheaded the Kabul operation.[38] Most observers generally agree that special Soviet units went to Amin's palace (where the Soviets had urged Amin to go for "protection") and that Amin died in an assault by his Soviet "protectors" on the night of December 27. One source insists that "far from being executed after a summary trial" by the new regime, "Amin was killed in cold blood by the Russians" along with "at least 40 members of his family, staff and friends."[39] Here is where the mystery of General Paputin begins. Was he involved in the operation against Amin and did he die in the ensuing firefight? What was an MVD first deputy minister, Central Committee candidate member, and crony of Brezhnev doing there? Was that operation so politically sensitive that the leadership required such high-ranking personalities on the scene and in action? How did he relate to the KGB and the military, or were the "military" forces involved (MVD troops?) under his control? One British source claims that Paputin was sent to Kabul, under the guise of modernizing the Afghan security forces, in order to help set the stage for the Soviet

[35] Aleksei Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage Training for World War III," *Soviet Analyst*, December 20, 1979, pp. 2-6.

[36] Ibid.

[37] *Los Angeles Times*, January 10, 1980.

[38] Quoted in the *Sunday Times* (London), July 13, 1980.

[39] *Sunday Times*, January 20, 1980.

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invasion.[40] Then, with a team of eighty to ninety Soviet intelligence and military personnel (*spetsnaz* forces?), he proceeded to secure key Afghan government posts without consulting Amin. On the night of December 26, 1979, General Paputin was killed in a wild shootout in or near Amin's palace when Amin balked at Paputin's maneuverings.[41] The one thing we can be sure of is this: the Soviets were far gentler with the Czechs and Dubcek in 1968!

(8) Fewer in number than the airborne units are *spetsnaz* units of regimental size or smaller, known as "diversionary bridages," subordinate to the General Staff's GRU.[42] Their main tasks include preparation for the landing of airborne units behind enemy lines, reconnaissance and real-time intelligence reporting on particularly critical targets, sabotage, disruption, and even the use of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons.[43] They would work in conjunction with "sleeper" agents long since placed in the target region. Myagkov puts it this way: "Shortly before the outbreak of war the KGB would activate its agents in Western political and military circles in an attempt to conceal Soviet intentions of launching an attack. Soviet diplomats would likewise use disinformation and other methods of dulling the awareness of the target countries. Some of the saboteurs would begin operations a few days before the outbreak of war but in such a way that enemy activity will not be suspected. In the first hours of war the special sabotage groups and paratroops would be added to the agents already operating in the target area."[44] A number of former Soviet military and intelligence officers have argued that even the GRU "diversionary brigades" would come under KGB control for actual operations, and World War II experience would seem to bear this out. Again, the recent events in Afghanistan may prove instructive here. Were "diversionary" units involved in the coup against Amin? Answers to this and previous questions about that affair could prove extremely helpful in gauging future Soviet actions.

(9) To the Soviet airborne and diversionary formations must be added similar units of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. At least 20,000 of these troops, mainly from Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, are available for behind-the-lines operations.[45] Additionally, naval infantry of the USSR, Poland, and East Germany would be used in special missions such as seizing beachheads, or in commando raids using tactics similar to those of *spetsnaz* units.

(10) Finally, one category of forces that has a "special purpose" mission involving great political sensitivity (and payoff) is that of military and security aid personnel. Little if anything ever appears about them, their presence in large numbers throughout the Third World merely being accepted as a fact of international life. Included are Soviet, East European (specifically East German), and Cuban cadres, plus a smattering of other nationalities. Apparently, Soviet military-aid personnel are controlled di-

[40] *Foreign Report* (The Economist), January 9, 1980.

[41] Ibid. This source lists three reported versions of Paputin's death. All three involved firefights at or near the palace between Afghan units and Paputin's bodyguards.

[42] Myagkov, *Soviet Analyst*, December 20, 1979, and January 9, 1980; C. N. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," *International Defense Review*, no. 1, 1980, p. 37.

[43] Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage Training."

[44] *Soviet Analyst*, January 9, 1980, p. 5.

[45] Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," p. 37.

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rectly by the General Staff through its Military Assistance Directorate.[46] Additionally, GRU cadres complement aid personnel by providing guerrilla, diversionary, and intelligence training. The GRU, in turn, is complemented by KGB officers who, in addition to subverting and destabilizing even friendly governments (e.g., Afghanistan), provide the expertise for structuring internal security replicas of the USSR in the host country or movement. Like the GRU, the KGB is also heavily involved in sabotage and guerrilla training and is believed to enjoy higher precedence than its sister service. The First Chief Directorate (foreign operations) is the organizational focal point for these activities. Cuban, East European, and other surrogate security services perform similar tasks under the guidance of the KGB.[47] Especially in Third World countries, the Soviets have found it critical to win over, control, or weaken the indigenous military because of their political power. Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev went to the heart of the matter when he stated: "Experience confirms that the position adopted by the army largely determines whether a particular regime can remain in power or not."[48] Control the military and you control the government! It is my suspicion that because of the political focus and sensitivity of such operations, Soviet military aid and GRU personnel may very well be under some type of KGB oversight or control. In a very real sense they, too, are *spetsnaz* forces when deployed out of the USSR in such places as Angola, Ethiopia, and, without doubt, Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union, its satellites, and its clients have invested in large numbers of elite military or quasi-military forces whose missions clearly are of a *political*-military nature. The importance of these missions makes it imperative that the control of such forces be linked in some special way to the political leadership. Traditionally, this has been via the security services, principally the KGB and its predecessors. That linkage continues to this day.

In Soviet political strategy and military doctrine, state objectives are ultimately political objectives. Military force is but one of several means for their achievement. In the Third World, the Soviets have employed, generally adroitly, a mix of military and security aid, military presence, subversion, and other "active measures," as well as more traditional political techniques to promote their ends. *Spetsnaz* forces and operations are used to greater or lesser degrees depending on the importance of the target country and Moscow's assessment of the situation.

In the case of Afghanistan, the Soviets had a test bed for employing "active measures" and *spetsnaz* forces in a mode and intensity not seen since World War II. From April 1978, when their Afghan clients were first installed, through the coup against Amin in

[46] Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 110.

[47] Brian Crozier, *The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies, no. 92, 1978), pp. 7-12.

[48] *Kommunist*, October 1971, quoted ibid., p. 3.

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December 1979, the Soviet security services appeared to be in the forefront of Soviet involvement. KGB officers were widely reported by press and diplomatic sources to have controlled the Afghan operation resulting in the wild gunfight in which U.S. Ambassador Dubbs was killed. Special-purpose airborne troops from the 105th Guards Airborne Division in Central Asia began arriving at Bagram airbase, north of Kabul, in early December 1978, and probably sooner.[49] Already in place before that were several thousand military advisers and an unknown number of KGB officers. There may also have been other *spetsnaz* units, such as diversionary elements, deployed in the country around the same time. Thus, when the Soviets began their massive regular military infusion after Christmas, they already had their KGB and *spetsnaz* assets in place for the operation against Amin.

Outlook

The general military equation between the USSR and the United States has changed significantly since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. At that time, few analysts would have imagined a strategic situation like that which now confronts American defense planners, who must agonize over the vulnerability of our land-based nuclear deterrent. Still fewer might have guessed that Moscow's strategic strides would be quickly followed by across-the-board improvements in general-purpose forces; or that Soviet and surrogate forces in considerable numbers would be deployed to the likes of Ethiopia, or South Yemen, or Angola. For the first time in Soviet history, Moscow has the *military* capability to propel the "historical process" in regions well beyond its continental confines. Marshal Tukhachevskiy may have dreamed of employing Soviet arms as a revolutionizing force in foreign territories; Brezhnev gave the dream substance. At the leading edge of this new capability is an older tradition: special-purpose forces linked to the security services.

Should we continue to treat such special units either as just another element of the total Soviet military picture or should we lump them together with the overall problem of Soviet intelligence to be dealt with by traditional counterintelligence means? On this question, I share the views of Myagkov, who urges that we submit the *spetsnaz* problem to a greater level of scrutiny, analysis, and programmatic response: "In discussing future wars attention tends to focus on two major aspects — thermonuclear weapons and conven-

[49] *Sunday Times*, January 20, 1980.

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tional forces. But a third aspect is no less important — that of saboteurs, secret agents and special forces. They are not easily counteracted and can destroy objectives which are immune to other forms of attack. Armed with atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons these special forces can cause untold damage to the enemy. Use of such forces would change the whole character of a future war."[50]

The future use of these forces appears to be along two major axes. One is the Third World, where the precedents of Soviet intervention, as in Africa or Afghanistan, portend either more, or greater intensity of, Soviet involvement. The second is NATO Europe, the great political-strategic prize. In a crisis or war, the ultimate Soviet objective would be the total political collapse of key NATO governments, or their destruction or neutralization.[51] Frontal military assaults may not accomplish this; that is why Soviet military strategy devotes almost as much attention to operations in the "rear." The rear is the realm of *spetsnaz* forces. Their operations are intended to sow the seeds of a political-military collapse.

[50] Myagkov, *Soviet Analyst*, January 9, 1980, p. 5.

[51] Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," p. 35. See, also, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe* (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN NAVAL PERSPECTIVE *

by Donald C. Daniel

I have argued elsewhere that 1979 can be viewed as the "Year of the Pacific" for the Soviet Navy.[1] The Pacific Fleet's strength was notably increased by the addition of an aircraft carrier, two of the latest cruisers, and its most modern and largest amphibious ship. Movement of fleet forces to the South China Sea in February and March of that year constituted a highly visible Soviet response to China's punitive invasion of Vietnam. Subsequently, the USSR's "routine" use of Vietnamese facilities significantly added to the Soviet Navy's flexibility to operate in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and enabled the Soviets to establish what has since become a standing naval presence in the South China Sea.[2]

These events have drawn increased attention to the naval dimension of the Sino-Soviet rivalry — attention fanned by China itself in its vitriolic condemnations of the Soviet Union's naval build-up and activities in the Pacific and elsewhere.[3] The visit to

* The views expressed herein are those of the author. They should not be construed to represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of the Navy, or any agency of the U.S. government.

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[1] "Navy," *The Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, 1980* (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980), p. 179.

[2] The term "routine" was used by President Carter to describe Soviet naval use of Vietnamese facilities. See Edward Walsh, "Brezhnev Told Carter No Bases in Vietnam," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1979.

[3] See, for example, Richard H. Solomon, "American Defense Planning and Asian Security: Policy Choices for a Time of Transition," in Solomon, ed., *Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition*, R-2492-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1979), pp. 2, 19. For expressions of Chinese concern, see Shih Junyu, "Looking at the Soviet Fleet's Visit to Haiphong Through the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty," *Ta Kung Pao*, November 5, 1979, p. 2, as translated in Joint Publication Research Service 74643, November 27, 1979, p. 1; "Expansion of Soviet Pacific Fleet Enumerated, Discussed," Xinhua broadcast in English from Beijing, July 7, 1979, as found in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report* (PRC), July 9, 1979, p. C1; "Moscow's 'Dumb-Bell' Strategy," *Beijing Review*, no. 8, February 25, 1980, pp. 8-9; "Moscow Beefs Up Its Pacific Fleet," *Beijing Review*, no. 32, August 10, 1979, pp. 26-27; and "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," *Beijing Review*, no. 4, January 28, 1980, pp. 15-19, 26.

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China by U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in January 1980 further contributed to awareness of Sino-Soviet naval competition when, in the midst of great publicity, he boarded a Chinese destroyer and submarine. At that time, Chinese Admiral Zheng Guozhong accused the Soviet Union of posing "threats to all the seas of the world" and pledged a "reconstruction of [China's] Navy" as part of the PRC's "contribution to the fight against Soviet hegemonistic expansionism."[4]

In this paper, which aims to enhance our understanding of the naval dimensions of the Sino-Soviet struggle, we shall address four issues: What are the comparative capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and China's naval forces? How could each use its navy against the other? What changes should one expect in their abilities to influence one another with naval forces? and What should the United States do with respect to the Sino-Soviet naval situation?

Naval Capabilities

In the course of the past twenty years, the Soviet Union has established itself as one of the world's two premier naval powers. The USSR now assigns one-fourth to one-third of its navy's assets, depending on which element of Soviet naval forces one focuses on, to the Pacific Fleet. Ship and submarine forces operate primarily out of Vladivostok and Sovetskaya Gavan, along the Sea of Japan, and Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Because of the long distances, the Pacific Fleet is somewhat isolated from its three sister fleets in the western USSR. Its area of geographic responsibility is vast, covering not only the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Pacific Ocean proper but also the Indian Ocean, for that fleet is the main source of units for the squadron maintained there, as well.

The Chinese Navy is often ranked third in the world by those who concentrate on its high manpower and ship numbers. It is formally subordinated to the People's Liberation Army and consists of three fleets. The North Sea Fleet, headquartered at Qingdao, secures Beijing and the northeastern plains from attack through the Po Hai Gulf and Yellow Sea. The East Sea Fleet defends the industrial area of Shanghai, where it is headquartered, and has responsibility for the contested Taiwan Strait. The South Sea Fleet protects the area from Chaon to the border of Vietnam including the important

[4] Quoted in Norman Kempter, "Brown Finds Chinese Navy Ship-Shape," *Los Angeles Times*, January 13, 1980.

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Guangzhou [Canton] commercial center. Its command elements are found at Zhanjiang.

Two indices are used here to compare the capabilities of the Soviet and Chinese navies. One is the quantity and quality of naval hardware; the other is operational open-ocean experience.

Naval Hardware

Tables I and II provide the basis for a static comparison of Soviet Pacific and Chinese naval hardware. They show the Soviet Navy to be far superior in long-range submarines, major surface combatants, fleet-support ships, oceangoing missile-armed air, surface and subsurface platforms, and fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft. The Chinese Navy, in contrast, has very few long-range submarines, only one missile submarine, no surface combatant larger than a destroyer, no ASW aircraft or planes armed with air-to-surface missiles. Its main strength resides with medium-range torpedo-attack submarines, a very large number of minor surface combatants (all coastal patrol craft), fighter aircraft, and close-encounter weapons such as guns, torpedoes, and small ASW launchers. Although China's navy is quantitatively superior in ASUW (anti-surface-ship warfare) missiles, 86 per cent of these are on coastal defense units. China is also quantitatively stronger in amphibious vessels, but these ships are very old (mostly ex-U.S.) and obsolete, unlike their modern Soviet counterparts.

The term "obsolete" is one that is often and consistently applied by different Western observers to nearly all of China's naval platforms and onboard systems.[5] Indeed, including "defense" as one of the Four Modernizations, the Chinese themselves have readily admitted on numerous occasions that all their military forces, including the navy, are technologically backward. After visiting Chinese Navy ships and facilities, Secretary of Defense Brown said that they were at a stage of development that the Soviet Navy had reached ten or fifteen years ago.[6] Brown's estimate was most probably a conservative one, for many of the Chinese Navy's platforms, weapons, and sensors are copies of or variations on Soviet systems turned over to the Chinese some twenty years earlier. This is the case, for example, with 95 per cent of the PRC's submarines, 32 per cent of its major

[5] See, for example, Bruce Swanson, "The Navy of the People's Republic of China," in Barry Blechman and Robert Berman, eds., *Guide to Far Eastern Navies* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), p. 100; Hugh Lyon, "China's Navy: For Coastal Defense Only," in *The Chinese War Machine* (New York: Salamander Books, 1979), pp. 158-162; and "The PLA Naval Force," *Conmilit*, no. 28, February 1979, pp. 40-44.

[6] Kempter, "Chinese Navy Ship-Shape."

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TABLE I

SOVIET PACIFIC AND CHINESE NAVAL ORDERS-OF-BATTLE *

	USSR	*PRC*
Submarines		
Ballistic missile	28	1
ASUW missile	23	0
Attack	62	94
TOTAL	113	95
Long-range[a]	most	2
Medium-range	few	93
TOTAL	113	95
Major Surface Combatants		
Aircraft carriers	1	0
Cruisers	11	0
Destroyers	25	7
Frigates	41	18
TOTAL	78	25
Other Surface Ships		
Minor combatants	180	942
Amphibious (LST and larger)	11	15
Mine warfare	95	100
Replenishment/fleet support	80	37
Other auxiliaries	140	479
Aircraft		
Tactical strike	110[b]	725[b]
Tactical support	70	6
Antisubmarine warfare	120	0
Helicopters (other than ASW)[c]	. . .	50
Training/transport	60	19

* ASUW = anti-surface-ship warfare; ASM = air-to-surface missile.

[a] Includes 55 Soviet and 2 Chinese nuclear-powered units.

[b] Most Soviet strike aircraft are medium bombers with an ASM capability. Chinese tactical-strike aircraft include 575 fighters, more than 100 light bombers, and fewer than 50 medium bombers; none has ASM capability.

[c] Almost all Soviet helicopters are antisubmarine-configured and have therefore been included in the ASW category, which consists primarily of long-, medium-, and short-range fixed-wing aircraft.

Sources: Defense Intelligence Agency, *Unclassified Communist Naval Orders of Battle,* DDB-1200-124A-79, November 1979, pp. 1-6, 10-16, and *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1980.*

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TABLE II

WEAPON LAUNCHERS/RAILS ON SOVIET PACIFIC AND CHINESE SHIPS*

	USSR	*PRC*
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers		
On high seas forces	193	86
On coastal defense force	170	534
TOTAL	363	620
Surface-to-Air Missile Rails	118	8
Other		
Long-range ASW launchers	66	0
Guns (76 mm and larger)	214	535
Torpedo tubes	1,465	1,698
Short-range ASW weapon launchers	2,712	4,222

* Missile launcher/rail data are for 1979 and were computed by the author. All other data are for 1978 and were drawn from Barry Blechman and Robert Berman, eds., *Guide to Far Eastern Navies* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), p. 52.

surface combatants, 30 per cent of its patrol craft, all of its mine-warfare vessels, approximately 96 per cent of its tactical-strike aircraft, nearly all its radar and IFF identification systems, and all its operational ASUW cruise missiles.[7]

When the Chinese have tried to develop their own technologically sophisticated systems, difficulties have been numerous and delays normal. A classic example is the Han-class nuclear-powered submarine, launched in 1974. The *Han* "has spent much of its time in port while attempts have been made to correct the miscellaneous reactor malfunctions which delayed its first successful dive."[8] Other examples are the navy's missile systems. Possibly because of difficulties in developing the necessary guidance mechanisms, the Chinese have yet to come up with an operational missile for the one submarine in their inventory built to carry them — a 1958-vintage Soviet design. China's efforts with surface-to-air missiles have been no more successful. The latest *Jane's Fighting Ships* notes that the Chinese Navy's "missile . . . apparently caused problems when first introduced and is still probably doing so."[9] There is no evidence that China has even attempted to develop a long-range

[7] I computed the percentage figures by reviewing the Chinese Navy's order-of-battle in each category and identifying those units or pieces of equipment that are of Soviet design.

[8] Bruce Swanson, "China's Navy and Foreign Policy," *Survival*, July-August 1979, p. 151.

[9] John Norton Moore, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1980* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1979), p. 106.

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ASW missile such as the Soviets have done. China's continued reliance on small ASW launchers and torpedoes probably reflects the lack of a reliable sensor system capable of detecting submarines at other than short ranges.

The one missile system that has come to fruition is the one for ASUW cruise missiles. China's inventory consists entirely of Styx missiles, another Soviet-developed system. The Styx has a reach of 20 or so nautical miles, a much shorter standoff range than that of the ASUW missiles found on Soviet oceangoing surface ships. As we have seen, most of these missiles are on small platforms such that it would be difficult to fire them in medium or high sea states. In addition, because the Soviet Navy pays much greater attention to electronic warfare than the Chinese Navy — a fact evidenced by the number and variety of radomes on their respective ships — it has the potential to render ineffective a Chinese ASUW attack unless it were a saturation strike or unless the Soviets had inadequate warning.

A very important area of uncertainty about China's capabilities is its mining potential. Whereas the Soviet Union is viewed as having an extremely large stockpile of naval mines, many of which are believed to be very sophisticated, information about the quantity and quality of China's mines is unavailable. Mines could be a highly effective weapon in the Chinese arsenal.[10] Even primitive versions can seriously hamper the movement of enemy naval and civilian ships, and to sweep them is a tedious, time-consuming task requiring control of the area to be swept.

Experience

A second useful index is operational open-ocean experience. Here the record is clear and simple: the Soviets' Pacific forces have for a decade regularly deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific and have recently, as noted, established a standing presence in the South China Sea, a presence that has enhanced China's fears of encirclement by the Soviet Union. In 1979, the Soviet Navy had a daily average of twenty-seven ships forward-deployed in the Pacific (including the South China Sea) and twenty-one in the Indian Ocean, most of the latter being from the Pacific Fleet.[11] The Chinese Navy,

[10] Because of the extent of China's continental shelf, the rather shallow water makes mines a "profitable instrument" of naval warfare there. Blechman and Berman, eds., *Guide to Far Eastern Navies*, p. 3. See, also, A. W. Grazebrook, "The Chinese Maritime Force," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, June 1978, p. 13.

[11] See my essay "Navy" (fn. 1, above) as well as my article "The Soviet Navy in the Pacific," *Asia Pacific Community*, Spring-Early Summer 1979, pp. 69-79.

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though, has a very short tether. As one analyst put it, "no combatant is known to have conducted operations beyond immediate territorial waters."[12] Although the vast majority of its ships are incapable of extended high-seas operations, China's navy does have twenty-five major surface combatants and a very healthy total of ninety-five submarines. A realistic radius of operations for the larger of the major combatants would be about 3,000 nautical miles; for the submarines, except for two nuclear-powered units, the radius would be about 1,200 nautical miles. It is unrealistic, however, to expect that the surface combatants would ever operate, at least during wartime, much farther than 400 to 500 nautical miles off the coast because they lack surface-to-air missiles for defense. The 500 nautical-mile radius would give the Chinese ships a protective air cover provided by the navy's fighters and light bombers, assuming proper coordination of the air protection. (See map.) I know of no compelling reason why, in the event of war, some Chinese submarines would not operate at the outer edges of the East China and South China seas, close to the 1,200-nautical-mile perimeter I have postulated. That perimeter extends as far south as the Malacca Straits and as far north as the lower Sea of Japan. Because the Sea of Japan can, in effect, be viewed as Soviet home waters during war and because units entering that sea must pass through easily defended straits, it is highly doubtful that Chinese submarines would dare enter those waters.

Use of Capabilities

How might the Soviets and Chinese use their navies against each other in one-on-one situations? What are their prospects for success? Let us look at naval use both in a wartime and in a peacetime context.

In War

From the static picture just sketched out, it should be clear that China's navy could do little, if anything, directly against the

[12] Swanson, "China's Navy and Foreign Policy," p. 146. Also see Moore, ed. *Jane's Fighting Ships*, p. 105, and Richard R. Pariseau, "The Role of the Submarine in Chinese Naval Strategy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1979, p. 67. Shortly after I completed this article, Chinese combatants did conduct operations beyond immediate territorial waters. Between May 18 and 21, 1980, Chinese destroyers accompanied salvage, satellite-tracking, and missile-tracking ships approximately 4,000 miles into the South Pacific. This deployment supported test firings of two CSS-X-4 ICBMs, which splashed down between the Solomons and the Gilbert Islands. The very special nature of this deployment argues against the notion that Chinese combatants are now shifting to a distant-water posture. See "Chinese ICBM Test Photos," *International Defense Review*, no. 5, 1980, pp. 654-655.

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

Radius lines drawn by author on U.S. Naval Oceanographic Chart H.O. 1500 (47th ed.).

Soviet homeland in the course of a Sino-Soviet war. The PRC's one ballistic-missile submarine has no operational weapons, and its navy has no prospect whatsoever of gaining sea control along the Soviet coast in order to engage in short-range operations against its rival. An amphibious attack would be doubly out of the question, owing to China's inadequate amphibious lift. The only serious offensive threat China could pose would be against Soviet civilian shipping

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within the East China and South China seas. The USSR has one of the world's largest merchant marines and the largest fishing and oceanographic fleets; the East China and South China seas are important operating and transit areas for Soviets. Through convoys and similar protective measures, some undertaken by naval forces operating from Vietnam, the Soviet Union would probably be able eventually to protect its ships, but to do so might place a heavy burden on the Pacific Fleet. That burden would be particularly heavy if China were to resort to mining. An alternative for the Soviets would simply be to have their civilian ships avoid the contested waters altogether. Ships shuttling between the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan could take a roundabout route that, while lengthening their transit, would also ensure their safety.

The Soviet Union, in contrast, has a much richer selection of offensive naval options. Moscow could consider a naval ballistic-missile, conventional gunfire, or amphibious attack against the Chinese mainland or offshore islands. Any amphibious operation would probably be small: Soviet amphibious forces are limited, and Moscow would want to keep the bulk of its amphibious assets in the Sea of Japan to capture key straits in the event of a war with the United States and its ally Japan. A small landing might serve as a diversionary maneuver in support of a ground offensive in Xinjiang [Sinkiang] or Manchuria. Moscow's aim could be to seize an offshore island in order to give Soviet forces a staging area for "follow-on" military operations against China. The USSR might seek to retain the seized territory as part of the spoils of war, giving it a forward-base position and a claim on natural resources within the territory's economic zone.

The Soviet Navy need not concentrate its offensive activities against China's territory per se. It could act to control the East China and South China seas in order to provide protection for its civilian shipping. It could also interdict or disrupt China's merchant traffic, fishing, and offshore oil drilling and exploration. To predict the effect on China's economy of any interdiction or disruptive activity is difficult, but a few facts are worth noting. One is that China is well on the way to becoming a merchant marine power. Its level of seaborne trade is increasing dramatically and is scheduled to continue growing. The PRC now has 707 merchant transport ships, 132 per cent more than in 1973.[13] In 1978, China's principal seaports handled 200 million tons of cargo, compared with 160 million tons

[13] *Lloyd's Register of Shipping Statistical Tables*, 1973 and 1979.

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only one year earlier.[14] China is also important as a fishing nation, ranking third in the world in 1976 with a catch of 6.8 million metric tons, nearly all of which was from inland and continental-shelf offshore waters.[15] Finally, China is clearly seeking to become an oil power, and Beijing has accorded very high priority to the needs of China's petroleum industry. The PRC "intends to rely on [this] industry to generate [the] substantial export revenues" needed to purchase the foreign technology for achieving the Four Modernizations.[16] Under contract with the People's Republic, Japanese companies (with European assistance) are now drilling for oil in the Po Hai Gulf. In 1979, seven other Western oil companies were involved in or had agreed to search and drill in the PRC's continental shelf under the South China Sea.

In considering how well the PRC could defend itself against any of the threats described above, it is useful to distinguish where and how the Soviet Navy might act. On its own, China would have little or no defense against Soviet naval operations conducted outside the East China and South China seas. Again, it simply does not have the proper forces to do so. Even if China's major surface combatants had adequate surface-to-air missiles, allowing Chinese ships to venture outside the zone protected by land-based air cover, they would probably still choose not to do so in case they should be needed close to home. What this means is that the Soviet Navy would be unimpeded in any effort to subject China to ballistic-missile strikes, for most Soviet strategic submarines need approach no closer to their targets than 1,600 nautical miles. The Soviet Navy would also be entirely free to interdict PRC merchant shipping in most of the Pacific and elsewhere.

Even within the East China and South China seas, the Chinese Navy would find it very difficult to deal with Soviet submarines. It has no air ASW capability, and those ASW weapons and sensors it does possess are probably of rather limited range. Almost certainly, Soviet submarines would be aware of the presence of a Chinese submarine or surface ship before either of the latter knew of the Soviet unit's presence. The Soviets would thus have a significant advantage, one that could be insurmountable if the Soviet boat had weapons of greater standoff range.

Were China to lay naval mines off its continental shelf, this could make a great difference against Soviet surface ships and

[14] Far East Economic Review (FEER), *Asia 1980 Yearbook* (Hong Kong), p. 161.
[15] Mark Downing, "China's Ocean Developments" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1979), p. 173.
[16] FEER, *Asia 1979 Yearbook*, p. 177.

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submarines alike. But China must itself be concerned that the Soviets might lay mines first; given China's poor ASW force, the chances that Soviet submarines could do so are good.

Apart from a Chinese use of mines, the greatest difficulty faced by the Soviet Navy would be the conduct of offensive operations by its surface ships as these attempted to approach the Chinese coast. The closer to the mainland, the more intense the opposition. It is generally accepted that China's navy, especially its many general-purpose submarines, minor surface warships, and fighter aircraft, constitutes an extremely formidable coastal-defense force.[17] Using hit-and-run tactics and taking advantage of surprise and the cover provided by some 3,500 offshore islands, the Chinese could make the Soviet Navy pay a heavy price to operate surface ships over China's continental shelf.

In my judgment, if Moscow were willing to accept the cost, its navy could *not* be prevented from operating wherever it wants. It is probable, however, that high costs would not be acceptable if the USSR feared NATO might take advantage of a Sino-Soviet war to open its own hostilities. The Soviet Union, if it felt it might also have to contend with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, would not want to divert or risk the loss of too many surface ships in anti-China ventures.

In sum, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in wartime, China's navy is essentially a coastal-defense force having some interdiction capability at the outer edges of the East China and South China seas. Vis-à-vis China, the Soviet Navy is a significant offensive naval threat. It can subject China to ballistic-missile attack; through the use of submarines, it can seriously disrupt China's civilian shipping even within the East China and South China seas; it can seize China's offshore islands, destroy China's oil-exploitation facilities over the continental shelf and, if it wishes to pay the price, cannot be prevented from operating surface ships immediately off China's coast, using them to shell the mainland or to land amphibious forces.

In Peace

Soviet and Chinese use of their navies in peacetime is a much more amorphous subject than wartime use. Simply by *having*, as opposed to using, a strong, powerful, and growing naval force in

[17] See, for example, Swanson, "The Navy of the People's Republic," p. 139, and Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces*, DDI-2680-32-76 (1976), p. 6-2.

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the Pacific, the USSR presents an image of clear naval preponderance over China. This image cannot help but affect China as well as its neighbors, who are reminded that the Soviet Union can take military action against them should they side with China.

The Soviet Navy's routine use of Vietnamese bases and its establishment of a permanent presence in the South China Sea must be a source of concern to China, increasing its fear of Soviet containment or encirclement. Those fears seem well-founded in view of the Soviet Union's land-based military build-up and its diplomatic campaign for an Asian "collective security system."

In peacetime confrontations, the overall relative size and capabilities of opposing navies matter less than they do in wartime. The force on the scene is what counts, assuming that force is perceived as being able to give a good account of itself. Unless such a confrontation were to take place close to China's coast, the Chinese have little with which to respond. Having no ships larger than a destroyer, China could not hope to outclass the Soviet force should the Pacific Fleet's carrier or a few of its cruisers come on the scene. True, China could deploy submarines, but these lack the visual impact of surface combatants. It is revealing that, when the Soviets massed naval forces in the South China Sea during the 1979 China-Vietnam "war," the Chinese Navy did not respond.

In short, the USSR has little to fear from China's navy in peacetime situations. It is China that must worry about the impact of the Soviet Navy even when it does nothing but symbolize the USSR's growing and preponderant military power.

Prospects for Change

It is clear from present evidence that Soviet naval forces in the Pacific will not be any less powerful in the foreseeable future. The sophisticated Backfire bomber, with its air-to-surface missile capability, is entering naval service at a rate of about fifteen per year and, in all likelihood, will soon be assigned to the Pacific Fleet. The USSR continues to build advanced submarines at a steady pace of ten or so each year. Recently, moreover, the Soviets have begun a very impressive construction program for a new generation of large oceangoing surface combatants (including a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered cruisers), amphibious ships, and replenishment ships. At least some of these will eventually make their way to Pacific service; indeed, the first unit of the new Ivan Rogov–class heavy amphibious ship is already in the Far East.

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Thus, the critical question for the future is how far China will go to close the naval gap. The answer will depend primarily on the prevailing attitude of China's leaders, an element of some instability in the recent past because of two contending schools of thought. One group, the "Maritimists," desire "not necessarily a world ocean navy but a force which can consistently perform limited 'blue-water' operations in adjacent seas."[18] They see China's navy as technologically backward in such areas as weapons, sensors, and nuclear power. In the 1950s, the Maritimists advocated accepting Soviet technological aid, and today they are willing to seek Western aid. Opposing them are the "Continentalists," who give high priority to maintaining a strong and highly politicized army that would defeat any enemy by fighting a protracted guerrilla war on Chinese soil. Naval forces are not seen to be very useful in such a campaign since "only token resistance would be offered at the coast." The Continentalists oppose foreign technological aid and (not surprisingly) believe that military modernization should emphasize ground and air forces. Indeed, as late as 1975, the Continentalists, personified by the "Gang of Four," argued that since China's short-based guided missiles could "hit any target, 'there is no need to build a big navy.' "

With the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping and the discrediting of the Gang of Four, the Maritimist position now seems predominant. But they will have to contend for resources with the other military services as well as with civilian sectors of the economy. Moreover, as Bruce Swanson tells us, "If past records are any gauge, Chinese navies have not been especially adept at maintaining a constant growth or reasoned modernization programmes. Much will depend on the continuity of current leadership of neo-Maritimist Deng Xiaoping."[19] For the present, at least, Deng seems firmly entrenched and can take satisfaction in the recent "surge of pro-Deng officers"[20] into top military posts. The Chinese high command, however, is still dominated by officers from the ground forces. In a battle over scarce economic resources, they may have little enthusiasm for the arguments of naval advocates.[21]

Whatever the outcome, today's trends provide some insight into the kind of navy the neo-Maritimists are striving to build. It is clear that they have in mind a far-ranging technological upgrad-

[18] Swanson, "China's Navy and Foreign Policy," pp. 146-148.
[19] Ibid., p. 153.
[20] FEER, *Asia 1980 Yearbook*, p. 36.
[21] See Swanson, "The Navy of the People's Republic," p. 133; Lyon, "China's Navy," p. 162; and Harvey W. Nelsen, *The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army* (Boulder: Westview, 1977), pp. 169-176.

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ing of this and other Chinese military forces. They have purchased the Crotale surface-to-air missile from France, and they have expressed interest in the Exocet surface-to-surface missile. From Italy, they are trying to buy the Oto Melara 76/62 gun, a sophisticated 80-rounds-per-minute antiaircraft and antimissile weapon. They have approached Japan about the purchase of ASW patrol planes; and, though it is uncertain whether they intend to acquire them for naval use, they have discussed with Britain a buy of ninety Harrier V/STOL planes. An arrangement to manufacture at Sian a military version of the Rolls-Royce Spey aircraft engine has been negotiated, and the Chinese are already using the engine in their new Shenyang F-9 fighter. Responding to China's interest in acquiring them, the United States has stated its willingness to sell China flight and radar training equipment, search radars, and communication systems.

Those weapons and sensors that China does buy or produce will be placed on ships and submarines whose oceangoing capabilities are similar to those already found in China's inventory. Absolutely no evidence exists to indicate that China will build any ship larger than a destroyer.[22] Present construction trends suggest a quantitatively larger navy and a continued strong emphasis on medium-range diesel submarines (produced at a rate of six or so per year) and on light surface forces suitable for coastal defense.

There is only one platform that may be built specifically for operations outside the East China and South China seas: a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine. Many analysts believe that the Hans-class nuclear attack submarine was produced merely as a test platform for the development of a propulsion system around which China could then build a strategic missile submarine.[23] According to *Jane's,* the experience gained from constructing the Han boats "combined with known Chinese capability to build liquid-fuelled rockets of the MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM types and completion of a solid propellant factory suggest that the forecast of a Chinese ballistic missile nuclear submarine in the early 1980s may not be out of the question."[24]

All things considered, then, the current interest of China's neo-Maritimists seems to be to build a navy better capable of doing what it does now: namely, to defend the Chinese coast against ap-

[22] See Moore, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships,* p. 103.

[23] Ibid., p. 104; Pariseau, "The Role of the Submarine," pp. 67-68; and "Role of Submarine in Chinese Naval Strategy Discussed," translation of an article by Ch'en Kuan in *Conmilit,* January 1, 1980, pp. 17-22, as found in Joint Publication Research Service L/8916, February 11, 1980, pp. 1-7.

[24] Moore, ed. *Jane's Fighting Ships,* p. 104.

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proaching enemy naval forces while acting to interdict enemy shipping in the East China and South China seas. They also seem intent on acquiring a fleet of operational ballistic-missile submarines; these will contribute to China's deterrence against attack and will allow the Chinese Navy to mount an offensive against the USSR should war break out.

To achieve all this, China has the advantage of possessing what is generally considered a very good shipbuilding capability. China's record, however, for producing advanced technological systems is not good. Beijing will have to import from the West, but it is "not so much interested in buying huge quantities of arms as in buying technology and then producing the arms in China."[25] The Chinese are determined not to become dependent on other states for equipment or parts. Though wise in the long run, this decision will considerably lengthen naval modernization in the short term. One reason is simply China's lack of trained manpower to build advanced technological systems. As Deng has admitted, the turmoils of the Cultural Revolution meant a ten-year hiatus in technical education and training.[26] At the time, it was more important to be "Red," but now China needs expertise.

Even if China could absorb Western production technology quickly, two uncertainties remain. The first has to do with how much military technology China can afford to buy. Defense is only one of the Four Modernizations leading China to import Western technology, and, according to the IISS, it seems to have lower priority than the other three (agriculture, industry, science and technology).[27] By cutting back in 1979 on its planned purchases abroad, Beijing made it clear that there are sharp limits to how much China can spend. Those limits would be raised if offshore oil production increases, but increases can be slow in coming.

The other uncertainty has to do with how much military technology the West is willing to sell, and it centers on two issues. First is the ultimate use to which new equipment will be put. Although the emphasis is on equipment considered defensive in nature, some questions remain.[28] Will a strengthened China, for in-

[25] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey, 1978* (London: IISS, 1979), p. 73.

[26] As quoted in Downing, "China's Ocean Developments," p. 88.

[27] *Strategic Survey*, 1978, p. 73. See, also, Edward Luttwak, "Military Modernization in the People's Republic of China: Problems and Prospects," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, May 1979, p. 16.

[28] See Leslie Gelb's excellent essay, "U.S. Defense Policy, Technology Transfers, and Asian Security," in Solomon, ed., *Asian Security*, pp. 258-276. Also see Francis J. Romance, "Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element," ORBIS, Summer 1976, pp. 437-459; V. Yoltukovsky, "Beijing's Naval Ambitions," *Krasnaya zvezda*,

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stance, become more bellicose toward the Soviet Union, thus bringing the world closer to nuclear war? Will it instead actively challenge the interests of Western states or Taiwan? Even worse, will it challenge the West after achieving rapprochement with the Soviet Union? Finally, will it transfer new equipment and technology to other states such as North Korea, which in turn might take action against Western allies?

Beyond the issue of what China will do is the question of what the USSR will do. The Soviets have bluntly warned against Western actions that strengthen Chinese power. They certainly would not stand by passively.[29] Attempts by the Soviet Union and the West to seek a *modus vivendi* would be hampered even more than they are today.

In short, there are good reasons for the West — especially the United States — to have a cautious "go slow" attitude toward military sales to China. Juxtaposing that attitude alongside China's decision to procure production technology instead of large quantities of actual systems, its shortfall in technically trained personnel, and the economic limits both on what it can acquire and what it can do at home, one can only conclude that, although China will probably reduce the naval gap in the foreseeable future, it will do so very slowly and incompletely.

Recommendations

It is appropriate to conclude with recommendations for U.S. policy. The United States should first of all retain its cautious policy with regard to the transfer of military-related technologies to China. So far as I can determine, the reasons justifying this policy today will stand in the foreseeable future.

Second, to predict that China will neither quickly nor completely close the Sino-Soviet naval gap is a good reason to urge a strong U.S. naval presence in the Far East. Such a presence could bolster the PRC's independent stance vis-à-vis the USSR — a stance that I postulate as in the American interest. China's exhortations that the United States and its allies remain strong in the face of rising Soviet military power makes it clear that Beijing sees the Western alliance in general (Japan included), and the United States in par-

September 7, 1979, p. 3, and Bernado Valli, "Moscow's Nightmare, a Chinese-Japanese-U.S.-European Axis: Beijing's Diabolical Plots" [Interviews with Soviet Major General Mikhail Keryan], *La Stampa*, December 28, 1979.

[29] See William Hyland, "Soviet Security Concerns in the 1980s," in *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s, Part II* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 152, 1979), pp. 21-22.

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ticular, as military counterweights to the USSR. China's fear is that in the absence of these counterweights, a rapacious Soviet Union would act to impose its will on weaker neighbors. A parallel fear is often expressed in the West: that without such counterweights, even China would, albeit reluctantly, accept accommodation with the USSR.[30] In this regard, it is important to point out that recent trends in the U.S.-Soviet naval balance have not favored the United States. Whereas Soviet Pacific naval power has increased over the past few years, that of the United States has decreased. In 1975, for instance, the U.S. Seventh Fleet maintained three aircraft carriers, twenty-eight major surface combatants, one amphibious ready group, and approximately seven attack submarines in the Far East. By 1979, the amphibious and submarine force totals were about the same, but the others had dropped by one-third: two carriers and nineteen combatants. At one point in the Iranian hostage crisis, both Seventh Fleet carriers and their related escorts were on station in the Indian Ocean. Should Washington decide to maintain a carrier battle group in Indian Ocean waters, that decision may well be carried out at the expense of the Seventh Fleet, which requires at least two carriers and associated ships to hold, at best, a narrow edge in the Far East naval balance.[31]

Finally, although the United States should maintain a strong naval presence in the Far East in order to bolster China's independent stance, it should not commit itself in advance to come to China's aid in any Sino-Soviet naval confrontation. Questions of direct aid should be decided case by case. Most of the same reasons arguing for a cautious attitude on military-technology transfers would apply here. In particular, the United States should seek to have good relations with both the USSR and the PRC. Any formal defense alliance with the People's Republic must inevitably send U.S.-Soviet relations far down the road toward a return to the worst days of the Cold War, a time better left behind.

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[30] On these issues, see James E. Dornan, Jr., "The Changing Security Environment in Northeast Asia," in Richard Foster, Dornan, and William Carpentar, *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1979), pp. 3-33.

[31] On U.S. naval developments in the Pacific and the Pacific naval balance, see the testimony by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U.S. chief of naval operations, and Admiral Maurice Weisner, commander-in-chief Pacific, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980*, 96th Congress, 1st Session, February 1979, pt. 2 [Navy/Marine Corps Programs . . . Pacific Area Report], pp. 482-599, 706-773; John Collins, *Far East Balance Between U.S. and Soviet Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1979), pp. 38-50; Noel Gayler, "Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia," in Solomon, ed., *Asian Security*, pp. 58-61; and Japanese Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1979*, pp. 46-49.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EGYPT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

by Robert Springborg

Since late 1977 the U.S.-Egyptian relationship has been a marriage of convenience between two weakened parties, both trying to avoid unpleasant domestic and foreign political realities. For his part, President Carter turned to President Sadat and to Egypt after finding it impossible to force on Israel the negotiating format and outcome implied in the comprehensive settlement approach. That Carter was forced to extricate himself from this confrontation with pro-Israeli forces by interlocking his and his country's fate with a virtually destitute and increasingly impotent Egypt is testimonial to his personal lack of political prowess and courage and to structural weaknesses in America's political system. It is, moreover, astonishing that Carter failed to perceive until the very end the imposing roadblock that from the outset of his presidency lay before his stated intention of bringing together all the various parties concerned, including the Palestinians and the Soviets, to negotiate a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This roadblock is Israel and its attendant lobby in the United States.

Having fallen under the influence of the Trilateral Commission on his road to the presidency in 1976, Carter replaced Kissinger's "step-by-step" diplomacy with the commission's comprehensive approach, possibly out of the conviction that it held out better prospects for securing a lasting peace, or maybe for no better reason than that advocating such an approach would help him get elected. Whatever the case, Carter either did not fully comprehend the implications of the shift to the comprehensive approach (i.e., that its successful implementation necessitated confrontation with Israel and her American supporters); or if he did, he nevertheless still failed to prepare his administration adequately for that inevitable political battle. Not ready for the confrontation with pro-Israeli forces and lacking any profound understanding of political dynamics in the Middle East, Carter, after endorsing the Soviet-American com-

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muniqué of October 1, 1977, quickly backtracked, placating Foreign Minister Dayan and Israel by agreeing to the American-Israeli "working paper" less than a week later. Carter thereby repudiated his commitment to a comprehensive settlement as spelled out in the communiqué, leaving American Middle East policy in a shambles.

II

It was into this vacuum that Anwar Sadat stepped. Having cast his lot with the United States in the wake of the October 1973 war and having been rewarded with Kissinger's virtually exclusive attention to Egypt (bar the Golan disengagement negotiations), Sadat, like the Israelis, feared the Carter administration's comprehensive approach, though for a different reason. His preference for trilateral dealings (U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli) stemmed from his objective of preventing other Arab states, especially Syria, from negotiating directly with the United States, thus keeping them out of the limelight of Middle East diplomacy. This goal was partly rational in that Egypt, if it remained the sole Arab state at center stage, would reinforce its claims to being the leading Arab state and the only possible peacemaker, thereby earning suitable rewards. But there was and is an irrational, ethnocentric, almost megalomaniacal element in Sadat's thinking, for, while Egypt might be able to crowd other Arab performers off center stage, it cannot deliver them as an afterthought to settlements arrived at trilaterally — a proposition whose truth has now been demonstrated. In the fall of 1977, however, Sadat may have been more concerned with re-establishing Egyptian paramountcy in the American Middle East peace strategy than with thinking through all the implications of his actions. So when the momentum of the comprehensive approach was finally exhausted with the issuance of the American-Israeli working paper, Sadat cleverly realized that his *mubaadarat* ("initiative") would in a single stroke locate Egypt squarely before U.S. decisionmakers, who would then see no alternative but to return to trilateral dealings.

A brilliant tactician, Sadat was and still is pursuing a strategy based on at least five main propositions, each of which is partially accurate and reflects a measure of cleverness, but which on balance can all be deemed inaccurate, suggesting a rather superficial analysis on Sadat's part. *First*, and most important, in Sadat's decision to tie his and his country's future to the United States is the view that in order to break the U.S.-Israeli connection, a front-line Arab state has to seek American patronage, thereby ending Israel's monopoly

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on American support and simultaneously serving as a bridge to other Arab states that would like both to move away from the USSR and to scale down their anti-Israeli commitments. The value of this proposition is that it recognizes the fragility of the link between various Arab states and the USSR, the negotiability of the Israeli issue in many (if not most) Arab states, and the disadvantages in being perceived by Americans as Soviet clients implacably opposed to Israel and to the American way of life. What remains in doubt, however, is the possibility that an Arab "broker," as Sadat has cast Egypt, can effect a fundamental change in the U.S.-Israeli connection. Over the long haul, this may be the case as the calculus of Middle East demography, oil, and development of national capabilities increasingly favors the Arab side, but Sadat cannot afford the luxury of basing his foreign policy on futurology. For the near future, meaning at least the first half of the 1980s, the American-Israeli tie may be strained, but it will not be broken.

Sadat's miscalculation of the susceptibility of American-Israeli relations to manipulation by a third party, however, may be the result not of his reading of long-term strategic trends, but of his penchant for overpersonalizing foreign-policymaking processes. In short, Carter may have appeared to Sadat as a good bet. New to the scene, not on record as a fervent supporter of Zionism and, at least in the early months of his presidency, seen as emphasizing the necessity of change in America's Middle East policy, Carter could have appeared to Sadat as the man most likely to effect a fundamental change in America's stance on the Arab-Israeli issue. That this was not to be the case stemmed, in part, from Sadat's misreading of the American president, who lacked the strength of character necessary to withstand pro-Israeli pressure. Of far greater importance, however, are the underlying structural characteristics of the unique American political system, which is difficult for many (if not most) non-Americans, especially those more at home in authoritarian political systems, to comprehend. The relative weakness of the executive, the strength of Congress, and the penetration of the latter (and of the political system generally) by lobbies are uncommon attributes of First or Third World polities and are invariably underestimated by those viewing the system from their own external, usually executive-centered perspectives. Exacerbating the structural condition is the decline of the American empire from the zenith of the 1960s — a decline that many Americans, failing to understand its underlying economic causes, now want to reverse by military means.

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The aggressive, chauvinistic mood of the late 1970s and early 1980s is not a climate in which "appeasement" strategies, or those that call for downgrading our commitment to such "faithful allies" as Israel, are likely to win popular support. Thus, the "Swiss cheese" structure of the American political system, so full of holes that it may be easily penetrated by both domestic and foreign lobbies, and the prevailing conservative political mood, make any presidential attempt to reorient American Middle East policy an uphill battle and one to which Mr. Carter was not equal.

Were Sadat a different and more cautious politician, he may have tested the water before plunging in, as many of his foreign policy advisers urged him to do, but his infatuation with bold, dramatic gestures dictated an all-out approach. This left him with no viable option but to depend on a weak and vacillating American president to extract concessions from a pugnacious Israel. While Carter's frustration with the obdurate Begin government occasionally gave way to fits of pique with Israel generally, that was far from sufficient, given the structural factors mentioned above, to cause him to downgrade significantly the linkage to Israel. In summary, Sadat moved too far, too fast, and with the wrong man as president of the United States. Unable to rupture or significantly weaken the bond between America and Israel, Sadat has had to accept the very much second-best outcome of insufficient American patronage and a subservient regional position to the number-one American client in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The *second* proposition on which the Sadat strategy rests is that Egypt, acting as a middleman between the United States and other Arab states, does in fact enjoy substantial influence over those states. In this case, Sadat's thinking is erroneous not because he is anticipating a possible future condition, but because he is projecting the past into the present. Nasser's Egypt was decisive in the Middle East for two reasons. First, Egypt's physical and human resources were immeasurably more developed in the early years of Nasserism than were those of any other Arab state. Nuri el-Said's pretension to Fertile Cresent leadership and the claims of other non-Egyptian contenders to Arab leadership ultimately failed to be realized not only because el-Said and the others aligned themselves with unpopular external powers, but because the capabilities of their national bases did not measure up to Egypt's. But while in the 1950s and 1960s, the leadership role had to be filled by an Egyptian, the growing equality of several Arab states and the maturation of their respective nationalisms during the 1970s made the appearance of a

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"new Nasser" unlikely. Increasingly equal and jealous of their own prerogatives, the Arab states are ever less likely to permit a foreigner, even if he is an Arab, to speak on their behalf. The Syrian and Iraqi Baathists, for example, had little choice but to take a back seat to Nasser even in their own countries; but neither Hafez el-Assad, nor Saddam Husain, nor their respective countrymen, would now conceive of merging their national identities in an unequal union with Egypt headed by Sadat or any of his likely successors. Nor, as recent events suggest, do they feel compelled to tailor their policies to suit Egyptian dictates and desires. Even the weakest Arab leaders now have little to fear from Cairo and can ignore it with impunity.

If Egypt was one vehicle of Nasser's success, the other was the message of Arab nationalism. The Arab masses were enthralled by Nasser because he told them what they wanted to hear. Virtually stumbling onto the mobilization potential of appeals to Arab nationalism, Nasser then brilliantly manipulated mass support in the Arab world in pursuit of Egyptian foreign policy goals. Being an Egyptian thus made it possible for Nasser to lead the Arabs, while being leader of the Arabs facilitated the projection of Egyptian influence into the region.

Sadat, on the other hand, lacks the advantage of Egypt's former vanguard status and is preaching a message that has scant appeal at home and almost none elsewhere in the Arab world. To "deliver" other Arab states, Sadat would have to make the lives of incumbent rulers of Arab states uncomfortable by causing their publics, as did Nasser, to demand that they follow Cairo's lead. But there is next to no likelihood of that happening now. The capitulatory message that Sadat is preaching, a message that has no resonance in Arab politics, has reduced his and his country's influence among Arab masses almost to zero. Other Arab heads of state may now formulate their policies, short of committing themselves to a one-front war with Israel, with little regard for Sadat's reaction. The Saudis, for example, can with impunity forge an alliance with Iraq, and even the Jordanians can afford to go their own way because, despite the fact that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan are pro-Western, the kings of neither state view Sadat's actions as having pre-empted that general position. Nor is Sadat in a position to make them think otherwise. In short, Sadat can commit Egypt, at least for the period of his incumbency, to a peace with Israel, but that is as far as his influence goes. As such, his role is of little value to his new U.S. patron. Compared with the access that Nasser in his heyday pro-

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vided the Soviets to the Arab world, Sadat's contribution to the U.S. strategic position in the Middle East seems meager indeed.

Sadat's *third* proposition is that Egypt's economy, hence his own political position, can be rescued, and rescued quickly, through American assistance. This represents misplaced confidence both in the speed with which foreign assistance programs can begin to have an effect, and in their ultimate effectiveness in improving living conditions and stimulating economic growth. It also underestimates the negative side effects of large-scale foreign assistance programs.

With regard to American aid to Egypt specifically, one question remains unanswered and may, in fact, be unanswerable. Concentrating on program rather than project aid and aiming primarily to improve the quality of Egypt's long-neglected, overused and much abused infrastructure, the approach of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assumes that once infrastructural bottlenecks are overcome, investment in productive facilities will be forthcoming from private venture capital, both foreign and domestic. The as-yet-unanswered question is: Just who is going to risk their capital in Egypt? Egyptians themselves have shown a marked reluctance to invest outside a few sectors, such as construction, spinning and weaving, tourism, and pharmaceuticals, while foreign capital remains heavily concentrated in the oil and tourism sectors. Innumerable problems cloud the future of the manufacturing sector, and without heavy investment in it there seems little possibility of taking up the economic slack. Thus far, favorable tax treatment and various legal guarantees against nationalization have proved insufficient attractions for foreign capital, and it is unclear what more can be offered, even if the physical infrastructure is vastly improved. In the meantime, some of the governorates are benefiting from road-paving programs, Cairo's telephone system is marginally improved, and a few villages have received the dubious benefit of intensive investigation by American social scientists. The overall economy, however, continues to stagnate despite the more than two billion dollars a year now being pumped into it by USAID.

That's the plus side. On the negative side are unintended and virtually uncontrollable economic, and ultimately political, side effects. First is inflation. The annual infusion of huge sums of money into an economy lacking an expanding productive base, along with Cairo's policy of subsidizing basic commodities, to say nothing of the expense of supporting a 2-million-strong army of bureaucrats, has

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caused staggering price rises in Egypt's oil-poor economy over the past several years, so inflation is now running much higher than in money-saturated Saudi Arabia.

Second, the beneficiaries of capital inflow are small in number and are clustered at the urban-elite end of the sociopolitical continuum — a consequence, in part, of the structure of the Egyptian political economy. Moreover, rampant corruption only further frustrates the effective use of incoming capital. Innumerable Egyptian professionals and bureaucrats have climbed aboard the USAID gravy train and are riding it for all their worth, which, in an increasing number of cases, is quite a lot. Enjoying high disposable incomes, they of course are in search of suitable purchases and pleasures, further discrediting themselves, their government, and American assistance in the process.

A third negative aspect of the aid program is the swelling army of Americans required to oversee and implement it. Their presence adds to inflation and emphasizes the stark differences in living conditions between the "haves" and the "have-nots," providing for some Egyptians the explanation for their dire circumstances. As in Iran, American expatriates are symbolic reminders of Egyptian dependency, and a perceived cause of it. Thus, the political cost of U.S. experts might well outweigh their contribution to the Egyptian economy.

Sadat, in turning his back on the Arabs and their petrodollars, and, consequently, having had to abandon the grandiose scheme of wedding Arab capital and Western expertise to give birth to modern, high-technology industry in Egypt, now finds himself a ward of the American state. This occurs at a time of diminished and probably ever diminishing American financial strength, so that the wherewithal for packaging an effective aid program is missing. Pressure is thus building from both ends as the Egyptian public, promised more and expecting more than can be delivered, demands recompense, while the American public, increasingly reluctant to support government hand-out programs — be the recipients Americans or foreigners — puts the electoral screws on U.S. politicians and government officials otherwise inclined to generosity. Unable to count on continued U.S. aid at the 1978-1981 levels, and not yet able to attract substantial foreign private investment in other than the few areas mentioned, Egypt, if it is to improve its economy dramatically, cannot long do without the financial assistance of her Arab neighbors. Such assistance at the required levels will not be forthcoming

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so long as American-Egyptian-Israeli relations remain in their present form.

The *fourth* proposition of the Sadat strategy is that Egypt can be successfully isolated from political trends in the Arab world, by far the most important of which is resurgent Islam. Revisionist, Pharaonic-centered Egyptian historiography, propagated by "Egypt firsters"; emphasis on Egyptian sacrifices for the Arab cause, sacrifices that allegedly have not been reciprocated; a carefully orchestrated campaign against indolent Arabs and their excesses while on holiday in Egypt; and Sadat's general vilification of Arabs as undeserving of Egyptian support — all are designed both to excuse the policy of disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict and to insulate Egyptian politics from their traditional interconnectedness with the Arab world. That this can be accomplished is doubtful. Resurgent Islam, predating the Iranian Revolution but receiving an enormous boost from it, has spread across all national frontiers of the region, including the borders of Egypt. The rapid growth of the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and of more radical, less compromised, and less compromising organizations; the consolidation of control of university student bodies by religiously inspired students and their various organizations; the recent and protracted riots in Asyût; and the growing apprehension of Copts and secularists in the face of a rising tide of political Islam — all point to the impossibility of redefining Egypt's heritage in a non-Arab, non-Islamic context. The rejection of the Arab cause for the American-Israeli alliance, coupled with ever increasing impoverishment of the Egyptian masses, is placing more strain on Sadat's semisecular, patrimonial political system than it may be able to bear.

The breaking point, if there is to be one, is impossible to foretell, but there can be no doubt that political Islam is beginning to pose a serious threat to the regime — a threat that can still be managed successfully, but maybe not within the framework of Egypt's current orientation toward the United States, Israel, and the Arab world. Sadat, caught between foreign policy obligations arising out of his commitment to Israel and the United States and domestic political considerations stemming from nationalist-inspired resurgent Islam, may eventually be forced to make a Hobson's choice, either rejecting that which he has accomplished in foreign policy innovation in order to dispel domestic criticism, or forging ahead with his chosen foreign policy while clamping down much more tightly on domestic dissent. While this latter course has normally been effective in the face of secular leftist opposition in Egypt and elsewhere in

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the region, Iran has proved that it may not work when the opposition is inspired by Islam. (Syria's el-Assad may also prove unable to counter Muslim opposition to his regime.) Thus, Egypt's form of secular politics could, if Sadat permits his foreign entanglements to dictate his domestic policy, fall victim to domestic opposition.

The *fifth* weakness of the Sadat strategy also has to do with his miscalculation of the importance of Egyptian, as opposed to pan-Arab, political symbolism. Specifically, Sadat sought to assuage doubts about the wisdom of selling out the Arabs by portraying Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai as momentous Egyptian victories. At no point, however, did this public relations extravaganza ever succeed in riveting the attention of Egyptians on their "reconquered" homeland, for other matters, including concern over daily bread and lingering doubts about the wisdom of isolationist policies, proved to be of greater significance. In retrospect, this is understandable. To most Egyptians, Sinai was not so much territory that simply had to be an integral part of the homeland, but a symbol of defeat and a blow to national pride. For the liberation of the Sinai to end the humiliation and thereby to be a dominant factor in legitimizing the incumbent regime, liberation had to come through dramatic military or diplomatic reconquest, not through niggling negotiations with awkward provisos calling for phased withdrawals of Israeli troops, restricted re-entry of Egyptian forces, the sale of the Peninsula's only vital resource, oil, to the former occupier at concessionary rates, and so on. When compared with the relatively swift and almost unconditional retreat forced on the Israelis following the 1956 campaign, it is not hard to understand why that was truly a victory in the popular mind for Nasser, and why the recent withdrawal was greeted with something less than overwhelming enthusiasm. The ballyhoo at St. Catherine's Monastery and El Arish could not disguise the fact that Sadat's Sinai "campaign" has achieved only a minor victory, waged at a very high cost to Egypt's politico-strategic position in the region. As a result, the return of the Sinai has given Sadat little political mileage at home, much less, in fact, than he obtained through Egyptian seizure of the Bar-Lev line on October 6, 1973.

III

In sum, Sadat can neither force the United States to apply sufficient pressure on Israel, nor can he deliver other Arab states hat in hand to the negotiating table. So now he is confronting increasing domestic pressure as a result of economic woes and radical

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Islam, while having failed, both by his efforts to replace Arab nationalism with an Egyptian version and by his public relations gambits in the Sinai, to alter substantially the Egyptian public's generally negative evaluation of the president and his political strategy.

It is in this context that two further developments must be seen. First, the cool reception of Israelis in Egypt at the official level and the increasing resentment of Israeli tourists at the private level reflect not just reaction to Israeli intransigence on the Gaza–West Bank issue, but more generally the widely held view that Egypt, in coming to terms with the Jewish state, has abandoned her heritage, sold out to US neoimperialism, and received little in return for such sacrifice. The Israeli presence in Egypt is itself a blow to national pride and yet another plank in the platform that opposition forces are nailing together.

A second and more worrying development from Sadat's vantage point is that an astonishingly large number of Egypt's most influential public figures have crossed over into the relative obscurity and inconvenience of opposition. Beginning with Mohammed Hassanein Heykal's departure in 1974, to say nothing of the previous purges of Aziz Sidky and other leftist Nasserites, there has been a virtual exodus from the political elite of editors, generals, ranking ministers, and foreign policy advisers, not to mention numerous leading parliamentarians including such luminaries as Kemal al Din Hussein, Khaled Muhyi al Din, and Hilmi Murad, who chose defeat in rigged elections to endorsement of Sadat and the American connection. Even closer to the bone is that within the Sadat camp itself former loyalists are putting distance between themselves and the president and his policies. Ibrahim Shoukry, handpicked by Sadat to head the loyal opposition, has turned his figurehead position and his party into thorns in the side of the president, thorns that Sadat dare not remove lest he alienate even more supporters and neutrals. Not even the inner circle of the president's intimates is immune to the contagion of disaffection. At least one of the most prominent of these insiders, Sayed Marei, in the time-tested style of broadcasting messages of dissent through private channels, has been able to cast himself in the role of pro-Arab dissident within the inner core of the elite.

Sadat, whose political style is quintessentially that of the loner and who isolates himself from others for long periods to think through key decisions, can take little succor from these desertions and the ever thinning ranks of increasingly obscure loyal troops. At

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the same time, those constituencies in opposition, be they the Muslim Brothers, students, workers, intellectuals, or army officers, have a large and growing choice of figures around whom to coalesce. While in the short term this plethora of challengers is useful to Sadat, who can exploit ambitions and animosities and balance contenders off one against the other, in the long run even a patrimonial ruler like Sadat needs some political base. Since many opponents predicate their opposition exclusively on their president's foreign policy, Sadat has the option, should a desperate situation require it, of suddenly revising his foreign policy, taking Egypt back into the Arab camp. His instinct for survival and his unquestionable skill as a political tactician suggest that he could make just such a decision. On the other hand, the strong identification of his person with the American-Israeli connection and his highly individualistic approach to decision-making militate against such an eventuality. In either case, the fragility of the domestic situation as a result of foreign policy factors, and the potential fluidity of policies in both areas, can hardly be reassuring to U.S. and Israeli decisionmakers, nor should they be. It is to the U.S. perspective on American-Egyptian relations that we shall now turn.

IV

Just as Sadat's strategy has been based on several erroneous propositions, so, too, had Carter's. In the first instance, while Sadat believed that Washington could deliver Israel, Carter and at least some of his advisers (unfortunately, those closest to him) believed that Egypt could deliver Saudi Arabia, hence Jordan, thereby leaving Syria and the Palestinians out in the cold and forcing them eventually to seek the warmth of the American embrace. This analysis ignored the factors mentioned above of diminished Egyptian influence over other states in the region and the unpopularity of the Sadat message in the Arab world, while overlooking the aspirations of leaders of the various Arab states and of the Palestinians to play independent and important roles in the Middle East. Even King Hussein, now the grand old man of Arab politics, has enough going for him not to have to depend on any single outside power, be it regional or extraregional. The Saudis, having their own pride and domestic stability to consider, to say nothing of their regional position as power broker, were not about to embark on a Sadat-led adventure, as Carter and his advisers could and should have predicted. As for the Palestinians, the fact that for more than thirty years they

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have rejected halfway measures denying sovereign rights should have suggested that negotiations through third parties and under U.S.-Israeli-imposed preconditions would be unacceptable to them. The magnitude of these misperceptions of predispositions and power relationships in the Arab world suggests that Carter's concern to find his way out of the impasse with Israel and her supporters clouded his vision and that of his closest political advisers, who likewise were more concerned with the domestic ramifications of foreign policy decisions than with the Middle Eastern setting within which those foreign policy decisions would have to be implemented.

The problem of relying on an enfeebled Egypt to do the work that only a far more impressive party could possibly have managed has been compounded by a series of related miscalculations. The Trilateral Commission's injunctions against "step-by-step" diplomacy were conveniently brushed aside. The argument that the Palestinians are central to any Middle East peace and should therefore be accommodated both in substance and in procedure was thus dismissed. So, too, was the correct observation that the exclusion of the Soviet Union from a negotiated settlement would provide that nation with the motive and the opportunity to act as wrecker, most probably through regional clients similarly excluded from negotiations or simply dissatisfied with their outcome. Having campaigned against Kissinger's diplomacy on these same grounds, Carter then proceeded to ignore his own advice.

Once having chosen the path of least resistance in the form of trilateral negotiations, Washington then created arguments favoring that choice. On the pragmatic side, it contended that war in the Middle East had become impossible as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli accord. This rationalization ignored the increasing independence and volatility of the eastern front and glossed over the not unlikely possibility that yet another and more intense war would be waged with newly acquired American weapons if the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations reached an impasse or if Sadat were to be replaced by a noncompromising leader. On another level, the separate peace between Israel and Egypt could be, and of course was, sold by Carter and his image-makers as a Middle East peace, providing the one "solid" foreign policy achievement of his administration. This claim had a hollow ring from the outset, and with the bogging down of negotiations over West Bank autonomy and the increasing number of Jewish settlements there, even this fiction of success was hard to maintain and should have been deemed too insecure a base upon

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which to rest the president's claim to foreign policy expertise. It may have been simply the lack of alternatives that forced this choice upon Carter and his advisers, but that does not erase the fact that they were skating on very thin ice with the claim to having brought peace to the Middle East.

Having revalued the benefits of the new Egyptian alliance and the willingness of Sadat to negotiate with Israel, the U.S. administration correspondingly devalued the cost to this country of strained relations with other Arab states and with our allies. One of those costs was the ending of improved relations with Syria, whose leader had been considering downgrading the Soviet connection in favor of a pro-Western and even pro-U.S. policy. Iraq, although drifting away from the Soviet Union, was likewise dissuaded from edging closer to the United States, while former U.S. friends in the area, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, felt compelled to put some distance between themselves and Washington, thereby opening up a gap that more radical Arabs have attempted to widen further. Iraqi-Saudi cooperation in the Gulf and elsewhere, is, for example, partly the result of the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli alliance. To the degree that OPEC oil production and pricing is related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the U.S. role therein, the Carter strategy has added to the oil-import bill.

The Carter strategy also fell victim to the belief that Washington held "99 per cent of the cards" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, if true, is only so if the hand is played with great skill. In the wake of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and America's subsequent endorsement of it, the European option has become increasingly attractive to the other Arab states and to the Palestinians, and, acting jointly, they have explored the possibility of an alternative framework for Middle East diplomacy. The Andrew Young affair must be seen against the backdrop of this emerging Euro-Arab alliance working to restore to the Palestinians a central place in the negotiations. Washington can ill-afford to be outflanked by its allies and thereby lose even more credibility; nor can it risk further strain in its relations with those same allies. The Reagan administration, therefore, will have to take account of European preferences and diplomatic initiatives.

The major disadvantage of the Carter strategy of tying Egypt and Israel together under American auspices is not to be found in the collection of secondary effects just mentioned, however. It is, instead, inherent in the American-Egyptian relation itself. Unwilling

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to control its Israeli client, Washington is now in the position of having a second regional client, Egypt, which can also exert influence over its patron, although not for the same reasons or to the same degree as does Israel. Egyptian leverage is based on weakness, especially that of its leader, with whom the United States is now so closely identified that it has little choice but to stand by him and his country, even if such support runs counter to U.S. interests. Thus, tentative U.S. initiatives to involve the Palestinians in the peace process, including the ill-fated Strauss mission to Cairo and Jerusalem, are now opposed not just by Israel, but by Egypt as well. Forced to forgo such efforts at broadening the peace process, Washington must fall back into the nonproductive and isolated trilateralism of American-Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

The future of the Egyptian-American relationship, at least in its present form, is not promising. Cairo cannot obtain for Washington that Arab support which was a principal factor in Egypt's attractiveness as a partner to the United States. With the passage of time, Sadat's isolation at home and in the region will force him to rely increasingly on the United States for political and economic support to prop up his regime. As such, Sadat's friendship will be a liability rather than an asset. The lesson of Iran points to the danger of this form of interdependency, and although Sadat is not as isolated from domestic political forces as was the shah, he is heading in that direction. Consequently, the American-Egyptian relationship, unable to serve as the basis for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is in danger of emerging as a patron-client relationship in which the American patron would both lack effective control of the client as well as alienate the Egyptian public and its potential future leaders.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LIBYA: INFLEXIBILITY AMID CHANGE

by Nathan Alexander

The foreign policy of Colonel Muammer el-Qaddafi, chief of state of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and self-designated "Leader of the Revolution" he initiated on September 1, 1969, is too often described as bizarre, unpredictable, and quixotic.[1] Such characterizations mistake style for substance and, in the process, underestimate both the extent to which history and geography have affected Libyan foreign policy and the continuity of that policy. Qaddafi has definitely had an impact on those determinants by building on the policies of his predecessor and setting new directions, but he is not *sui generis* to the extent many observers have suggested.

Consequently, the temptation to concentrate on the leader, even when that leader is as flamboyant and mercurial as Qaddafi, must be avoided if a meaningful perspective is to be achieved. To explain Libyan foreign policy solely — or even largely — in terms of the government's present leader is to ignore the many other important forces that have influenced it. Libyan foreign policy since independence in 1951 has been nurtured in a climate of traditional Islamic values, colonialism and neocolonialism, and nationalism. To comprehend that policy, it must be approached as a complicated but intelligible whole that can be appreciated and understood for having developed in a unique milieu.[2]

Genesis

Libya is often described as Egypt without the Nile. Twice the size of its neighbor to the east, Libya stretches from the Mediterranean deep into the Sahara, sharing a frontier with Niger, the Sudan and, across the Tibesti Massif, Chad. Aside from scattered oases

[1] The Kingdom of Libya became the Libyan Arab Republic in 1969 and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1977. For the sake of brevity, the country will be referred to simply as Libya.

[2] Ruth First, *Libya: The Elusive Revolution* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), pp. 20-21, 26-27.

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and agricultural projects, Libya's entire cultivated area consists of two coastal strips divided by the barren coast of the Gulf of Sirte. The gulf, a great bite out of Africa, is of both geographic and historical significance as it has traditionally divided the country into two entities: the one, Cyrenaica, looking east toward Egypt and the Mashrek; the other, Tripolitania, facing west toward Tunisia and the Maghreb. While much of the area's traditional focus has been toward the east, this natural bifurcation has made the Maghreb a natural secondary interest, and the emphasis of Libyan foreign policy has oscillated between east and west. The Fezzan, a vast sand sea in the southwest quadrant of the country, comprises the third traditional region. With its limited resources and minuscule population, the Fezzan — indeed, the entire southern frontier with Niger and Chad — has been relatively unimportant to the rulers of Libya so long as it was secure and unthreatening.[3]

The parallel with Egypt can be overdrawn for two reasons. First, Libya's population is small, the smallest of all the countries of North Africa and certainly no more than 5 or 6 per cent of Egypt's. Moreover, that small population is concentrated in Tripoli, Bengasi, and the oases of the Fezzan, centers that are hundreds of kilometers apart. Second, while Libya does not have the Nile, geography has favored it with considerable oil deposits, whose reserves are currently estimated at around 25 billion barrels. This combination of limited manpower resources and vast oil revenues, coupled as it is with a large geographic area, has had a dynamic impact on the objectives and capabilities of Libyan foreign policy, clearly separating it from that of Egypt.

Libya's early history is one of colonialism and neocolonialism under the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and Turks. Several centuries of Ottoman rule were followed by three decades of Italian occupation and nearly a decade of French and British occupation. The Italian domination of Libya was especially traumatic as it was marked by two bloody wars and led to ten years of exploitation that endured until British troops defeated Italy during World War II. Italian policy included the seizure of choice lands, the dislocation of nomads and peasants, and the creation of an enclave economy. Independence finally came in 1951 — not because of internal actions, however, although there was discontent, but because it suited

[3] Henri Pierre Habib argues that Colonel Qaddafi has sought to make Libya the bridge between the Maghreb and the Mashrek. If so, he has failed miserably, for one of the few things today uniting most of the governments of both areas is their rejection of Qaddafi's leadership. (*Politics and Government of Revolutionary Libya* [Montreal: Cercle du Livre de France, 1975], p. 340.)

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the strategic purposes of the Western powers. Moreover, the boundaries of the new Kingdom of Libya, as it was called, were defined by the partition lines of the imperialist powers in North Africa: those of the United Kingdom in Egypt and those of France in Tunisia and Algeria.[4]

Islam is the final major influence on Libyan history and society that must be touched on before turning to an examination of the foreign policy of the monarchy. The strong role of religion in Libya's traditional Islamic society has been very influential on the nation's foreign policy. Conservative attitudes dominate, and people's values and behavior are very much a function of their religious background and attachment. The resistance wars were motivated by the demands of the true faith as part of national expression and emancipation, and religion was also central to the Arab League's efforts to motivate the Libyan populace to demand independence from the UN Commission. Thus, throughout Libya's recent history, religion has been a most influential determinant of the direction of foreign policy as well as a political symbol of great importance in controlling and mobilizing the masses.[5]

From Monarchy to Republic

After the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France signed the Italian Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947, a special Four Power Commission of Investigation was created to study conditions in Libya and the other former Italian colonies. Eventually, the Libyan question was consigned to the United Nations, where in mid-1949 the United Kingdom and Italy proposed the establishment of a UN trusteeship over Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan (Italy, the United Kingdom, and France serving, respectively, as trustees). Violent, widespread Libyan opposition to this plan was supported by the Arab-Asian bloc of delegates in the United Nations, and an alternate plan of immediate independence was eventually accepted by the General Assembly on November 21, 1949.

The Kingdom of Libya, under the rule of Mohammed Idris el-Mahdi el-Sanusi, was proclaimed on December 24, 1951, and was the first state to emerge under the auspices of the United Nations.

[4] For an idea of the lasting imprint that Italian colonial policy left on today's leadership in Libya, see Oriana Fallaci's interview of Colonel Qaddafi ("Iranians Are Our Brothers," *New York Times Magazine*, December 16, 1979, p. 123).

[5] Omar I. El Fathaly, Monte Palmer, and Richard Chackerian, *Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 11-12.

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Regionally and internationally, Libya initially enjoyed the real advantage of having no aggravated boundary disputes or other outstanding quarrels. Tranquility did not prevail, however, and the Libyan government and people became increasingly enmeshed in the growing politicization of the Arab world. Contemporary events — the colonial struggles that bracketed Libya, the Palestine conflict, the growth of Nasserist and Baathist pan-Arabism, and antiroyalist movements elsewhere in the Arab world — hardly constituted a propitious environment for the development of a conservative, traditionalist monarchy. Moreover, the limited anticolonialist credits of the regime were quickly used up as its dependence on income from American and British air bases resulted in a policy of cooperation with and support of the West. Simultaneously, the legitimizing force of nationalism, owing to the achievement of independence, was increasingly challenged internally by the pan-Arab inclinations of the members of the opposition National Congress Party and externally by the pan-Arab movements themselves.

After World War II, two rival systems, the Middle Eastern and the Arab, struggled for predominance in the area. The real architect of the Middle Eastern system was the U.S. government, backed by its NATO allies (especially the United Kingdom). This group viewed the Middle East in geographic terms, as a land mass vulnerable to the Soviet Union because of its proximity. Wholly preoccupied with the Soviet threat, the Middle Eastern system expected the Arab countries to join in an alliance to guarantee the security of the region. The Arab system, having a completely different outlook, viewed the Middle East not as a geographic expansion between Europe and Asia, but as a single nation having common interests and security priorities that were distinct from those of the West. According to this logic, the nations in the area enjoyed a unity of language, religion, history, and culture that they should take advantage of to create their own system in order to counter any outside threat. Instead of the Soviet Union, Israel was seen as the main threat.[6]

In a policy that strongly differentiated him from his successor, King Idris accommodated to and cooperated with the Middle Eastern system while limiting his participation in the Arab system. Although he always emphasized Libyan-Arab brotherhood and solidarity, the king seldom went beyond lip service unless under tremendous pressure. King Idris blocked Libyan membership in the

[6] Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, pp. 719-722; George Lenczowski, "The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Sector," ibid., Spring 1979, pp. 796-820.

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Arab League until February 12, 1953, and while supporting such Arab causes as the Algerian independence movement, he took little active part in the Arab-Israeli dispute or in the tumultuous inter-Arab politics of the 1950s and 1960s.

Thus, during the first decade of independence, the monarchy maintained a generally Western orientation, and Libya was widely regarded as one of the conservative, traditional states of the Arab world. Since the country was thought to lack any natural resources, this orientation rested heavily on the income and financial assistance generated by British and American military bases. On July 29, 1953, a twenty-year treaty of friendship and alliance was signed with the United Kingdom whereby the latter received extensive jurisdictional and extraterritorial rights in return for financial and, later, military-training assistance. A year later, on September 9, 1954, the governments of Libya and the United States also signed a treaty of friendship and mutual support scheduled to last until December 24, 1970. Under the treaty's terms, the U.S. government secured military base rights, exemplified principally by Wheelus air base outside Tripoli, in exchange for a program of economic, technical, and military assistance.

It was the existence of these bases and the Libyan government's heavy dependence on the income from them that led many observers to conclude that the monarchy was "pro-Western." In certain respects, this was a misnomer: it implied a commitment — to Western traditions, Western ideals, and Western policies — that did not exist, except perhaps in the minds of a few senior government officials. While the monarchy did grant the U.S. and British governments major air bases in return for financial and diplomatic support, it sought to minimize the impact of the West on Libyan sociopolitical structures and emphasized its political nonalignment in the United Nations and elsewhere. The close connection of the monarchy's Western orientation to its need for military base revenues became obvious once it developed another revenue source.

Petroleum — discovered in large quantities in 1959 and coursing richly through the economy by the 1960s — changed the direction and emphasis of the monarchy's foreign policy. The government began to orient itself more toward the Arab system, and Libyan support for the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western countries decreased even further in the United Nations and other international organizations. In 1964, the Libyan government formally requested a reconsideration of the future status of the air

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bases. The U.S. government agreed, in principle, to withdraw from Wheelus Field, and the United Kingdom actually began evacuating troops from the Tripoli area in 1965. Most of the British forces were withdrawn by the following year although the evacuation was not completed until March 1970.[7]

The year 1967 was pivotal for the monarchy as the nature and extent of its response to the Six Day War proved to be the catalyst for the 1969 coup d'état. Popular reaction in Libya was both violent and widespread, especially in Tripoli and Bengasi. Officially, the Libyan government threatened to shut down Wheelus Field; and, together with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, it did briefly shut down oil production. Nevertheless, the prime minister was forced to resign at the end of June 1967 in the face of widespread criticism that Libya had not done enough to assist its Arab brethren in the Arab-Israeli conflict and over his decision to resume oil shipments to Western Europe.[8]

In the face of such bitter opposition, the Libyan government made some additional token gestures toward the Arab system but essentially sought to retain its nonaligned orientation. At the 1967 Arab summit in Khartoum, for example, Libya joined the leading Arab oil-producing states in agreeing to subsidize the losses of Egypt and Jordan in the Six Day War; but it refused to take more stringent measures, such as cutting off oil exports to the West, that would be detrimental to its own interests. Thereafter, the Libyan government continued to identify itself as a general supporter of Arab causes, but it did not seek a more aggressive role in the arena of Arab politics and the Palestine question.

On June 12, 1969, the aging King Idris left Libya for rest and medical treatment in Greece and Turkey. Taking advantage of his absence, a group of approximately seventy army officers carried out a successful coup d'état on September 1. The coup was planned and executed by the Libyan Free Unionist Officers' Movement, whose Central Committee of twelve officers immediately designated themselves the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The composition

[7] Oil revenues also had a tremendous impact on the domestic policies of the Idris regime, both enriching the government and awakening the populace. This proved a heady combination, and popular dissatisfaction centering on the slow rate of modernization and on the Western orientation of the government mounted. (Ali A. Attiga, "The Economic Impact of Oil on Libyan Agriculture," in J. A. Allen, K. S. McLachlan, and E. T. Penrose, eds., *Libya: Agriculture and Economic Development* [London: Frank Cass, 1973], pp. 9-18.)

[8] In a television interview on October 14, 1969, Colonel Qaddafi emphasized that the 1967 war was one of the factors that had precipitated the revolution. (Mirella Bianco, *Gadafi: Voice from the Desert* [London: Longman, 1975], p. 68.)

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and leadership of the RCC was at first anonymous; however, within a week, it issued a terse statement announcing the promotion of Captain Muammer el-Qaddafi to the rank of colonel and his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Libyan armed forces. Thereafter, while the RCC remained a rather closed organization, it was apparent that its chairman and the de facto head of state was Qaddafi.[9]

Colonel Qaddafi, the members of the RCC, and indeed most members of the Free Unionist Officers' Movement shared similar backgrounds, motivations, and world views; and these were reflected in the foreign policy positions they articulated for the new Libyan Arab Republic. Most of them came from poorer families and minor tribes and attended the Libyan military academy at a time when a military career offered the widest possible opportunities for education and advancement to the less-privileged sectors of Libyan society. Their language was the language of Arab nationalism, guided by the precepts of the Koran and the Islamic Sharia and strengthened by the conviction that only the RCC spoke for the Libyan people. They were convinced, moreover, that they spoke not only for the Libyan people, but also for those throughout the Arab world and even beyond who they felt were restricted in their exercise of self-determination.[10]

Not surprisingly, the planning and execution of the September 1 coup bore many similarities to Nasser's 1952 coup, for the latter had served as a model for the former from its earliest stages. Later, the RCC as well as most of the members of the Free Unionist Officers' Movement frequently described themselves either as students of Nasser or as Nasserists. The RCC's debt to the Egyptian experience became even more pronounced as it began to issue its initial foreign policy statements. The RCC emphasized that the new republic was an *Arab* republic, which would be neutral in great-power disputes and which would act against any form of colonialism or imperialism at home or abroad. The council also announced that

[9] Muammer el-Qaddafi has dominated the RCC from the beginning, and all the council's major policy statements bear the imprint of his personality and thinking. Even today, with the people's committee system well established, Qaddafi still controls and directs the revolution from his position as "Leader of the Revolution." Michael Hudson drastically underestimates the extent of Qaddafi's power, describing him as simply first among equals in a collegial executive body of military officers. (*Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977], p. 322.) Habit (*Politics*, pp. 173-174) also perpetuates the myth of collegial leadership.

[10] Richard F. Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook for Libya*, 2nd ed. (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 163.

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it intended to play a much more aggressive role in espousing Arab nationalism and supporting the Palestinian cause against Israel.[11]

The foreign policy of the September 1 revolution can be understood best in the context of the major statements on freedom, socialism, and unity that were incorporated into the Constitutional Proclamation of December 11, 1969. This short document, promulgated by the RCC in the name of the Arab people of Libya, is a clear reflection of the goals, philosophy, and policy that first motivated the revolution and that now guide the RCC's conduct of government. The Constitutional Proclamation comprises a preamble and three parts. The preamble details the causes of the revolution, the legitimation of the regime, the nature of Arab nationalist philosophy (including the Arab struggle against Israel), and the ideals of freedom, socialism, and unity. Part 1 defines the state, describing Libya as an Arab democratic republic whose people constitute part of the "Arab Nation" and whose objective is overall Arab unity. It also sets forth the concept of a socialist-style planned economy and reaffirms the establishment of Islam as the state religion. Part 2 describes the system of government, making it clear that all law, except for the Sharia strictures governing inheritances, will be made by the RCC. Part 3 consists of miscellaneous and transitional rules.[12]

Freedom

Freedom, also translated as "liberty" by the RCC, has meant complete political and economic independence from any kind of foreign (especially non-Arab) influence, control, or constraint. Soon after seizing power, the RCC opened negotiations with the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in order to achieve an early termination of various treaties and executive agreements, especially the 1953 and 1954 treaties providing for air bases in Libya. As a result of those discussions, British forces evacuated Wheelus Field in June 1970. On February 5, 1972, all agreements between the United States and Libya made before the September 1969 revolution were terminated. As part of the same catharsis, all Italian-owned assets were confiscated and the few re-

[11] Peter Mansfield, *The Arabs* (London: Allen Lane, 1976), pp. 451-452; Christian d'Epenoux, "Les Complots de Kadhafi," *L'Express,* June 19-25, 1978, p. 54. Appropriately enough, the passwords used by the Free Unionist Officers on the day the monarchy was overthrown were "Palestine Is Ours" and "Jerusalem." (Habib, *Politics,* p. 96.)

[12] Meredith O. Ansell and Ibrahim Massaud al-Arif, eds., *The Libyan Revolution: A Sourcebook of Legal and Historical Documents. I, September 1, 1969–August 30, 1970* (Stoughton, Wisc.: Oleander, 1972), p. 108; Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture, *The Revolutionary March* (Tripoli: 1974), pp. 13-14.

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maining Italians were expelled in mid-1970. The early emphasis of the RCC on anticolonial gestures reflected the regime's distaste for any foreign presence, especially a non-Arab presence.[13]

Even after evacuation of the air bases, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom became the targets of special criticism by the RCC. On June 11, 1972, at ceremonies commemorating the second anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from Wheelus, Colonel Qaddafi returned to the themes of the injustice and indignity that Arabs had suffered at Western hands, and did so in such vitriolic tones that the ambassadors of the United States and the United Kingdom both left the ceremonies. Qaddafi was especially critical of the U.S. government because of its support for Israel. Early relations with the United Kingdom were more complicated, one of the chief issues being the RCC's demand that the British repay funds advanced by the monarchy for a radar system that had not yet been delivered. Relations remained strained after two years of negotiations, and the issue was one of the reasons that Libya withdrew Libyan reserves from British banks and nationalized all British Petroleum Company assets in 1971.

Early relations with other West European governments were also sensitive to any hint of colonialism, but by and large commercial relations continued. After 1972, for example, fairly large numbers of Italians began to return to Libya, and commercial relations increased considerably thereafter. Throughout the 1970s, French relations with Libya were closer than those enjoyed by any other Western country. Much of this was because of France's recent history as the Western country whose Middle Eastern policy was most acceptable to the Arab side. A real turning point in Franco-Libyan relations occurred on January 21, 1970, when Paris agreed to sell Libya 110 Mirage fighter aircraft. This agreement was followed by another in early 1974 whereby Libya received considerable French technical assistance in return for oil supplies.

In the early seventies, the RCC also pursued a policy of neutralizing the Mediterranean Sea by diminishing or eliminating the presence of NATO forces there, especially those operating from Malta. The RCC felt the use of Maltese air and naval installations by the United Kingdom, and indirectly by NATO, sustained what it con-

[13] Ahmed M. Ashiurakis, *A Concise History of the Libyan Struggle for Freedom* (Tripoli: The General Publishing, Distributing, and Advertising Company, 1976), pp. 82-87. Symbols of conversion were also stressed. All place and street names in Latin script were changed to Arabic, churches were closed, and foreigners were often harassed by petty control regulations. (First, *Libya*, p. 122.) Even Arab immigration to Libya has been strictly controlled since 1969.

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sidered to be excessive Western power and influence in the area. In support of this policy, the Libyan government intervened in the 1971 negotiations on the future status of NATO facilities, promising the Maltese generous amounts of financial aid in return for the reduction or withdrawal of NATO forces. Eventually, the Maltese government agreed to a short-term continued use of the facilities by NATO, but even at this point the final treaty was somewhat of a Libyan victory since it included a clause prohibiting use of the bases for air attacks against any Arab country.[14]

During the first ten years of the revolution, diplomatic relations between Washington and Tripoli have followed a dichotomous pattern. The Libyan government has become one of the Soviet Union's staunchest clients in the Arab world, purchasing a huge Soviet-supplied arsenal far beyond what its army can employ effectively. At the same time, it has maintained close commercial ties with the West, selling the bulk of its oil to the United States and its European allies in return for massive imports of Western technology. Libyan students continue to go abroad for university education, and they go largely to the United States, not the Soviet Union. Moreover, Colonel Qaddafi has repeatedly emphasized his friendship for the American people as official relations between Tripoli and Washington have deteriorated.

At the center of the present imbroglio between the governments of Libya and the United States are some basic, longstanding policy differences. The crucial one, of course, is the Palestinian issue, which has had a profound impact not only on the Libyan government's policy toward an overall Middle East settlement, but on almost all areas of foreign policy, particularly with respect to Libya's relations with many African states and its position on terrorism. As we shall see, behind the Libyan government's policy south of the Sahara has been a desire to isolate Israel. This has led Libya to support governments like those of President Idi Amin in Uganda and Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Empire at a time when the venality and brutality of both were obvious to the rest of the world. The Libyan government's image in the United States has also been damaged by its identification with international terrorism, despite the fact that it has publicly denounced hijacking and has even signed antihijacking accords.

[14] In September 1973, the Maltese government stressed that it permitted foreign bases on its territory for economic reasons only and promised to eliminate them before 1979. (Bianco, *Gadafi*, p. 157.) The RCC's policy toward NATO was ambivalent. Even as it moved to reduce NATO's presence in the Mediterranean Sea, it invested most of its petrodollars in NATO countries. ("Libya's Quiet Investments in NATO Countries," *Business Week*, March 26, 1979.)

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In the context of these policies, the Libyan government's aggressive denunciation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and its leadership of the Arab isolation of Egypt have evaporated whatever official or unofficial constituency existed in the United States for improving relations. This was reinforced by Libya's stand at the January 1980 Islamic Conference in Islamabad. Initially, the Libyan government refused to attend the conference, on the grounds that discussion of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would draw attention away from what it called the "greater danger" of normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt. Once at the conference, the Libyan delegation sought to tone down condemnation of the Soviets and to prod the conference into taking an equally strong stand against the United States. Consequently, while the Libyan government can be expected to continue its occasional efforts to improve relations with the U.S. government, there appears to be little common ground for discussion today.

In theory, the Libyan government's policy of nonalignment means that Libya will not join any alliance of non-Arab powers, especially either of the two major-power blocs that developed after World War II. Thus, the RCC's early pronouncements rejected both communism and capitalism as unsuitable for the Libyan milieu. Communism was described as a godless, rejected system that was alien to Islam and to Arab socialism. Even while the Soviet Union was praised for its support of the Arabs vis-à-vis Israel, early relations with the Soviets and the rest of Eastern Europe were carefully confined to cautious commercial transactions. In this spirit, a military sales agreement between Libya and the USSR was concluded in 1970, and by the time of the September 1, 1974, military parade the army was able to display an impressive array of Soviet military equipment, including some 300 tanks. In May 1975, Tripoli and Moscow closed a deal for an additional $1 billion in modern military equipment.[15]

In contrast to the U.S. government, the Soviet Union has been very assertive in seeking to improve and expand its relations with Libya. Colonel Qaddafi was invited to Moscow for a state visit in 1977, and the Soviets have made repeated offers of military and technical assistance in return for hard currency. The Libyan government has been very responsive to these offers, and while the exact amount of Soviet arms purchased has not been publicized, it is con-

[15] Qaddafi has been quoted as saying that a nation of 3 million people, even with petrodollars, is nothing and will be respected only when it has a strong army. (Eugene Mannoni, "Le Danger Kadhafi," *Le Point*, February 11, 1980, p. 52.) Regardless of whether or not the comment is apocryphal, the idea is certainly consistent with Qaddafi's thinking and explains, in part, a universal-conscription program that has decimated government offices and public industries.

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siderable and has been accompanied by several thousand Soviet advisers. A prime motivation behind Soviet policy appears to be the need to earn hard currency; however, observers have also speculated that the Soviets see Libya as a potential oil source when their own supplies begin to run short. An important secondary benefit that Moscow derives from supporting the Libyan government is that the RCC's constant criticism of the West supports, directly and indirectly, many of the Soviets' own policies in the Middle East and elsewhere.[16]

On the Libyan side, Qaddafi has never followed up on a threat he made in 1978 to join the Warsaw Pact, and he has clearly sought to limit his Soviet connection largely to the armaments arena. The Libyan government has made clear its willingness to make those arms available in any Arab war with Israel, and it feels that they are needed to deter any threat from Egypt. The Soviet Union has not been permitted to use any Libyan port or refueling facilities, and the influence of Soviet advisers on the armed forces is carefully controlled, in contrast to the experience of Egypt or South Yemen. The basic reason for this is the Libyan government's resolve to retain a degree of neutrality in the world power struggle. Libya's populist, Islamic, Arab nationalist views, moreover, have little in common with atheistic Marxism.

In support of the policy of nonalignment, Colonel Qaddafi developed the "Third International Theory." Based on religion and nationalism, which he describes as the paramount drives in history, the Third International Theory seeks to steer an alternate, middle course between communism and capitalism. It is intended to embrace Libyans, the Arab world and, indeed, the world as a whole. The theory is both comprehensive and simplistic in that it seeks to address all aspects of life — social, political, economic, and metaphysical — but often confines its observations on complex issues to only one or two paragraphs or sentences. Critics have emphasized the intellectual shortcomings of the Third International Theory — and they are obvious. They should not, however, obscure its political effectiveness in Libya. The theory emphasizes absolutes; through it, the Libyan government is able to present the revolution as more Islamic, more pan-Arab, and more democratic than any alternative. By trumpeting indigenous values, the theory reinforces fundamental values in Libyan political culture and provides a natural sequel to the rejection of alien values that occurred immediately after the Septem-

[16] Christopher S. Wren, "Libya's Identity Blurred by Ties with East, West, and Terrorism," *New York Times*, October 14, 1979.

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ber revolution. For the very same reasons, of course, it has no appeal outside Libya; and, particularly outside the Arab world, its tenets appear bewildering, amusing, and even absurd.[17]

In his Evacuation Day speech on June 11, 1972, Colonel Qaddafi also made broad statements of intent to aid various minority or dissident groups, such as Muslim insurgents in the Philippine Islands, the IRA in Northern Ireland, and black militant groups in the United States. Qaddafi also announced he was opening a center for equipping and training guerrillas in the struggle against Israel. Volunteers were instructed to apply at Libyan embassies, and the First Nasserite Volunteers Center was opened by Qaddafi himself on July 23, 1972. While government spokesmen later played down Libya's support of liberation movements, Tripoli has actively encouraged a number of them throughout the past decade and has sponsored and sustained terrorist movements, as well. The motives behind the Libyan government's support for many of these groups are complex and varied. In the early days, support of liberation movements was intended to symbolize that the Arab revolution was passing from the defensive to the offensive. Ideologically, support of selected liberation movements, such as the Filipino Muslims, was also an expression of Islamic solidarity. Finally, Libya's support of liberation movements was a tactic employed to enhance its international status as a leader in the Third World's struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism.[18]

Socialism

The RCC has frequently defined socialism as "social justice" to distinguish it from the common Arab usage, which often connotes little more than nonmonarchical government. In order to achieve socialism through social justice, the revolution sought to eliminate exploitation, to provide equal access to legal justice, to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth, and to eliminate class

[17] Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture, *The Fundamentals of the Third International Theory* (Tripoli: 1974), 27 pp.; Muammer el-Qaddafi, *The Green Book. Part II: The Solution of the Economic Problem, Socialism* (London: Martin Brian & O'Keefe, 1978), 30 pp., and *The Green Book. Part III: The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory* (Tripoli: Public Establishment for Publishing, Advertising, and Distribution, 1979), pp. 3-9.

[18] As Walter Laqueur has astutely observed, terrorism in the 1970s became a kind of surrogate warfare between governments and had almost nothing in common with the movements of national and social protest that had engaged in terrorist activity in previous decades. (*Terrorism* [London: Sphere Books, 1978], pp. 143-444.) On April 7, 1972, for example, the First National Congress of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union proclaimed its support for all liberation movements and revolutions throughout the world.

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differences. Since the application and impact of socialism have been largely internal matters, only the questions of origin and export are of further significance to this discussion.

The two basic schools of socialism that have evolved in the Middle East are those of the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party and the more pragmatic version developed in Egypt by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The latter is often simply called Arab socialism, and while President Nasser used to give the impression that he created Arab socialism, such was not the case. Nasser's contribution was to sense the potency of already half-formed and popular doctrines and then to spread them far more widely than would probably have occurred otherwise.[19]

Stimulated by the lack of socioeconomic development under the monarchy, the RCC's brand of Arab socialism is based on the Egyptian example but has gone far beyond it. It is neither Marxist nor a form of classical European socialism, and still less a variant of post-Lenin communism. Instead, as Qaddafi has emphasized, it is in simple terms a combination of social justice and mutual egalitarian rights and responsibilities (under an authoritarian umbrella). Libyan socialism shares many characteristics with other varieties of Middle Eastern socialism in that it is pragmatic, rather than doctrinal, and closely associated with nationalism. Its origins are always described in local terms, and its character is distilled from local history and custom.[20]

Colonel Qaddafi has sought to export his brand of Arab socialism as part of his Third International Theory. As early as March 1972, for example, he told the audience at the First National Congress of the newly established Libyan Arab Socialist Union (ASU) that he expected any Arab country liberated in the future to adopt both Arab socialism and the ASU. In this regard, as we have seen, Qaddafi greatly overestimated the appeal and applicability of his theories to the rest of the Arab world. This is particularly evident today, when Nasser's Arab socialism is largely discredited and the Sadat government is prescribing a combination of foreign capital and domestic private enterprise to cure Egypt's ailing economy.

Arab Unity

The RCC's first and most dramatic policy change was to move Libya out of the Middle Eastern system into the Arab system. The interests of the RCC, like those of Nasser, focused on the Arab

[19] James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1974), pp. 241-242.

[20] Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook*, p. 167; Bill and Leiden, *Middle East*, p. 245.

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world; and, like Nasser, Colonel Qaddafi frequently referred to the Arab nation not as a geographic entity, but as a descriptive expression of conviction and guidance. The Arab nation, for Qaddafi, is an ideological, even emotional, bond joining a common sociological and cultural history and peoplehood with a faith in the destiny of that people as equals to any human beings on earth. Colonel Qaddafi believes that the key to Arab unity is the unification of the Arab lands comprising the Arab nation into a single Arab state. He produced a formula for united Arab politics at his first press conference, in February 1970; and, in a July 1972 speech marking the revolution that brought Nasser to power in Egypt, he described Arab unification into a single state as an absolute necessity.[21]

Immediately after the Rabat summit conference, which ended in December 1969, the RCC initiated the first of several attempts to make the dream of Arab unity a reality. Colonel Qaddafi, President Nasser, and President Gaafar Mohammed el-Nimeiry of the Sudan flew to Tripoli for discussions, which resulted in a document known as the Tripoli Charter. Signed on December 27, 1969, the Tripoli Charter reaffirmed the participants' faith in the objective of Arab unity, declared their intention to work toward some sort of eventual unity, and announced that periodic planning sessions would be held in the coming months.[22]

On November 8, 1970, Qaddafi, Anwar el-Sadat (who had replaced Nasser), and Nimeiry met in Cairo and agreed to form a tripartite federal union. Three weeks later, the Syrian government, at the request of its new head of state, Hafez el-Assad, joined the federal plan. After additional discussions, Qaddafi, Sadat, and Assad announced on April 17, 1971, the formation of a federation. Because of internal problems, the Sudan did not immediately join the federation, but the option was left open for later membership. The Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR) was declared officially in existence on January 1, 1972, and the newly elected Federal Assembly met for the first time in Cairo on March 12, 1972.[23]

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[21] First, *Libya*, p. 124. The Palestinian issue is closely associated with this emphasis on Arab unity, and Qaddafi frequently argues that all Arabs must unite in order to regain Palestine. In this sense, he sees a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not as a precondition for Arab unity but, rather, as a probable result.

[22] Once the Tripoli Charter was signed, the RCC began to press for full constitutional unity of the three states. President Nasser, still disillusioned by the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union, made clear his reservations.

[23] Qaddafi was furious with Nimeiry for his refusal to join the federation and accused him of betraying the Arab nationalist cause. In his criticism of Nimeiry, Qaddafi completely overlooked the problem that a large non-Arab minority presents for a government contemplating participation in an Arab union. (Mansfield, *The Arabs*, pp. 506-508.) The confederation is also referred to in English sources as the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR).

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The Revolutionary Command Council saw the formation of the CAR as a major step toward its ultimate objective of uniting the Arab governments into a single state. Its optimistic assessment overlooked basic policy differences that divided the member states and kept progress toward unification from going beyond liaison at the upper levels of government and conscientious exchanges of minutiae at the lower levels. Eventually, those policy differences and the feebleness of concrete efforts to nurture unity convinced the RCC that a closer, stronger union was required. As a consequence, the Libyan government made a merger proposal to Egypt in February 1972 that led to a joint announcement on August 2 that the two countries would merge on or before September 1, 1973. The so-called Bengasi Declaration established a unified political command and seven joint committees to work out the details of the merger.

On April 15, 1973, Qaddafi announced a Popular Revolution whose stated aim was to purge Libya of all anti-Islamic and anti-Arab elements and principles. The populace was urged to seize power and to establish people's committees in support of a new five-point program. Qaddafi's actions were based on a complex web of tactical and ideological considerations, but the upcoming merger with Egypt was a prominent one. The decision to merge had been met with apathy and scorn in Libya, and the people's committees were meant to generate enthusiasm for the move as well as to neutralize critics.[24]

As September 1 approached, many Egyptians began to have second thoughts about the merger. Sensing this hesitation both by the Egyptian citizenry and its government, Colonel Qaddafi traveled to Cairo in late June for a prolonged, unscheduled visit during which his detailed explanations of his own policies and his criticism of Egyptian policy and society doomed whatever chance might have remained for a full and immediate merger. A unified political leadership and provisions for merger through evolution were agreed to on August 29, 1973, but they were definitely compromise measures.[25]

The October 1973 War further isolated the Libyan government from Egypt as well as from much of the rest of the Arab world.

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[24] Text in *Al-Fajr al-jadid* (Tripoli), April 16, 1973; Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture, *The Popular Revolution: Fundamentals and Objectives* (Tripoli: Modern Press, 1973), 39 pp.; George Lenczowski, "Popular Revolution in Libya," *Current History*, February 1974, pp. 58, 61, 86.

[25] The Egyptian government argued that the Popular Revolution launched in April 1973 was unforeseen and could not be imported into Egypt as Qaddafi desired. Moreover, real policy differences — such as the RCC's emphasis on Islam and Tripoli's intransigence with respect to oil policy and the Arab-Israeli conflict — increasingly separated the two governments.

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The war's outcome vastly strengthened the Sadat regime domestically and enabled him to accelerate some basic policy changes, both internally and externally, which threw the Libyan government's policy of Arab unity into bankruptcy. Eventually the Egyptian government completely rearranged its alliances both in the region, where a Teheran-Riyadh-Cairo axis replaced the former Damascus-PLO-Cairo axis, and outside the region, where the United States and Western Europe supplanted the Soviet Union and the Third World as Egypt's allies. In short, the Egyptian government moved out of the Arab system and into much closer contact with the Middle Eastern system less than four years after the RCC seized power and moved Libya in the exact opopsite direction.[26]

Rebuffed in the Mashrek, the Libyan government turned its attention west toward the Maghreb, where it proposed a Libyan-Tunisian merger to President Habib Bourguiba in January 1974. The idea was not a new one; Colonel Qaddafi had first raised it in December 1972. Nevertheless, the timing made it seem an act of pique in the face of Egypt's rejection. The Libyan proposal was hurried and gave evidence of poor planning; and, while the Tunisian government did not reject it immediately, the so-called Union of Djerba was dead within the month.[27]

Relations with Tunisia deteriorated after the collapse of talks aimed at economic and political union. There were repeated reports of Tunisians receiving guerrilla training in Libya; and, on January 27, 1980, one such group crossed the border and attacked the Tunisian mining town of Gafsa. After crushing the rebel raid, the Tunisian government, convinced that the attack was organized by the Libyan government, withdrew its ambassador from Tripoli and closed the Libyan cultural center in Tunis and the Tunisian cultural center in Tripoli. Precisely what the Libyan government's motives for such filibustering might have been is not clear, but disagreement over the 1974 merger plan and the way that President Bourguiba rejected it are surely among them. Tunisia and Libya are also disputing the ownership of oil deposits in the Gulf of Gabès. Moreover, Colonel Qaddafi, again overestimating the regional popularity and applicability of many of his programs, would like to see his political

[26] Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," pp. 725-726; Hudson, *Arab Politics*, p. 248.

[27] In his discussion of the proposed Tunisian-Libyan merger, Professor Habib radically underestimates the factors inhibiting the consummation of any union, most obviously the diametrically opposed backgrounds, personalities, and policies of Bourguiba and Qaddafi. (*Politics*, pp. 130, 341-342.) In a realistic appraisal on April 15, 1973, Qaddafi examined in some detail the internal and external policies that separated him from Bourguiba. (Bianco, *Gadafi*, pp. 95-96.)

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and socioeconomic reforms implemented in Tunisia. Gafsa must have appeared to be an ideal choice for the raid, for it has traditionally been an area of dissent, primarily because it is distant from Tunis geographically and generally depressed economically.

Western reaction to the attack was immediate and extensive. The French government sent two military transport planes and several helicopters to Tunisia, and stationed three warships in the Gulf of Gabès as a warning to the Libyans. The United States accelerated its military assistance program by air freighting armored personnel carriers and military helicopters to assist the Tunisian Army in patrolling its long and unprotected border. The response of the Libyan government was to allow mobs of citizens to ransack and burn the French Embassy in Tripoli and the Consulate General in Bengasi on February 4, 1980. Calling the passivity of Libyan authorities during the attacks unacceptable, the French government then withdrew its ambassador and principal aides and asked the Libyan mission in Paris to do the same. The U.S. Embassy had already been sacked on December 2, 1979, by Libyans who supported the Iranian militants holding the U.S. hostages in Teheran. Therefore, the U.S. State Department announced on February 7, 1980, that it was effectively closing its embassy in Tripoli because events at the French Embassy meant that the United States could not accept guarantees from the Libyan government for the future security of U.S. diplomats.[28]

In the rest of the Maghreb, Libya has not emphasized Arab unity to the point of pressing for a formal union. Relations with the Algerian government have been generally good, although Colonel Qaddafi has not always been pleased with Algeria's tendency to emphasize internal problems instead of concentrating on the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, while the two governments have both emphasized socialism, other policies of the revolutionary government in Algiers have not been so welcome. Algeria has been one of the most resolutely secular of the revolutionary regimes in the Arab world, in marked contrast to the combination of Arab socialism and Islamic fervor propagated from Tripoli. Moreover, it has evidenced a much stronger Western orientation, culturally and technologically, largely because of the legacy of French colonialism. The Libyan and the

[28] Libyan relations with France had already begun to deteriorate in 1979 over French military involvement in the Central African Republic and Chad and French support for the Moroccan government during the war in the former Spanish Sahara. A further source of embarassment was the Libyan American Oil Company's legal action in the French courts to secure compensation for its nationalization by the RCC in September 1973 and February 1974.

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Algerian governments have alike been active in assisting the Polisario guerrillas to fight Morocco in the Western Sahara war, although Algeria recently expressed fears that Libya has sought to manipulate the Polisario. Tripoli's relations with the Moroccan government have been strained, especially since July 1971, when the RCC endorsed an abortive coup against the Moroccan monarchy. The Libyan government's message of freedom, socialism, and unity has virtually nothing in common with a pro-Western monarchy described by the RCC as corrupt, feudal, and reactionary.[29]

Throughout the 1970s, the Libyan government continued to promote the idea of Arab unity through political union, but its words fell on deaf ears. Pan-Arabism, or Arab unity, was an exhausted, discredited idea after 1967 and, after 1973, appeared to be dead as traditional Arab rivalries and divisions re-emerged in the aftermath of the October War. The Sinai Accord brought those rivalries into the open and confirmed the deep fissures that exist in Arab ranks. In the spring of 1977, many Arab governments, not including Libya, welcomed President Carter's outline of basic principles for a peaceful settlement, but they were subsequently disappointed when the Camp David agreements seemed to fall away from those principles. The resultant Arab coalition, forged at the October 1978 Baghdad Conference as an alliance to destroy the Camp David accords, simply deepened the hostility and complexity of inter-Arab relations.[30]

In the past few years, Colonel Qaddafi may have begun to see some of the real differences among Arabs that had previously eluded him. Nevertheless, he has continued to push ideas and experiments for Arab unity that are largely irrelevant to the needs and situations of Libya's Arab neighbors. Hence, it is difficult not to be skeptical about the future of the Libyan-Syrian merger that Qaddafi called for last September 1, in a speech marking the eleventh anniversary of his rise to power. Syria, like Libya, has been party to several unification schemes in the past that floundered because the personality and policy differences of the participants proved too great to overcome. Consequently, as this article is completed, in late-September 1980, when few details of the merger have been agreed

[29] Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook*, pp. 189-190; Patrick Blum, "Islamic Revival Fuels Maghreb Discontent," *Middle East Economic Digest*, February 29, 1980, pp. 6-8.

[30] Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, pp. 695-698; Lenczowski, "Arc of Crisis," p. 818. A fuller discussion of the retreat of pan-Arabism that began after the 1967 Six Day War is beyond the scope of this article; see Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978-1979, pp. 355-373.

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upon, it is difficult to be sanguine about the prospects for union. Despite superficial similarities, such as their emphasis on socialism and Arab unity, and attractive tactical considerations, such as Syria's financial difficulties and rising discontent in both countries, the differences that delineate the objectives and priorities of Libya and Syria in important areas of domestic and foreign policy are almost as great as the 800 odd miles that physically separate them.

Arab Nationalism

Evidence of nationalism and anti-Western feeling surfaced in Libya under the monarchy, especially in the late 1960s, but it fell to Colonel Qaddafi to articulate a nationalist ideology targeted at the Arab nation. The variant of Arab nationalism he propagates is closely associated with the concepts of freedom, socialism, and unity already discussed and thus serves to unite the major policies of the RCC's revolution. Its central features include the concept of an Arab nation; a consciousness of backwardness owing to more than 400 years of foreign domination; a revulsion against monarchical government as degenerate, corrupt, and repressive; and a sense of massive injustice, bordering on a persecution complex, because of wrongs inflicted at foreign hands over the centuries. The feeling is often expressed that the Arab people are equal to any other people in the world and have a right to control their own destiny. The Palestinian question has been a focal point of Colonel Qaddafi's Arab nationalism because he perceives the creation of Israel as the ultimate indignity in the long history of oppression visited on the Arab nation by colonial imperialism.[31]

Colonel Qaddafi sees himself as Nasser's heir, and claims that Nasser designated him the trustee of Arab nationalism. Even today, ten years after Nasser's death, pictures of him are everywhere in Libya. While the RCC definitely derived its Arab nationalist views from the Nasser-Egyptian school, it is important to emphasize that Libya's revolutionary leaders are inspired by the flamboyant, idealistic Nasser of the fifties and early sixties and not by the more moderate, experienced, and battle-weary Nasser of the days after the 1967 war. Moreover, while both men were animated by the same tenets, it is important to recognize, too, that sociopolitical and economic factors affected them and their philosophies in very different ways. The Libyan government is unique, for it is the first Arab revolutionary

[31] Bill and Leiden, *Middle East*, pp. 235, 243; Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook*, pp. 166, 185.

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government to be wealthy. For the first time, a government has combined two forces that have generally been at odds in recent Arab history: oil and pan-Arabism. The country's immense wealth and small population have encouraged Qaddafi to dream the impossible dream; while Nasser's base, an overpopulated, impoverished land, set real limits on his expectations and possibilities, especially in the latter days of his career. Qaddafi and the Libyan people, moreover, have largely escaped the wounds and traumas suffered by Nasser and the Egyptian people during thirty years of war with Israel. Finally, Qaddafi's Arab nationalism is a pure, simple "desert philosophy" influenced by his Bedouin origins, while Nasser's bore the maturity and leveling influence of a long association with the Arab world's largest and, in many ways, wisest and most cynical city.[32]

Devoutly religious, Colonel Qaddafi has also made a contribution to Arab nationalism by reviving Islam as a central part of that nationalism. Unlike other Arab nationalists, he has managed to recognize Arab nationalism without denying its Islamic heritage, maintaining that the two movements are distinct but closely linked. In the early years of the revolution, the Libyan government repeatedly expressed its intention to establish Libya as a leader in world Islam, and it has maintained that orientation over the past decade. In support of this objective, the government took a number of concrete actions, including the establishment of the Jihad Fund to provide aid for the Palestinian struggle against Israel, the designation of the University of Libya as a worldwide educational center for Muslim intellectual leaders, and the funding of an Islamic missionary organization whose object is to further the spread of Islam throughout the world.[33] Qaddafi's emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism in the early 1970s did not make him a harbinger of the shift from pan-Arabism to pan-Islamism, which began to sweep much of the Arab world after the October 1973 War, generally for very different reasons. It has, however, increased his acceptability with many radical and Islamic states, most recently Iran.

Under the monarchy, Libya's diplomatic relations with the nations of sub-Saharan Africa were of small consequence, largely conducted within the framework of the Organization of African

[32] Fouad Ajami, "The Struggle for Egypt's Soul," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1979, p. 11; Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook*, p. 165; Habib, *Politics*, pp. 331-332.

[33] The eventual limits and objectives of Qaddafi's use of Islam came into question in early 1979 after he reportedly committed several heretical acts, such as having a Tripoli mosque dynamited to make way for a parade ground and comparing himself publicly — and favorably — with the Prophet Mohammed. (Abdelaziz Dahmani, "Le Messager en difficulté," *Jeune Afrique*, January 31, 1979, p. 28.)

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Unity (OAU). The RCC viewed Israel's presence in Africa as a fifth-column movement and soon opened an aggressive diplomatic offensive aimed at countries having sizable Muslim populations, such as Niger, Mauritania, and Cameroun. The offensive was fruitful and, as early as 1973, eight African heads of state had visited Tripoli and six had severed diplomatic relations with Israel. In the 1970s, a continuing procession of African diplomats were welcomed to Tripoli, where they sought Libya's support and largess. The Libyan government's goal in Africa was largely limited to isolating Israel, and Tripoli used religious propaganda and financial aid to achieve that end. Libya also willingly joined the OAU in its condemnation of Rhodesia and South Africa, seeing them as concrete examples of the colonialism it abhorred. Uganda, an early success of this policy, later went sour as the oppression, corruption, and incompetence of Idi Amin reached intolerable limits. Eventually, Libyan foreign policy in the area suffered a humiliating defeat as the Libyan troops sent to buttress Amin were killed or held for ransom, and Amin himself was finally forced into exile in Libya. Relations with Chad were an anomaly in the general pattern of Libyan relations with sub-Saharan Africa, involving both a rebellion in northern Chad supported by a Muslim minority and a minor boundary dispute complicated by rumors of uranium deposits in the area.[34]

The most visible example of the Libyan government's Arab nationalism has been its support of the Palestinian cause. It accepts the Arab nationalist view that Palestine is a part of the Arab nation and that Zionism, a European political movement, is the enemy and not Jews as such. The hostile forces of imperialism are Israel, the Zionist invader state, and the colonial powers in Western Europe and the United States that created and nurtured it. The Libyan government believes that the imperialist powers, motivated by greed and hatred for Islam and Arabs, created Zionist Israel in a contrived scheme to divide the Arabs and exploit Arab resources. Conservative Arab states that cooperate with the West are viewed not only as reactionary and corrupt but, also, as collaborators with imperialism and thus with Zionism. In this manner, opposition to Israel encompasses the entire ideological system of Arab nationalism.

Since the overthrow of the monarchy, the Libyan government has consistently advocated war as the only appropriate means to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. War is meant to include economic and political as well as military measures; but, in point of

[34] In an interview in late 1979, Qaddafi emphasized that he supported Amin because the Ugandan president was a Muslim who opposed Israel. (Fallaci, "Iranians," p. 121.)

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fact, Libya's small population, relatively small army, and distance from Israel have limited its direct impact on the Palestinian situation. Nevertheless, endorsement and support in the form of money and facilities were immediately given to Al Fatah, whose leader, Yasir Arafat, was a frequent visitor to Libya after September 1, 1969.

Terrorism is a tactic enthusiastically endorsed and supported by the Libyan government as a means of striking at Israel. After the 1972 Munich massacre, in which eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed, for example, Libya had the bodies of the five Arab guerrillas also killed in the action flown to Tripoli, where they were taken to a central mosque and given a martyr's funeral. Unfortunately, the Libyan government continued to support the use of terrorism even after the October 1973 War strengthened the position of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the oil weapon proved to be much more effective than terrorism. The PLO, recognizing that terrorist movements become vulnerable when their actions alienate support, announced in January 1975 that henceforth the hijacking of airplanes, ships, or trains would be considered a crime, and that the death penalty would be imposed on hijackers if their actions involved a loss of life.

While the PLO finally realized that terrorism could be counterproductive, the Libyan government did not; and it was this dispute over the use of terrorism, and the use of force in general, that eventually led to the recent break between Arafat (PLO chairman as well as head of Al Fatah) and Colonel Qaddafi. In a Palestine Solidarity Day speech on November 29, 1979, Qaddafi called on the PLO to step up its guerrilla attacks on Israel and to destroy the Suez Canal, which, he said, was being used to support Israel. Later, he personally attacked Arafat for imitating the "capitulationist" policies of Sadat and for preparing to sell out the Palestinian people. Qaddafi's criticism of Arafat and his hostility toward Al Fatah centered on the PLO leadership's recently more moderate attitude toward the West at a time when Libya and possibly Iraq and Syria remain the only truly unregenerate rejectionists in the Arab world. Qaddafi's solution was as predictable as it was unrealistic as he began calling for the organization into people's committees of the some 40,000 Palestinians in Libya in order to pursue the war against Israel.[35]

The final aspect of Libyan foreign policy that must be dis-

[35] The split had been building for some time and was motivated by several factors, including Qaddafi's financial support for Palestinian groups more radical than the PLO and his attempts to organize the Palestinians in Libya into people's committees and revolutionary committees. (Edmund O'Sullivan, "Split with Libya Hampers PLO Fence-mending," *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 18, 1980, p. 33.)

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cussed is the change in the motivation and orientation of petroleum policy initiated by the RCC soon after the 1969 coup d'état. As the Libyan government's policy evolved, it became clear that socialism and pan-Arabism as well as nationalism had become the guiding principles of a petroleum policy based on the Algerian experience. Immediate objectives included an increase in posted prices and tax rates, improved conservation measures, and the accelerated substitution of Libyan personnel for expatriate workers in the administrative and technical positions of the oil companies. Longer-term objectives focused on raising state revenues from oil production and on increasing government participation in the operations of foreign oil companies.

The Libyan government opened negotiations with the oil companies in early 1970; by 1974, it had secured control of all of them through participation or nationalization agreements. Since then, Libya has pursued a policy emphasizing controlled production to conserve reserves and price escalation to maximize oil revenues. Tripoli has been particularly aggressive in its oil-pricing policy, occasionally even when a price increase was not in Libya's best economic interests, because the government sees petroleum as a major political weapon in its struggle against imperialism and Zionism. In this sense, Libya's petroleum policy has often been incongruent with that of many other oil-producing countries more concerned with the pursuit of internal economic-development goals.[36]

Conclusions

The foreign policy pursued by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been strongly influenced by the geography, history, and social patterns of what was formerly Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan. As the Gulf of Sirte divides the nation's population centers, so has Libyan foreign policy oscillated between its search for a wider role in the Mashrek and its more natural affinity to the Maghreb. Historically, the key influence on foreign policy has been a long and difficult experience with colonialism and neocolonialism that did not really end until the September 1969 coup. Culturally, many factors have had an impact on the policies of the RCC, the orthodox religious faith of the people being the most obvious. To begin to understand the foreign policy of the Socialist

[36] Edith Penrose, "The Development of Crisis," in Raymond Vernon, ed., *The Oil Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 52; Robert S. Pindyck, "OPEC's Threat to the West," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1978, p. 41.

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People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, that policy must be appreciated and studied as having matured in this unique milieu.

It is seldom appreciated that the Libyan government under the direction of the Revolutionary Command Council simply continued or expanded many policies established by the monarchy. Considerable domestic support for the Palestinian people, for example, had been obvious in Libya since 1947, at least, and the monarchy had supported and encouraged it to a modest extent. In oil policy, the monarchy had been pressing for government participation in the posted price of oil since 1967. Finally, after the discovery of oil, the monarchy sought to decrease the Western presence and influence in the kingdom and to bring substance to the image of neutrality. While the RCC's impact on the monarchy's foreign policy should not be underestimated, it is equally incorrect to assume there was no continuity between the two regimes.

Moreover, the RCC sought to legitimize its objectives of freedom, socialism, and unity by placing them within the context of the Libyan heritage and by appealing to traditional values, especially Islam. Its rationale for legitimacy was not dissimilar to the monarchy's, but of course, both essence and emphasis varied considerably. The RCC stressed brotherhood, but it shifted the emphasis from narrow tribal structures to the larger Arab community. It recalled the heroic struggle against Italian colonialism but added condemnation of the more recent corruption of the palace and its cooperation with neocolonialism, specifically those governments the RCC saw as primarily responsible for the oppression of the Palestinians. Religion was also repeatedly invoked, but it was promoted in the context of the orthodox doctrine of right rule and justice, rather than in the form of the parochial religious lodges and brotherhoods of the Sanusi movement. Colonel Qaddafi, an austere and devout orthodox Muslim, frequently expressed his desire to increase the role of Islam as both a cultural and a religious factor in national life.

In other areas, the RCC's policies were radical departures from the policy of the monarchy. Qaddafi and the RCC abruptly terminated the loose association that the monarchy had had with the Middle Eastern system and began a close, albeit frequently estranged, association with the Arab system. The RCC, moreover, actively sought ways to demonstrate its political independence from the Western world while maintaining the close economic relationship that had developed under the monarchy. It also initiated a policy of actively promoting Arab unity, the long-range objective being

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the union of all Arab governments into a single Arab state. In oil policy, it developed a strategy of controlled production and maximum price that went far beyond the monarchy's efforts at increased participation.

To comprehend fully the nature and extent of the policy changes initiated by the RCC, one must be careful to distinguish policy from tactics. Failure to do so is one of the chief reasons that the origins and consistency of the Libyan government's policies have been so misunderstood. For example, the Libyan government's policy has been to fight colonialism and neocolonialism in the name of freedom, while the tactics employed have included support of liberation movements from Northern Ireland to the Philippine Islands. Similarly, its policy is to regain Palestine by isolating Israel politically and economically and then conquering it militarily, and the tactics used have included support both of PLO terrorist attacks and of African dictators like Amin and Bokassa who oppose Israel. Since the Libyan government has adopted new tactics, compared with those of the monarchy, in order to support new foreign policy objectives, those objectives must be separated from the tactics employed to accomplish them if the former are to be understood and objectively evaluated.

Colonel Qaddafi and the RCC have also sought a much broader audience for many of their policies. Where the monarchy's foreign policy was largely regional in interest and impact, the RCC has addressed the wider Arab world. Growing oil revenues have enabled it to address that wider audience; but, much to its astonishment and dismay, the government has found that the message has little appeal outside Libyan frontiers. Libya's small population and its limited geopolitical and military strength are disproportionate to the ambition of the RCC (especially of Colonel Qaddafi). As a result, the government has often set foreign policy objectives that national resources will not allow it to achieve.

Because both the execution of the September coup d'état and many early policy statements were based on the Egyptian example, the substantial differences that separate Libyan foreign policy from that of Egypt under Nasser should also be clearly underscored. First, the Libyan government incorporated Islamic doctrine into its approach to Arab unity. This union of pan-Arabism and orthodox Islam into a single strategy of legitimacy is quite different from the policy followed by Nasser or by most other Arab states, which have employed one or the other but not both. Second, Libya's oil wealth

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made it the first wealthy Arab state to promote Arab unity. Advocacy by the rich of union with the poor was a complete reversal of a long-standing pattern in the Arab world. Oil revenues have also meant that the Libyan government has not needed a patron in the way that Gamal Abdel Nasser needed first the West and then the Soviet Union, although Tripoli does use the former as a market for its oil and the latter as an arms supplier. This continuing reliance on East and West has led some cynical Libyans to observe that, despite Colonel Qaddafi's assertions, Libya is still only a pawn between the superpowers. The popular committee–revolutionary committee system developed in Libya is also a totally new form of government for the Middle East, one that the RCC hoped would correct some of the deficiencies it had observed in other Arab revolutionary governments. In this respect, the replacement of Libyan embassies by so-called people's bureaus, which began in September 1979 and was accelerated in May 1980, is only the most recent manifestation of Qaddafi's determination to find a new form of government based on direct popular participation.

Another point to be emphasized is the contradictory nature of much of Libyan foreign policy. The Libyan government has preached Arab unity while severely restricting Arab immigration and harassing Arab expatriates from those Arab states with which it is at odds, such as Egypt and now Tunisia. It cries for freedom from colonialism and neocolonialism but has established one of the most efficient totalitarian states in the world today. It advocates self-determination and then seeks to subvert the governments of neighboring states because they do not agree with RCC sociopolitical and economic theories. Severely critical of most aspects of the Western world, the Libyan government is a full participant in the international capitalist system, marketing crude oil in exchange for manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and even primary materials. Much of the profit it derives from that trade, moreover, is then invested in the Western economies. Finally, the government calls for a return to orthodox Islam while taking actions that many Muslims, both inside and outside Libya, consider heretical. Furthermore, Tripoli has completely failed to understand why its pan-Islamic crusade has caused deep divisions and separatist tendencies in countries with large non-Muslim minorities.

We now come to the most pronounced aspect of Libya's foreign policy: its remarkable stabiilty and consistency since Colonel Muammer el-Qaddafi and the Free Unionist Officers' Movement

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seized power nearly ten years ago. Early policy statements emphasized the concepts of freedom, socialism, and unity; and while later discourse refined and occasionally expanded those ideals, the basic philosophy and policy of the revolutionary government has remained intact and largely unchanged throughout the past decade. In large measure, this is the fundamental problem with the foreign policy of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya today and accounts for its singular lack of success. The initial foreign policy pronouncements of the RCC, many of them patterned after Nasser's policies when he seized power, were anachronistic in 1969, and they have become increasingly so over the past decade. Where the policies of almost all the other Arab governments have changed considerably in this period, the Libyan government has refused to adapt its objectives to the changing realities of the Middle East. The result is a foreign policy whose tenets and objectives are increasingly removed from the governments and people it seeks to influence, if not lead.

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NEGOTIATING BY PROXY: JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. OPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

by Adam M. Garfinkle

One of the most durable American friends in the Arab Middle East has been the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Always a "moderate" in Washington's classification of Arab political tendencies, Jordan's King Hussein has long enjoyed a favorable public image in the West as a brave, pragmatic man defending his country's interests. Never did he flirt seriously with Moscow and, alone among the Arab leaders in immediate confrontation with Israel, Hussein has been highly regarded for his "flexible" attitude toward peace. He alone had recognized Israel's right to exist — albeit conditionally — and long before Sadat broke the taboo on direct negotiations, the king was suspected — accurately — of having met face-to-face with Israeli officials.[1] For these reasons and others, the stability and sovereignty of the Hashemite realm has come to occupy an important place in U.S., and even Israeli, strategic conceptions. Indeed, a decade ago, both the United States and Israel were prepared to intervene in defense of Hussein against a Syrian invasion during the Jordanian civil war.[2]

In light of this legacy, it puzzled many that on the issue of the Camp David accords, which led to the U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and the talks on Palestinian "autonomy," Jordan joined the ranks of the radical "rejectionists." Hussein's orientation was especially significant against the backdrop of Washington's

* This essay has benefited from good collegial advice. In particular, the author thanks Dr. Harvey Sicherman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute for his helpful scrutiny.

[1] Hussein's grandfather, Abdallah, also met with Israeli leaders on numerous occasions between 1947 and 1949. See Moshe Dayan, *Moshe Dayan: The Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), chap. 3.

[2] The last published account of the Jordan crisis is William Quandt's chapter in his *Decade of Decisions: United States Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). A useful account is my "United States Foreign Policy and the Jordan Crisis of 1970: A Cognitive Approach" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1978).

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fervent expectations of his support for the Camp David process and unusual American efforts to ensure it.

After the Sadat initiative had deflected the Carter administration's approach to a "comprehensive settlement," the president and his advisers worried that the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations might lead to a vulnerable bilateral accord against which other Arab states and the PLO might struggle. It was their view that only a more inclusive arrangement, one that dealt with the Palestinian issue and one that had multilateral Arab assent, could endure.[3] Jordan, far more than Syria or the PLO, seemed to be the key to a "breakout" from a geographically and politically circumscribed truce onto the broader plateau of a comprehensive settlement. But American efforts to involve Jordan in the emerging peace process, both before and immediately after the Camp David summit, fell short. With the collapse of the Iranian imperial regime toward the end of 1978, the administration's desire to progress toward a comprehensive settlement grew even more intense. Both before and after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979, the United States redoubled its efforts to attract the support of its "moderate" friends — Jordan and Saudi Arabia — for the treaty and the upcoming autonomy negotiations. Again, these efforts were to no avail.

While American hopes for an Arab-Israeli peace have been partially fulfilled by the Israeli-Egyptian treaty and the agonizing but enduring autonomy talks, the United States has not been able to attract other Arab states into even grudging support. Nearly two years of sustained effort to entice Jordan into the peace progress, highlighted by the Saunders mission of September 1978 and the Vance and Brzezinski visits of March 1979, came to naught, straining relations between Washington and Amman. After his emissaries returned, President Carter claimed that he had gone as far as he could "prudently" go to persuade the king to support the pact. As for Hussein, he stated with undisguised sarcasm on the eve of the treaty's signing that "we got a whole series of messages telling us the good news and achievement, as if they expected us to jump for joy."[4]

In the year and a half that has passed since the treaty's signing, relations between Amman and Washington have improved

[3] There are many accounts of U.S. Middle East policy during the Carter administration's first two years. The best is Harvey Sicherman's *Broker or Advocate? The U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-1978* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, Monograph no. 25, 1978).

[4] Jonathan C. Randal, "Jordan's Hussein Criticizes U.S. On Peace Treaty," *Washington Post,* March 21, 1979.

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superficially, but Hussein has budged not one inch in the direction of supporting American policy. Instead, he has rejected firmly any participation in the Camp David process, maintained his antipathy for Sadat's Egypt, improved relations with Moscow, and supported various "alternatives" to Camp David — Arab and European — that have been seen as undermining American efforts. Hussein has deeply annoyed most of official Washington with his vigorous support for Iraq in its military campaign against Iran. Finally, there is no evidence that, behind the scenes, the king has encouraged his friends in the West Bank to cooperate with the attempt to build a Palestinian autonomy that will terminate the Israeli military administration of those areas.

Why did the "moderate" turn "rejectionist"? How could the United States have misjudged so badly the prospects of Jordanian support? What does Jordan's refusal to support or join the negotiating process tell us about the near-term prospects for a multilateral settlement? What circumstances, if any, might persuade Hussein to reverse his course and join the peace process?

Obviously, answers to these questions have more than a historical import for, as another four-year cycle in American foreign policy commences, policymakers in Washington face these same puzzles as they craft an approach to the region. To serve American interests, U.S. policy must evince an understanding of the complex connection between the Hashemite dynasty, the Palestinian issue, and Jordan's delicate position in inter-Arab politics. Once this connection is understood, the potential and limits of the Jordanian role in any effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict will be appreciated.

The Hashemite Monarchy and Palestinian Nationalism

Since the early 1970s, the issue of Palestinian nationalism has come to occupy a central role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. This development has transformed the Jordanian position in the conflict and greatly complicated its diplomacy. But the relationship of Palestinian nationalism — or Arab nationalism, for that matter — to Hashemite aspirations is an old and bitter one.

The Hashemite family, sponsors of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, were the principal beneficiaries of the British-dominated reconstruction of the Arab-populated areas under the mandate system established at Versailles. Hussein, grand sherif of Mecca, became king of the Hejaz. A throne was found for Hussein's elder son Faisal in the new state of Iraq (the

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British mandate of Mesopotamia) after his ignoble eviction from Damascus. A sem-independent emirate called Transjordan was carved out of the mandate for Palestine and given to Hussein's younger son, Abdallah.[5]

In 1926, the Kingdom of Hejaz was conquered by the legions of ibn Saud, founder of Saudi Arabia. Despite having lost Mecca, the Hashemites nevertheless considered themselves the leaders of the Arab national revival then sweeping the Middle East. Abdallah and Faisal attempted to fashion a dynastic and nationalist unity — the Fertile Crescent scheme — that would dominate the Levant. This path was blocked, however, by the French, the British, the Zionists, and also by the Palestinian Arab movement.

Palestinian Arab nationalism arose during the 1920s and 1930s in response to the British occupation of Palestine and to the growing strength of the Jewish community and Zionist ideology.[6] Palestinian nationalism was, among other things, thoroughly anti-British; by association, this made it anti-Hashemite as well. The Palestinian movement resented Abdallah for his connivance with the British and his tacit acceptance of the hated Balfour Declaration. During the late 1930s and early years of World War II, the Palestinians courted Nazi patronage in hopes of unseating both the British and the Zionists. This enraged Abdallah; his long-standing contempt for Palestinian Arab politicians and their leader, the mufti of Jerusalem, now became limitless. Abdallah opposed both a Zionist state and an Arab sovereignty in Palestine outside of his rule.[7]

In 1947, during the tense period that preceded the birth of the modern state of Israel, Abdallah publicly manifested solidarity with the Arab League and hostility to an independent Jewish entity of any kind. In private, however, he maintained discreet contact with Golda Myerson (Meir) and Moshe Sharett with whom he sought to conclude an agreement over the disputed parts of Palestine. At first he offered a protectorate, with "autonomy" for the Jewish-populated areas. In return, he would protect the Zionists against the mufti and his irregulars. After partition was voted, Abdallah told the representatives of the Jewish Agency that his well-trained and British-led Arab legion would not join a war against the infant Jewish state. But

[5] For one account of all this, see Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 4, *1916-1922* (London: Heinemann, 1975).

[6] See Ann M. Lesch, "The Palestinian-Arab National Movement Under the Mandate," in William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabbar, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[7] An account of this period can be found in Howard M. Sacher, *Europe Leaves the Middle East, 1936-1954* (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 66-108.

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as the Arab war coalition developed, Abdallah realized that he could no longer promise protection. He nevertheless instructed his Arab Legion to seize only those areas not allocated to Israel in the UN resolution.[8] This was Abdallah's payment for Britain's acquiescence in Transjordan's absorption of Arab Palestine, a deal he had secretly negotiated with Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary. In the course of the 1948 war, Abdallah managed to secure what remained of Arab Palestine with the tacit approval of London and Tel Aviv. The annexation, formalized in 1949, was recognized only by Britain and Pakistan.

With this maneuver, Abdallah realized part of the Hashemite quest, but the Palestinians never forgave him for preventing them from setting up their own state. On July 20, 1951, a Palestinian assassinated Abdallah before his sixteen year-old grandson in the el-Aqsa Mosque. Two years later, following the abdication of his father Talal, the young man became King Hussein of Jordan.

Hussein received a political time bomb for an inheritance, a kingdom of exiles: Palestinians from the new state of Israel and the Hashemites from the Hejaz. But Abdallah also bequeathed to Hussein the most effective Arab army then in existence, and he left Jordan in a pivotal position in the war for the succession of the Palestine Mandate. Though not recognized by any Arab state, Jordan's absorption of the Arab "half" of the Palestine partition soon acquired a logic of its own as the pattern of Jordanian rule emerged. Palestinian Arabs carried Jordanian passports but the West Bank and Jordanian Jerusalem held second place in Jordan's economic and political priorities. With the previous Palestinian leadership eliminated, the Hashemites successfully recruited their own local support, beginning with the Jericho conference of 1948. More cooperative Palestinian families enjoyed royal patronage and rose to high posts in the civil service and even the army.

Between 1953 and 1967, Hussein's rule was nevertheless threatened by violent expressions of Palestinian nationalism precipitated by the emergence of Arab radicalism in Egypt and, after 1958, in Iraq.[9] But resistance from the refugee camps and elsewhere was crushed by force. In the meantime, a stable *modus vivendi* evolved

[8] A good general account can be found in Sacher, *Europe Leaves the Middle East*, and Sacher, *A History of Israel* (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. 320-324. This history can be constructed from the memoirs of Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, John B. Glubb (Glubb Pasha), and King Abdallah himself. For the king's own account, see Abdallah ibn Hussein, *Memoirs*, ed. Philip Graves (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950).

[9] See Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamel Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

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between Israel and Jordan: though Israel's lack of strategic depth provided constant military temptation and though Jewish Jerusalem could be reached only through a vulnerable corridor bordered on both sides by Jordanian territory, a virtual peace endured between the two countries.

These tolerable balances were shattered by the June 1967 war. Against Israeli expectations and pleas, Hussein joined Nasser's war coalition at the last moment rather than face a civil war — backed by Syrian and Iraqi armor — in Jordan itself. The early destruction of the Egyptian Air Force doomed the Jordanian Legion's military possibilities. Vigorous but unsuccessful resistance was offered in Jerusalem itself; the king withdrew his main forces intact to the other side of the Jordan River.

Before the war, the Hashemites' claims to representing the Palestinian cause had never gained widespread support among the Arabs. With the loss of the West Bank and the humiliation of military defeat, Palestinian antagonism to the Hashemites was roused to a new pitch. The Fedayeen, whose attacks offered the only Arab military resistance to Israeli control between 1967 and the War of Attrition in 1969, quickly captured the admiration of the Palestinians, who still composed more than half of Jordan's remaining population on the East Bank.

In these somewhat desperate circumstances, Hussein recognized that a more attractive arrangement than the *status quo ante* was necessary if Palestinian sympathies were to be enlisted toward Jordan in the recovery of the lost territories. Soon after the war, Hussein stressed that, *after* liberation, the West Bank could choose among reintegration with Jordan, complete autonomy, and local autonomy within a federal system.[10] Hussein publicly preferred the third option and expressed the conviction that the people of West Bank would eventually agree with him.[11] Meanwhile, he opposed both the efforts of West Bank politicians to negotiate with Israel and the PLO's pretensions to represent their interests. At the same time, the king became involved in a risky compromise with the "new" PLO. Hussein afforded the Fedayeen a launching area for attacks against Israel hoping that, by doing so voluntarily, he could influence Fedayeen operations. Theoretically, this might also have been expected to strengthen Jordan's hand in negotiating a recovery of the

[10] See Uriel Dann, "The Jordanian Entity in Changing Circumstances, 1967-1973," in Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, eds., *From June to October: The Middle East Between 1967 and 1973* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1977), p. 240.

[11] Ibid., pp. 240-242.

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West Bank by making Israel's occupation more costly and a deal with the king more attractive. Simultaneously, the Fedayeen would be fully occupied with the Israelis, the less to concern themselves about the future of Jordanian politics. But it was not to be. The Jordanian Army observed in humiliating inactivity as the Fedayeen gained prestige despite their military failures. By June 1970, a protracted contest for authority between a divided and frustrated PLO and the apparently paralyzed royal regime threatened the survival of the Hashemite monarchy.

The struggle for authority exploded into violence when Hussein scored his first significant diplomatic victory after the 1967 war: Jordan's inclusion in the American diplomatic initiative terminating the War of Attrition, the "Rogers ceasefire" of August 1970. For the first time, the Israeli government had to state that UN Security Council Resolution 242 applied to the West Bank, a declaration that broke up the National Unity Coalition when Menahem Begin resigned rather than subscribe.[12] The intrigue of the smaller splinter organizations within the PLO following Jordan's accession to the ceasefire brought on the civil war in September. When it was over, the PLO was finished in Jordan. The Syrian regime, the other major danger to Hussein, gambled and lost when its invasion during the fighting was balked by U.S., Israeli, and Jordanian resistance. Amid Syria's defeat, Hafez el-Assad promptly seized power in Damascus. Although the immediate physical threat to the monarchy had been overcome, a heavy political cost had been paid: the Hashemite regime emerged as the mortal enemy of the "new" Palestinian nationalists in the PLO and Jordan stood dangerously isolated in the Arab world. This predicament was reinforced during the winter of 1971 when the Jordanian Army attacked and ruthlessly decimated the remnants of the Palestinian forces in the forests of Ajlun.[13]

Despite a fundamental enmity between Jordan and the PLO, Hussein did not deny, after 1967 or after 1970, that Palestinian nationalism deserved political expression. The king has never been convinced, however, that such expression required either an independent state carved out of Jordanian territory or inherent antipathy toward the Hashemite dynasty. In March 1972, Hussein unveiled his federation plan proposing a "Hashemite" East Bank and a "Pales-

[12] See Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 502-510.

[13] This was the origin of "Black September," not the civil war itself. Black September's first reprisal was the November 1971 assassination of the Jordanian premier, Wasfi Tell, in Cairo.

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tinian" West Bank: two regions, two capitals, two Arab national "cultures," but one foreign policy, one army, and, most important, one king.[14] Hussein's federation plan was designed to keep Jordan in competition for the sympathies of the population of the occupied territories, to reduce Jordan's isolation in the Arab world in the aftermath of the civil war, and to ease the strains that had developed between the Bedouins, the mainstay of the army, and the Palestinian citizens of Jordan's East Bank.[15] On the latter two counts, the plan achieved some successes but it failed to stem the PLO's increasing acceptance as the legitimate representative of Palestinian interests.

Jordan's inter-Arab diplomatic standing, damaged by defeat in 1967 and the subsequent expulsion of the Fedayeen, was further reduced by its marginal participation in the October 1973 war. Its principal external supporter, the United States, contributed further to this isolation by energetically pursuing disengagement agreements on the southern and northern fronts. A brief attempt at a Jordanian-Israeli negotiation was stillborn.[16]

Between the 1967 and 1973 wars, the strength of Hussein's domestic constituency and Jordan's international position reached a nadir. The kingdom had suffered military defeat and a ruinous civil war; it was economically weak and dangerously vulnerable to political intrigues from a variety of sources. Hussein was thus in a poor position to fend off the PLO's political assault on his trusteeship of the Palestinians. The PLO was victorious in Rabat, Morocco.

The Rabat Summit: Jordan and the Arab Cold War

The Rabat summit in October 1974 bestowed on the PLO the exclusive right to speak for the Palestinian cause. Since the civil war, and particularly since the October 1973 war, Hussein had striven to deflect the deepening recognition of the PLO's claim to representing Palestinians without advancing one of his own.[17] He

[14] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report* (Middle East & North Africa) (hereafter FBIS), March 17, 1972.

[15] These strains were exacerbated by Prime Minister Wasfi Tell's efforts to "de-Palestinize" the Hashemite government during his ministerial tenure from October 29, 1970, to November 28, 1971.

[16] See Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, pp. 233-234, 248-249, and esp. pp. 254-258.

[17] The Rabat summit was the culmination of a process whose proximate origins are to be found in the Algiers summit of November 27-28, 1973. For coverage of this summit, which Hussein did not attend, see FBIS, November 28-30, 1973. At the Rabat summit on October 27, the king declared: "While we do not assume the right to impose ourselves on them after the liberation, we likewise do not consider it fair that others should impose any position on them which these residents do not choose or decide for themselves. So, we support them in respecting the right of self-determination and will give them the chance to exercise this right after the liberation." (FBIS, October 31, 1974, p. A4.)

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stressed that the West Bank must speak its own will; the PLO he portrayed as attempting to impose itself by force. The Rabat summit clearly spelled defeat for Hussein's tactics. Even as the physical threat to the monarchy receded, the PLO had evolved into an ever more formidable political adversary. Beyond the obvious damage done to Jordanian diplomacy, the Rabat resolutions cast an ominous shadow on the political stability of a country whose population was more than half Palestinian.

Hussein had little choice but to accept publicly the Rabat verdict. His response, however, was designed to enhance Hashemite credibility on the West Bank at the PLO's expense without incurring the enmity of the Arab countries that insured Jordan's solvency and without disturbing any local political advantages.[18] Hussein cited his acquiescence in the Rabat decision as evidence of his noble pan-Arabist sentiments, but he campaigned to convince the population that the PLO could never secure an Israeli withdrawal. Hussein skillfully employed Jordan's remaining influence in the area, deploying money, legal favors, and family connections with consummate skill.

The Rabat summit did less damage to Jordan's position in the West Bank than its resolutions suggested, but a good deal of damage elsewhere. Despite some success in limiting the local impact, the general trend toward recognition of the PLO in the Arab world menaced Jordanian interests. Between the Rabat summit and the spring of 1976, Jordan sought to break out of its isolation through a cautious and conditional alliance with Syria, hoping to moderate Syrian support for the PLO and to engage Egyptian interest in keeping Jordan from becoming aligned with Cairo's arch-rival in Damascus. But serious inter-Arab quarrels complicated Jordan's strategy and again illustrated Jordan's historical position: powerful and well-placed enough to be significant, but not strong enough to pursue an active, independent policy toward Israel. Hussein wished neither to encourage nor to reward the "step-by-step" approach practiced by the United States and supported by Egypt and Israel, but, at the same

[18] After the civil war, subsidies from the Arab countries dropped sharply. After Rabat, most of the subsidies were resumed and increased. In 1968, Jordan received about $100 million in Arab aid, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. All subsidies were halted after the civil war except the Saudi one, which amounted to about $40 million. After Rabat, the Arabs agreed to pay Jordan $300 million each year, compared to $1 billion each for Egypt and Syria and $50 million for the PLO. (*New York Times*, March 3, 1968, and October 20, 1974.) Local political advantages include the following: residents of the West Bank carry Jordanian passports; Jordanian currency is legal tender; banks have their central offices in Amman; public officials, teachers, and other municipal workers are salaried through Amman; Jordan contributes to municipal budgets and local development projects; until Parliament was suspended in 1975, the West Bank was represented in the Jordanian Parliament; the judicial system is Jordanian; there is easy physical access between the East and West Banks, facilitated by Israel's "open bridges" policy; and there is still a substantial economic tie between the two banks, as well.

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time, he did not want to sever Jordan from useful future developments in which Egypt might play an important role. Hussein's interest in improving relations with Sadat, however, irritated the Syrians who did not hesitate to recite a litany of threats. As a result, while relations with Syria grew somewhat closer, there was scant improvement in relations with Egypt, and any moderation in the PLO's attitude toward Jordan was more the result of the gathering storm in Lebanon than of anything else.

Jordan's emergence from the constrictions of the post-Rabat period was afforded principally by developments in Lebanon. As Jordan's civil war had isolated Hussein, so the Lebanese civil war enlarged his freedom of maneuver. In 1976, Syria set out to dominate the warring factions in order to prevent either a breakaway Christian ministate or a Lebanon controlled by radical Muslims or Druses. This brought the Syrian forces into armed conflict with their erstwhile ally, the PLO, and by October, the PLO had been soundly defeated. Alone among the Arabs, Hussein supported Syria's actions in Lebanon in hopes of turning Damascus' disaffection with the PLO into an advantage for Amman. The PLO's behavior in the Lebanese crisis resulted, as well, in a deterioration of its support in the West Bank. Here, too, the king cultivated the PLO's troubles with zeal.

At first, Hussein's support for Syria ran against the careful balance he had attempted to build after Rabat. Though drawn closer to Syria after 1974, Hussein had not associated Jordan fully with the Syrian political line toward Israel. After Sinai II, the second U.S.-supported Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, Jordanian criticism of Egypt had been far milder than Syria's and Hussein had not allowed the connection to Damascus to interfere with good relations between Jordan and the United States. But the risk entailed in aiding Syrian policy in Lebanon soon abated and even turned ito an advantage.

With its military in control of most of Lebanon, Syria found a shared interest with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in settling the Lebanese crisis; the former desirous of Egyptian and Saudi acquiescence in the new *Pax Syrianica,* and the latter two hoping to extinguish the crisis in anticipation of a new American Middle East initiative. A spate of Arab summitry between October and December 1976 succeeded in settling the Lebanese problem at least temporarily and in moderating somewhat the rivalry between Cairo and Damascus.[19] But more important from the Jordanian perspective, these summits recognized

[19] Hussein called these summits "the most successful conferences in which the Arab leaders have met." See Asher Susser, "Jordan," in Colin Legum, ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey,* Vol. 1, 1976-77 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), pp. 478-479.

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anew the "special relationship" between Jordan and the Palestinian problem and worked to limit the PLO's prestige and freedom of maneuver. At the Cairo "Reconciliation Conference" of December 18-21, for example, both Syria and Egypt pressed the PLO to "clarify" — read moderate — its political position in anticipation of the Carter administration's first foray into the region. Though Syria and Egypt disagreed over how Palestinian interests would be best served, it was soon evident that the PLO's internal political weakness rendered it incapable of compromise.[20] When the PLO proved unable to satisfy either Syria or Egypt, Assad and Sadat turned to Hussein. In late December, Sadat announced that a future Palestinian state should have mutually agreed ties to Jordan.[21] While this position did not coincide with Jordanian policy, Hussein nevertheless recognized that it undercut the conclusions of the Rabat summit. Assad, meanwhile, conspired with Hussein to turn the pro-Syrian Palestine Liberation Army into an "alternative" to the PLO and to pack the Palestinian National Congress with anti-Fatah delegates.[22]

Thus, Syria taunted the defeated PLO with its overtures to both Sadat and Hussein — the hated butcher of Black September. Egypt, hoping to use an improved relationship with Jordan to ease its own isolation, was willing to stress anew a Jordanian role on the West Bank. Saudi Arabia, though it financed both the PLO and Jordan, was eager to strengthen the role of a conservative state at a time of the PLO's weakness, particularly in a context of growing inter-Arab accord. Thus, by moving closer to Syria at a propitious time, Jordan was able to improve its ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well and reassert Jordan's political significance at the PLO's expense.

Jordan and the Carter Administration

By the time Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, Jordan had managed a major diplomatic comeback. Through an astute navi-

[20] Syria favored a joint Arab delegation probably so that it could better exert its own influence within the "eastern front" it had recently built. Egypt preferred an independent PLO delegation or one tied to a separate Jordanian delegation. Hussein opposed the Egyptian suggestion; he did not want a formal negotiating link established between Jordan and the PLO and counted on Israeli opposition to defeat this proposal. Arafat announced after the Syrian-Egyptian reconciliation summit that the "PLO is not prepared to set up a government-in-exile as demanded by Egypt" and the "PLO will not go to Geneva on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242." This was, and was intended as, a rebuff to Sadat and Assad.

[21] See *Washington Post*, December 30, 1976, *Newsweek*, January 6, 1977. See, also, FBIS, January 3, 1977, pp. D1-D6.

[22] See FBIS, December 30, 1976, p. A1, and January 17, 1977, p. H2; also see *Middle East Intelligence Service*, December 16-31, 1976, pp. 140-141, and January 1-15, 1977, pp. 148-149.

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gation of troubled inter-Arab currents, Hussein was able to evade many of the ill effects of Rabat, to associate itself with both Syria and Egypt, to support Saudi mediation in Lebanon, and to improve Jordan's standing in the West Bank. Moreover, of the four Arab states bordering Israel, Jordan was the only one not reeling from domestic upheaval. In January 1977, riots struck Egypt, lending urgency to President Sadat's hopes of solving Egypt's economic problems by ending the state of war. In Syria, discontent over corruption, religious strife, and the Lebanese intervention strained the Alawi-dominated regime. Lebanon lay in near total ruin. Only Jordan was calm and increasingly prosperous as dozens of large Western businesses abandoned the rubble of Beirut for the tranquility of Amman.

Amman's increased flexibility abroad and apparent stability at home put the country in a receptive mood for the new American administration's expected initiatives. When these emerged, however, the king and his counselors were very disappointed.

From the beginning of the Carter administration's tenure, American diplomatic activity in the Middle East flowed from a particular theory of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the most efficacious U.S. role in its resolution. The theory held that (1) the Arab-Israeli conflict threatened so many important U.S. interests that it had to be resolved as rapidly as possible; (2) the United States could not rely on local initiative alone: American pressure was essential to diplomatic progress; (3) bilateral agreements, such as those of the Kissinger period, were undesirable because the excluded parties, including the Soviet Union, could overturn them; (4) the United States should therefore seek a comprehensive agreement, associating all the principal parties and giving them each a constructive stake in the solution.[23]

In theory, Jordan took no offense at this concept; after all, it had gained nothing from the "step-by-step" approach. The new administration seemed to imply a greater role for Jordan, reaffirming, in early 1977, that Resolution 242 demanded withdrawal on all fronts with only insubstantial border rectifications. Despite an apparent change in U.S. attitudes toward Palestinian political demands, the administration refused to support either an independent Palestinian state or a permanent Israeli occupation.[24] Any optimism on Hussein's

[23] For a fuller account, see Sicherman, *Broker or Advocate?*, esp. chap. 2.

[24] The beginnings of this change can be traced back at least to 1975. See the prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, *The Palestinian Issue in Middle East Peace Efforts, Hearings* before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, September 30, October 1, 8, and November 12, 1975, pp.

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part was soon discouraged, however. Jordan was less at the center of U.S. diplomatic efforts than even Syria. Much worse, Carter's espousal of a Palestinian "homeland" and the administration's attempts to arrange a PLO "presence" in the proposed Geneva conference built up the PLO's prestige at a time when trends in the Arab world worked in the opposite direction. Was the United States now intending to destroy the benefits of two years' hard work? If, through either incompetence or deceit, this was the case, then it became imperative that Jordan's new ties to Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia be strengthened.

Already in January 1977, the Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement had been bolstered during Hussein's visit to Cairo as Sadat repeated his call for strong ties between a future Palestinian political entity and Jordan — a declaration he reiterated to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in mid-February. Sadat proposed a formal link between a future Palestinian state and Jordan and suggested that Hussein and Arafat negotiate these arrangements before Geneva. President Assad also supported a link between Jordan and a future Palestinian state, though within a more parochial context — that of a federated Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine (implicitly) under Syrian domination. The Saudis seconded the notion. Neither scheme was attractive to Hussein but pressures brought upon a weakened PLO by Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to sit down with Jordan suited the king's campaign to discredit the PLO leadership and further undermine Rabat. It was also of some use as a hedge against what Washington might be planning.

The PLO Central Committee responded to all this by agreeing to talk with Hussein, but without moderating its positions whatsoever. In March, Arafat insisted that any reconciliation be based on the Rabat declarations, that there be a new PLO military and political presence in Jordan, and that the king's newly resurrected federation plan be scrapped as a basis for negotiation. Hussein rejected these demands outright.[25] He had already indicated to Vance in February that he would not form any link with the PLO so

178-180. The Israelis thought that they were protected against any independent U.S. initiative on the Palestinian issue through the assurances tendered by Washington as part of the Sinai II agreement of September 1975. They protested the Saunders statement vigorously only to be told that it was not "official policy" and represented no change. It has been overlooked that Jordan, too, was downgraded by this approach, despite U.S. assurances that Washington would not associate itself with Rabat. The Saunders statement was noncommittal at best with respect to Jordan; one paragraph had a particularly abrupt ending: "It has been our belief that Jordan would be a local negotiator for the Palestinian related issues. The Rabat Summit, however, recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

[25] See Susser, "Jordan," p. 480.

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long as the Rabat declarations endured. Hussein had no intention of aiding the PLO's entry into the diplomatic process; instead, he stressed the rights of the Palestinian *people* to representation at Geneva. In this regard, Hussein's policy inclinations seemed to run far closer to Israel's than to those of the Carter administration.

Despite the PLO's rigidity and Jordan's improving relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Hussein was unable to bring about as rapid and deep an erosion of the PLO's political standing among the Arabs as he desired. His problems were many and now Washington seemed to add to them. Jordan's own participation at Geneva was afforded by its status as a "confrontation state," not as a representative of Palestinian interests. This enabled Hussein to influence the negotiating process without having to repudiate Rabat openly, but this was hardly the mandate he sought. In early 1977, therefore, Hussein's approach to Geneva was slow and cautious; he warned that if Geneva were convened prematurely, its failure might lead to war at a time when Israel's military superiority was manifest. While Jordan could not by itself prevent a PLO presence at Geneva and wished not to be seen trying, the king stressed repeatedly that the PLO should not be forced upon the Palestinian people and suggested that non-PLO Palestinians also attend Geneva. It went without saying that the king was willing to supply some names.

In pursuing its case among the Arabs as a trustee for Palestinian interests, Jordan had always been able to fall back on a singularly effective argument: in any negotiated settlement, Jordan was far more acceptable to Israel than the PLO. It followed, therefore, that, for the population of the West Bank at least, the road to liberation from Israel ran through Amman. But the Israeli electoral revolution of May 1977 brought to power the opposition Likud after almost two decades of uninterrupted Labor Party rule. The new government was not persuaded, as was its predecessor, that the "Jordanian option" was the best diplomatic alternative to continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank. To the contrary, important members of the new Begin cabinet believed that *Jordan* was the real home of the Palestinians; only its ruler was not a Palestinian.[26] The prime minister himself had long cast doubt on the very legitimacy of Jordan, carved as it was from the original Palestine Mandate.[27] Hav-

[26] Ariel Sharon's views are reported in Sidney Zion and Uri Dan, "Israel's Peace Strategy," *New York Times Magazine*, January 21, 1979, and in "Israel's General Sharon: As Tough As Ever," interview by Ranan R. Lurie, *Playboy*, March 1978, p. 43.

[27] For a summary of Begin's views, see Sicherman, *Broker or Advocate?*, pp. 39-40, 69-70. The resentment aroused in other members of Begin's group, such as Defense Minister Weizman, seemed due less to ideology than to Hussein's role in 1967. See Weizman's *On Eagle's Wings* (New York: Berkeley, 1979), pp. 233-235.

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ing long studied Israeli politics as a matter of course and having met Israeli Labor Party officials, Hussein could not fail to appreciate the significance of the Likud victory.

The Israeli election results added to the king's worries; he was already concerned that his effort to insure Jordan's role in future negotiations was being undercut by the Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian attempt to monopolize preparatory negotiations for the Arab position at Geneva. By late summer, however, these problems were overshadowed by the dangers inherent in American diplomacy. Despite Washington's reassurances that statements about a Palestinian "homeland" did not alter long-standing American commitments to Jordan,[28] the United States, in pursuit of its comprehensive solution, was led to concentrate first on moving Syria and, especially, the PLO. During Secretary Vance's visit to Saudi Arabia in early August, President Carter declared that a U.S.-PLO relationship could begin — and, implicitly, that the United States would support inviting the PLO to Geneva — if the PLO accepted Resolution 242.[29] The president even allowed that the PLO might attach a qualification stating its objection to the resolution's reference to the Palestinians as refugees. That President Carter all but drafted the acceptable phraseology for the PLO while Vance was in Saudi Arabia was no coincidence, for it was through Riyadh that moderation of the PLO's position was expected to come. This was an obvious and clumsy retreat from an earlier position; the Israelis argued heatedly that it contravened a pledge given to Israel by Kissinger in 1975 and reaffirmed by Vance as recently as March.[30] In any event, the Saudis failed to deliver; instead, the PLO demanded a change in Resolution 242, and this, Washington said, it would not consider.

Hussein hoped that, with this somewhat embarrassing rebuff, the Carter administration would abandon its effort to court the PLO. In late August, however, Washington issued a stream of messages urging Arafat to reconsider. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who reportedly met with Hussein in London, remarked that the king was much dismayed by U.S. policy.[31] The administration's steadily concessionary approach to the PLO, however, still failed to find any resonance with Arafat.

In the fall of 1977, the American pursuit of a comprehen-

[28] See FBIS, May 5, 1977, pp. F1-F2.

[29] See the Carter interview in *Time*, August 8, 1977.

[30] The standing U.S. position, established as an addendum to the Sinai Agreement of 1975, was that the PLO must change its national covenant, which called for the destruction of Israel. The addendum also pledged the United States to close consultation with Israel on all matters involving the PLO.

[31] See Susser, "Jordan," p. 488, and FBIS, September 2, 1977, p. N3.

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sive settlement via a Geneva conference produced two notable episodes. The first was Washington's attempt to forge a compromise with Israel under which a joint Arab delegation, including "low level" PLO participation, would conduct formal opening sessions at Geneva, followed by bilateral working groups in which these Palestinians would be part of a pan-Arab or Jordanian delegation. This plan drew favorable comment from Egypt and consideration from Syria and Jordan, but Israel's rejection was strong and unmistakable. The U.S.-Israeli quarrel that then erupted was soon magnified further. On October 1, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué in which the United States mentioned for the first time the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people and excluded mention of Resolutions 242 and 338 — the only bases of a settlement accepted by Israel and some Arab states.[32] The communiqué was overwhelmed by an outraged American public opinion, and on October 4, a U.S.-Israeli "working paper" was produced in order to repair some of the damage done to U.S.-Israeli relations over the previous two months. In the working paper, the Israelis conceded a Palestinian role in discussions of the West Bank and Gaza, but there was no mention of the PLO or the joint communiqué.

Jordan's public reactions to the U.S.-Israeli quarrel over PLO representation at Geneva and the communiqué were calm and unexceptional,[33] but the king was privately of the opinion that both were egregious and dangerous errors. By assuming the role of the PLO's advocate, the Carter administration suddenly undermined Jordan's position seemingly on the very eve of Geneva, violating pledges Hussein thought he had received during his trip to Washington in April. The administration also thus demonstrated its insensitivity to Jordan's new strength in the Arab political equation and the unwisdom of allowing the chance for peace to become hostage to the most recalcitrant parties. Through the communiqué, Washington had let the Soviets back into a position of influence, allowing them to pose as champions of Palestinian rights even though the United States had been most responsible for resuscitating the PLO's damaged political fortune. In early 1977, despite public caution, Hussein recognized that the chance for peace grew as two big obstacles to progress — the Soviets and the PLO — were cast out of the diplomatic mainstream, the former owing to the successes of Kissinger's "step-by-step" diplomacy and the latter by defeat in

[32] Raymond Cohen, "Israel and the Soviet-American Statement of October 1, 1977: The Limits of Patron-Client Influence," ORBIS, Fall 1978.

[33] FBIS, October 3, 1977, p. F1.

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Lebanon. By the fall of the year, it was with perplexity and frustration that Hussein watched as Washington squandered methodically its most precious assets. As it turned out, Hussein was not the only agitated onlooker.

After the Sadat Initiative

There is little doubt that the episode of the Soviet-American communiqué and the working paper helped convince Sadat that the Carter administration's approach to the Middle East was headed toward total failure. When Syria rejected the working paper after tentative Egyptian and Jordanian approval, Sadat declared on November 9, 1977, that he would address the Israeli Knesset if such an event would prevent a new war and promote peace.

Jordan's response to the Sadat initiative was cautious. Unlike other Arab leaders, Hussein did not condemn the establishment of personal contacts; he could hardly have done so, having used such tactics himself as had his grandfather before him. But neither did Hussein openly support Sadat. His position was equivocal. Hussein saw no immediate value for Jordan in the Egyptian approach, for even if Israel were willing to return the Sinai to Egypt, Hussein knew that the Begin government would never willingly withdraw from any of the West Bank. Yet, there was value in the Egyptian policy for Jordan if it might help transcend the procedural morass that blocked the way to Geneva. Once the peace process was finally allowed to take up more substantive issues, then the administration's penchant for comprehensiveness and America's long-standing interpretation of Resolution 242 might work to bring heavy pressure on the Israelis. It was important, then, that Hussein do nothing to actively discourage Sadat.

Hussein's careful reaction to the Sadat initiative demonstrated that Jordan's recent political emergence had not been strong enough to enable it to follow any course of action directly at odds with its immediate neighbors. It was evidence, too, of Hussein's understanding that the polarization of the Arab world always reduced Jordanian maneuverability. The king strove to minimize that polarization, particularly because the ally he wanted but could not afford — Egypt — was by far the most likely to advance Jordanian claims to a role on the West Bank. Upon receipt of Egypt's invitation to the Cairo conference, Hussein adopted a position suggestive to both Sadat and his opponents that Jordan required additional in-

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centives. Jordan would not attend the Cairo conference (or the Tripoli rejectionist summit) unless all Arab states did so. He stressed that, despite new divisions, great progress toward a unified Arab position had been achieved and that Jordan would not perpetuate Arab divisiveness or encourage another Arab Cold War.[34]

Both Sadat and the Carter administration were quick to supply incentives. Sadat declared on December 11 that the Tripoli summit had invalidated Rabat, leaving Egypt free to deal with other forms of Palestinian representation.[35] President Carter's remarks on December 15, implying that he had finally given up on the PLO, expressed heightened U.S. interest in Jordan.[36] These actions quickly revived the "Jordanian option" in Cairo and Washington, but Hussein was not prepared to join the negotiation simply because the PLO had been ruled out of it. Enough was known of the Sadat-Begin meeting in Jerusalem to suggest that the Egyptians were prepared to accept an agreement giving them what they sought in Sinai and leaving other issues at the mercy of a "declaration of principles" and future talks.[37] Jordan was hardly strong enough to negotiate successfully with Israel alone; with no certain outcome in sight, it was far too risky to do so in the face of Syrian opposition.

Egyptian policy in this period had two tiers of interests: the first, concretely pro-Egyptian, and the second, more abstractly pro-Arab. Sadat may have hoped for a comprehensive settlement but the full satisfaction of pan-Arab interests depended fundamentally on others, notably Hussein. It was not a question of whether Sadat *wanted* a separate peace but a realization that by himself he could achieve nothing more. Sadat was no more willing to tie Egypt's future to Jordanian inteersts than he had been to mortgage it to Syrian and PLO nay-saying, but Egypt's attempt to elicit Jordan's support was not merely theatrics. A positive Jordanian association with the initiative would ease Egyptian isolation and open yet another channel to Washington. At this stage, Sadat needed Hussein and hoped, perhaps too optimistically, for his help. In retrospect, Sadat went to much trouble to orchestrate multilateral implications to the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations; in early 1978, his tactics centered on extracting a declaration of principles from Israel.

Sadat hoped that the Ismailia meeting of December 25,

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[34] FBIS, November 29, 1977, pp. F1-F4.

[35] See FBIS, December 12, 1977, p. D6, and the *Washington Post*, December 11, 1977.

[36] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, January 1978, p. 14.

[37] Sadat's interviews with U.S. correspondents suggested as much. See FBIS, November 29, 1977, pp. D1-D14, esp. pp. D7 and D11-D13.

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1977, would produce a joint declaration of principles that might enable King Hussein either to join the negotiations or to support Egyptian policy in other ways. The failure to agree on the declaration, however, foredoomed the negotiations and magnified the apparent dangers of Egyptian isolation both in Cairo and in Washington. Paradoxically, the importance of Jordanian participation in the negotiations for both Egypt and the United States *mounted* after Ismailia, even as the Jordanian reluctance to participate was strengthened by the summit's failure. But rather than proclaim opposition to Egyptian policy, it made more sense for Amman to nurture anticipated Egyptian and American bids for its participation in the peace process. The PLO would be diminished further; the United States would commence the arduous task of pressing Israel over its settlement policy and peace terms for the West Bank. Despite Jordan's vulnerabilities, or perhaps because of them, Hussein set out to harvest the benefits of Jordan's position as a "swing state" without necessarily swinging; but this required delicacy and discretion, for good relations with Syria and Saudi Arabia could survive only modest provocation.

Hussein's campaign began soon after the Ismailia meeting. When Carter courted Hussein in Teheran on New Year's Eve, the king emphasized that Jordan could not accept the risks of participation at such an early stage. But he was disarmingly cordial and careful not to disabuse Carter of his belief that Jordan might join the talks if they progressed. When the Political Committee talks in Jerusalem were aborted by Sadat on January 18, Hussein promptly declared that the negotiations had failed because Israel did not want peace. He praised U.S. mediation and he hailed Sadat's hard-line speech of January 21.[38] Despite this performance, Washington learned Hussein's "price" on January 27-28 for joining the newly stalled talks. It was reported to be surprisingly modest: a declaration of principles providing for "Israeli withdrawal" from the West Bank (not necessarily total withdrawal) and a declaration of Palestinian rights.[39] Hussein also told special envoy Alfred Atherton, the recipient of this good news, that Jordan could not consider joining the peace process until Israel showed a willingness to make serious proposals.

Hussein's private moderation was aimed squarely at the United States; Israel had refused precisely such a declaration at Ismailia. By appearing the moderate, Hussein could sharpen the

[38] FBIS, January 23, 1978, pp. D1-D10, F1-F3.
[39] See *Middle East Intelligence Service*, January 16-31, 1978, vol. 5, no. 20, p. 158.

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contrast between Jordanian and Israeli approaches and more effectively urge the United States to whittle down Begin's intransigence. In his reactions to the failure of the Ismailia meeting, public and private, Hussein managed to project simultaneously images of moderation toward the United States, support for Sadat in his hardline incarnation, and steadfastness toward Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Hussein's meeting with the president and his conversations with Atherton apparently did the trick. Washington had concluded that Sadat could not negotiate for the West Bank, for he simply could not compel either Israel, the Palestinians, or Jordan to cooperate in a scheme acceptable to Egypt alone. The failure at Ismailia seems to have bolstered the administration's belief that a bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace was either not possible or, if possible, not viable. Jordanian participation now acquired a new dimension: aside from being a positive development in itself, the administration now hoped that Jordanian accession to the talks would lubricate the stalled negotiations and put the entire process back on track. The Carter administration was convinced that if Egyptian-Israeli negotiations showed progress, Hussein would throw in his hat. The occasion of Sadat's visit to Camp David on February 3-5, 1978, thus prompted American statements designed to prod Israel, appease Sadat, and tempt Hussein. Most notably, Carter and Sadat agreed to the "Aswan formula" for Palestinian representation, a formula that greatly enhanced the Jordanian role at the PLO's expense.[40] Amid all this, the administration announced that Atherton would return to the area in search of the elusive declaration of principles.

Diplomacy in Absentia

As Egypt and the United States built up a case against Israel's position in order to enable Jordan's participation, the king, as if aware of his growing importance, suddenly increased his demands. On February 9, he stated that a declaration of principles was no longer sufficient and that, in addition, Israel would have to agree *in advance* to Jordan's "minimum demands": total withdrawal to the

[40] The Aswan formula spoke only of "Palestinian participation" in determining the future of the West Bank and Gaza. The formula, reputed to be that of President Carter, marked an end of U.S. efforts to tempt the PLO into changing its political line. Sadat's acceptance of the formula confirmed an identity of the U.S. and Egyptian positions regarding the desirability of getting Jordan into the negotiations. But the formula itself was variously understood: Begin took it to mean the "working paper," Sadat thought it meant U.S. support for a Palestinian entity, and Hussein saw it as Washington's newly rediscovered "Jordanian option."

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1967 borders, including Israeli evacuation of East Jerusalem and self-determination for the Palestinians *after* withdrawal. He declared that Resolutions 242 and 338 did not meet Jordan's requirements, that the refugee problem should be solved by repatriation and compensation, and that if Israel refused these terms an all-Arab force should be formed to "reduce Israel to size."[41] On March 9, Hussein repeated these demands to Atherton and added that Jordan would seek an alternative to the Sadat initiative; perhaps, he said, the Soviet Union would have a role in this "alternative."[42]

Most experts, in Washington and outside of it, believed that most of this line was directed mainly at deflecting Syrian suspicions.[43] This was partly true. Assad had become alarmed at Hussein's kind remarks about Sadat in January and had made private threats. Jordan became concerned, too, about an apparent rapprochement among Syria, the Soviet Union, and the PLO over Lebanon, precipitated in part by Israel's strong retaliation for a PLO terrorist attack in early March. The Israeli incursion into Lebanon also sparked large Palestinian demonstrations in Jordan that suddenly took on an anti-Hashemite tinge. A position critical of the United States and Egypt helped settle a restive Syria and calm Jordan's domestic tensions. But beyond that, on the eve of Prime Minister Begin's first visit to Washington in April, it also added pressure on the United States to respond to Jordan's demands. Jordan's new hard line had a multiple audience.

In May, when Sadat grew tired of stalemate, he finally responded to U.S. suggestions that he come up with a proposal of his own. Sadat's ideas firmly endorsed the "Jordanian option." He wanted the Gaza Strip returned to Egypt and the West Bank to Jordan as "interim" steps for a five-year period, after which the final status of the area would be established according to the "principle of self-determination." At the same time, the Egyptians cautioned Jordan against "upping the ante." Public statements by Egyptian officials obliquely accused Hussein of having an ambiguous and erratic approach to the peace process and implied that, with Egypt's latest proposal, it had gone as far as it could to satisfy Jordanian interests. But Hussein now seemed to back away entirely. He held his ground against the persuasiveness of Egypt's Vice-President Mubarak, and on May 16, Hussein announced again that Jordan would

[41] FBIS, February 10, 1978, pp. F1-F3.
[42] See FBIS, March 13, 1978, pp. F1-F3.
[43] See, for example, *Middle East Intelligence Service*, March 1-15, 1978, vol. 5, no. 23, p. 179.

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join the talks only if all the other Arab states would also join, obviously not a realistic demand.

While Sadat sought support in vain from Jordan (and Saudi Arabia), U.S. energies were devoted to preventing a new stalemate. The United States persisted in questioning Israel about its position on the West Bank. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders announced to a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the administration, still committed to a comprehensive settlement, believed that the major outstanding issues were *not* Israeli-Egyptian bilateral relations, but Israeli policy toward the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian question as a whole.[44] Saunders noted that the administration was doing its utmost to bring Jordan into the negotiating process. Meanwhile, U.S. "questions" to Israel over its peace terms were accompanied by suggested answers rejected by the Israelis. Israel's own answers came on June 15 and evoked sharp U.S. criticism; Egyptian counterproposals, though "unacceptable," drew American praise.

U.S. efforts in May and June led to the mid-July meeting of the U.S. secretary of state and the Israeli and Egyptian foreign ministers at Leeds Castle. On the eve of the Leeds meeting, it seemed that efforts to break through Hussein's stalwart pessimism had finally garnered modest but important results. When the tentative Egyptian proposals, which included provisions for a five-year transitional period for the West Bank under Jordanian aegis, were published on July 5, Jordan gave an unusually positive response. Information Minister Adnan Abu Odeh said that the Egyptian proposals were "realistic and responsive" to pan-Arab interests.[45] Other sources suggested that Jordan might supplement Egyptian proposals concerning the redivision of Jerusalem, an unmistakable hint that Jordan might join the negotiating process.

At Leeds, Egypt finally presented a full, but unexpectedly rigid, peace plan. Despite Israel's rejection of it, the Leeds conference appeared, in Washington at least, to prevent the stalemate from freezing over. Israel's new willingness to consider territorial compromise — as expressed by Foreign Minister Dayan — and Jordan's ambiguous but still gratifying response to Sadat's plan constituted the best news the administration had heard in months. As a result, the United States resolved to step up the tempo of its mediation, leading Washington to attempt yet another ministerial meeting. Sadat, how-

[44] See Harold Saunders, "Middle East: U.S. Policy in the 1970s," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, August 1978, pp. 29-33.

[45] FBIS, July 11, 1978, p. F1.

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ever, had already determined to go no further. On July 27, he reiterated his demand for total withdrawal, cut the telex line to Jerusalem, and expelled the Israeli delegation to the still-functioning Military Committee in Alexandria. This stunned the administration and rendered futile Vance's trip to arrange a follow-on to Leeds. Another heavy blow fell on July 31 when "moderate" Saudi Arabia informed the United States that the Sadat initiative was "finished" and that "Arab unity" was now its policy goal.

These developments portended disaster; the Sadat initiative and the very basis of U.S. mediation were at stake. Egyptian-Israeli negotiations were stalled, Hussein was still outside the talks, and the administration now suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Saudi Arabia. For in March, Carter, against strong Israeli opposition, "sold" a "package" of arms for Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to Congress by promising *increased* Saudi support for Sadat and U.S. mediation. To rescue itself, the administration resorted to the riskiest kind of diplomacy; such were the origins of the Camp David summit.

On the Eve of Camp David

From November 1977 through the Camp David summit in September 1978, the United States, and sometimes Egypt, had tried to tempt Jordan into the peace process. While these efforts were not successful, neither could they be judged decisive failures. Hussein responded to each overture with variations on a single theme: "Maybe, ask me again tomorrow."

On the eve of the summit, most analysts in the Carter administration (and many outside it) explained Jordan's recent recalcitrance mainly as the consequence of constraints imposed on Hussein by the Syrians and the Saudis. They reasoned that Hussein's pessimism precluded his risking Jordan's Saudi subsidy and carefully cultivated ties to Syria. This was particularly important because, if Sadat failed and Geneva returned to the forefront of diplomatic activity, Hussein would need help in opposing the PLO's assaults on the peace process. According to this view, a major "success" at Camp David would free Hussein from this problem. The Carter administration (and others, too) were optimistic that success at Camp David would thus reverse Hussein's assessment of the risks and potential benefits involved, and that after a short period of diplomatic adjustment, Hussein would enter the peace process.

This analysis was logical as far as it went, but it was both

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incomplete and misleading. In addition to the "defensive" or passive dimension to Jordanian strategy, an active element was present as well. Hussein *did* fear, as he had from the start, that if he joined the talks the onus of responsibility for the most intractable issues would fall upon his shoulders. While Hussein could not prevent Sadat from making a separate peace, he gained nothing by helping him except trouble from Jordan's neighbors and sponsors. This consideration obviated Jordan's joining the talks at Camp David. But while it was clear that Sadat primarily wanted peace for Egypt, he would also make some effort to secure Israeli concessions on the West Bank before he would sign a peace treaty. And though it was obvious, too, that Sadat's effort could not achieve enough on the West Bank to satisfy Jordan, Hussein saw that Egyptian negotiating postures, backed strongly by the American desire for comprehensiveness, might weaken Israeli positions. Because the United States, Israel, and Egypt chose to start with an Israeli-Egyptian peace before turning to more difficult issues, Israel would surely not concede anything significant over the West Bank until *after* it was assured that Egypt would make peace — and then only if forced by Washington. There was simply too little to gain and too much to lose by formal participation in the talks. Why should Jordan trade preliminary concessions with Israel over the West Bank when Sadat, with Carter's assistance, would do it for him? The activist dimension of Jordanian diplomacy, then, was to encourage Egypt, with active U.S. support, to erode Israeli positions as far as possible *before* Hussein decided about his own participation. And if Camp David succeeded beyond Hussein's expectations, he could still join the talks.

Thus, beyond the obvious constraints on Jordanian policy, an opportunity had developed to link Jordan to both Egyptian diplomacy and the American penchant for comprehensiveness, promising far more than Jordan could hope to get, in war or in peace, from its Syrian alliance or Saudi subsidy. The negotiating process itself had proved useful to Jordan, notwithstanding its success or failure. Between February and July, Hussein had assumed a stiff diplomatic posture; yet U.S. and Egyptian policy had both turned progressively his way. American pressure had pushed Israel into modest compromise; Sadat had cast the PLO out of the immediate diplomatic picture. Hussein found himself the object of both Egyptian and American solicitation that improved his position vis-à-vis both Israel and the PLO, *and for which he risked nothing*. If Camp David revived the Israeli-Egyptian talks, so much the better, for their continuation promised still more active U.S. pressure on Israel. If not, the onus of

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failure would probably be laid on Israel to the same end. But this would be so in either case even, and perhaps especially, if Jordan remained on the fence. Hussein decided that studied ambivalence served Jordanian interests better than formally joining the peace talks; he resolved to negotiate by proxy.

The strategy of negotiating by proxy had many advantages. Aside from being most effective, it was safe. It did not force Hussein to antagonize Syria and other Arab states because no Jordanian concessions were required. Thus, Hussein's initial plan for Geneva remained a credible and an attractive backstop if Camp David failed. And because Hussein had not closed the door on participation, he could change his mind whenever he judged that the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, in success or failure, had exhausted their potential for Jordan. Such an equivocal posture served to reinforce U.S. hopes in Jordanian participation and enabled Hussein to insure that, if the summit succeeded and an Egyptian-Israeli peace became probable, the United States would press Israel to make further concessions in the hopes of drawing Jordan into the process.

After the Summit: Linkage and the Saunders Mission

When the results of the Camp David summit became known on September 17-18, it was evident that Sadat had gone a long way toward conceding positions having to do with the Palestinian issue in order to get peace with Israel, and that the Americans had allowed it to happen. On strictly Egyptian matters, Sadat gave not an inch. In the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt failed to get an Israeli promise to transfer the areas to Arab sovereignty after five years; the self-determination principle was not specified; the settlements were not mentioned at all; and the issue of Jerusalem arose only in the exchange of letters in which Israel gave nothing while Sadat recognized the indivisibility of the city. Most annoying, there were two, formally separate, documents.

At Camp David, the Carter administration temporarily betrayed the principles of its own advocacy in order to save its position as mediator and, with a diplomatic success, breathe life into an embattled and unimpressive foreign policy performance. The administration nevertheless believed that with the "success" of Camp David, Jordanian participation was *more* likely than ever; indeed, some believed it was imminent. The administration thought it had done

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Hussein a great favor, but the king saw inconsistencies.[46] At best, Camp David envisioned a policeman's role for Jordan in the West Bank under effective Israeli military control. At worst, the autonomy plan might lead to an independent Palestinian state, perhaps the most dangerous outcome of all from the Hashemite point of view. The truth was that the "success" of Camp David made it *less* likely that Jordan would join the talks, not more likely. As far as Hussein was concerned, the accords made it easier for Sadat to arrange a bilateral deal with Israel. Whether Sadat had originally intended to use Jordan as a "fig leaf" or not, Camp David seemed to Hussein to provide just that. The king was far more impressed with *that* implication of Camp David than with what Washington claimed to be the multilateral direction of the accords. This does not mean that Hussein was completely unhappy with what occurred at Camp David; Israel had made concessions that could be cultivated. This became the king's aim; the immediate target was Washington.

The accords reserved a role for Jordan designed to serve three very different political strategies. After Camp David, only the American strategy held much potential for Jordan. The Egyptians could claim that the accords afforded Jordan — and the other Arab parties to the dispute — a framework for their participation in the negotiations on terms "as honorable" as Egypt itself had enjoyed. If King Hussein chose not to negotiate, then this was his error. The Israeli government believed that Sadat wanted the "Framework for Peace" mainly as a cover and that such a symbolic price was worth paying if it brought peace with Egypt. Israel accepted the framework in the belief that by the letter of its agreement it sacrificed nothing on its eastern front. Prime Minister Begin was determined, as well, to reduce any lingering multilateral implications to a minimum. Neither he nor his colleagues were inclined to offer a great deal for Jordan to enter the talks.

This left only the United States as the principal exponent of a Jordanian role. In Washington's view, Amman's joining the discussions would be critical to the process of transforming the essentially bilateral Camp David accords into the more comprehensive and — in the administration's view — more stable peace agreement.

[46] The Camp David "Framework for Peace" mentioned Jordan fifteen times. Jordan was invited to play a role in negotiating the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, the transitional arrangements in the interim period, and a peace treaty with Israel. Jordan was also invited to police the area with Israel in the interim period. But the final status of the area is to be discussed among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and "the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza." The semantic gymnastics in this document are truly extraordinary. See the text in *Survival*, November-December 1979, pp. 271-274.

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With Egypt unwilling to delay the satisfaction of its own interests on behalf of Jordan and with Israel even less inclined to entertain Hussein's demands, the Carter administration faced two critical questions: Could the United States *alone* provide sufficient assurances to bring Jordan into the peace process? and Would an effort to secure Jordan participation be more likely to weaken or strengthen what had been achieved at Camp David? The administration quickly resolved this debate in favor of an optimistic appraisal of its own efficacy, believing that new overtures to Jordan would both succeed and provide support for Camp David.

On the evening of September 18, President Carter telephoned Hussein in Amman to explain the U.S. "interpretation" of certain aspects of the accords and to ask if the king would receive Secretary Vance and an American entourage. This accepted, Carter eagerly dispatched Vance to Riyadh, Damascus, and Amman along with Atherton, Saunders, and State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. When Vance arrived in Amman two days later he was asked pointed questions — in the style of a police interrogation — about U.S. backsliding and the linkage between the accords. The administration was shocked. After Vance left Jordan, Hussein accepted an Iraqi invitation to an anti-Sadat conference and busied himself preparing a list of questions for the president about the U.S. position on a variety of sensitive issues in a prospective settlement. He specifically asked for the answers in writing. This was Hussein's personal contribution to the birth of the "linkage" controversy.

As it turned out, Hussein had much help in this. Just after Prime Minister Begin's return to Israel from Camp David, disputes arose between Israel and the United States over the nature and duration of the moratorium on new Israeli settlements and over the extent to which the Israeli-Egyptian accord was linked to progress toward settling the questions of Palestinian autonomy and the disposition of the West Bank — matters left vague at Camp David. These disputes embarrassed Sadat by highlighting issues that lent credence to rejectionist accusations that he had made a separate peace with Israel and betrayed Palestinian interests. Egypt responded by stating that it took Israeli settlement policy as an index of its integrity and that there were indeed links between the accords.

Despite these problems, Egyptian-Israeli negotiations resumed in Washington on October 12. They made no progress. Meanwhile, the American answers to Hussein's questions arrived in Amman with Saunders on October 16. On the 19th, Saunders met with the king and a Palestinian delegation during which he implied that

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the United States viewed Israel's agreement to total withdrawal from Sinai as a model for negotiations on other fronts. Saunders also urged the PLO to accept Resolution 242. The Jordanian media quoted Saunders as saying: "The Egyptian experience with Sinai could explain what would happen in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the Palestinians join the negotiating process."[47] On the same day, Israel was shown the secret answers to Hussein, and Saunders flew to Jerusalem on October 20 to discuss them. The Carter administration, pursuing its own version of linkage, sought to insure that negotiations on the "Framework for Peace" would dovetail with and promote the successful culmination of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. Jordan remained the key to this strategy.

By the time Saunders arrived in Israel, Begin was livid. In answer to Hussein's question about settlements in the West Bank and Gaza after the five-year transition period, the U.S. reply reportedly read: "Whatever number that might remain beyond that transitional period . . . would presumably be agreed to in the negotiations concerning the final status of the West Bank and Gaza."[48] The intimation that after five years over seventy Israeli settlements with more than 10,000 residents would be a mere shadow of their present size was bad enough; but, worse, Israel suspected that the administration was now trying to depict Israel's agreement to withdraw its settlements in Sinai as a model for the West Bank and Gaza. This went very far beyond anything Israel had agreed to — or that Sadat had demanded — at Camp David.

Begin, determined to demonstrate that Israel certainly dissented from *that* interpretation of linkage, responded by reiterating Israel's "rights" in the areas: on October 25, he announced the "thickening" of Israel's existing settlements in Judea and Samaria. This evoked sharp criticism from Secretary Vance and President Carter, but only mild protest from Sadat, who wished not to contribute to a protracted delay in completing the negotiations.[49]

The dispute sparked by the Saunders mission soon grew very serious. Aside from throwing a whole new light on the practical meaning of a draft treaty preamble that the United States had introduced on October 19,[50] the quarrel highlighted the linkage contro-

[47] FBIS, October 20, 1978, p. F1.

[48] See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Answers to Hussein's Question," *Washington Post*, October 30, 1978.

[49] Technically, Israel had not violated any pledge made at Camp David; the administration later admitted that this was the case.

[50] The new wording stated that the draft treaty was only one step toward an overall accord. Dayan and Weizman initialed the treaty on the 21st but the furor aroused over the Saunders mission now made Cabinet approval of such language impossible. This in turn undermined the authority of Israel's negotiation team.

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versy and presented Sadat with a difficult problem: How could he afford to do less for the Palestinians than Jimmy Carter? Egypt's position hardened; its view of the linkage question now found expression in a demand that the treaty speak even more clearly of linkage in its preamble and in its insistence that a letter accompany the treaty specifying a timetable for implementing the second accord. Nevertheless, Egypt carefuly refrained from a precise definition of linkage and declined to specify what would constitute a diplomatic casus belli. Israel rejected the idea of a timetable, and the talks struggled onward without prospect for a breakthrough.

All of this must have delighted Hussein. Not only were the U.S. answers the "right" ones for the most part, but Carter had indicated a willingness to face down intense Israeli displeasure over them. The linkage problem had now emerged in all of its malevolence. American handling of the problem suggested that the Carter administration viewed Jordan as Israel's next bargaining partner and would vigorously press Israel to insure that those negotiations came about.

This U.S.-Israeli argument, and Egypt's studied reaction to it, demonstrated that a genuine linkage between the accords was more important to the Carter administration than it was to Sadat. The birth of the linkage controversy frustrated Sadat's desire for a quick *fait accompli* and led to a six-month delay between the Camp David accords and the peace treaty. Among its many consequences, this hiatus allowed opposition to the accords to organize substance to its threats. While the United States and Israel quarreled, Hussein found himself with another attractive incentive for remaining in diplomatic limbo. The Baghdad summit, which commenced on November 2, offered Hussein $1.25 billion annually over a decade in exchange for his remaining outside the peace negotiations.[51] Even if the king assumed that only a fraction of this money would ever be delivered, it still dwarfed the other external aid Jordan then received.[52] The rejectionists pledged to pay Hussein for doing something he seemed intent not to do anyway. They may also have unwittingly helped Begin and Sadat for whom Hussein's participation might have thrown major new obstacles in the way of an Israeli-Egyptian treaty.[53]

[51] See Jonathan C. Randal, "Arabs Approve Multi-Billion War Chest, Anti-Sadat Steps," *Washington Post*, November 6, 1978. About half the Baghdad amount is in lieu of budgetary support previously given by Arab oil-producing states; about $500 million is extra.

[52] U.S. economic aid for FY 1978 totaled $10 million. The Saudi subsidy came to about $300 million. See "Marketing in Jordan," *Overseas Business Report*, U.S. Department of Commerce, December 1977, OBR 77-67, p. 10, and *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 19, 1979, p. 3.

[53] Sadat has even admitted that he does not seek Jordanian participation in the

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The rejectionist offer deeply worried the Carter administration; it tipped the calculus of incentives further against the United States and required the administration to offer Jordan still more in response. The administration's lack of resources to stay in the bidding complemented the rejectionist ploy, which was not so much to win over Hussein but only to make certain that the Americans did not. Soon after the Baghdad summit, Jordan's dissatisfaction with Camp David grew more vocal and King Hussein unveiled plans for a united Arab alternative to Camp David via the United Nations.[54]

Despite Hussein's public opposition, he did not conclusively shut the door on U.S. mediation. Sometimes in public, more often in private, the king cultivated the belief in Washington that if and when his participation could be sufficiently protected by the negotiations' success, he would join. The Carter administration, for its part, retained its hope that Hussein would eventually come around, exemplifying William James's observation that "we believe all that we can and would believe everything if only we could."[55] As the United States pressed Israel in the period between Camp David and March 1979, it did so in the belief that persistence would deliver the Jordanians. American perceptions of Jordanian interests were such that, on the eve of the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979, Washington's hopes for Jordanian participation were again buoyed. But if Camp David had reduced Jordan's incentive to join the peace process, the treaty itself put it nearly beyond the pale of imagination.

Since March of 1979, the king has made it abundantly clear that Jordan would not join the Camp David process. He has sought to keep good (but not too good) relations with all of the rejectionist countries, noticeably shifting toward Iraq as it has emerged as a major regional power in the past year. Jordan's relations with the Soviet Union have also improved. Finally, Jordan has

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autonomy talks, an attitude he has held since the eve of Camp David. According to Yitzhak Rabin, Sadat said that Hussein's accession to the talks now "would blow it up." See "Exchanging Ideas With Sadat," *Jerusalem Post* (International Edition), September 21-28, 1980, and especially FBIS, September 23, 1980, pp. D2-D11, where Sadat claims he did not wish Hussein's presence at Camp David, and told him so by telephone.

[54] See Hussein's remarks, apparently just before the summit, in FBIS, November 13, 1978, pp. F2-F4; and after the summit, FBIS, January 15, 1979, p. F1.

[55] One reason, among many, that the Carter administration remained so closely wedded to an optimistic appraisal of its own efficacy and of Jordan's likely role was that the administration's approach to the Middle East was developed in such a way as to foster bureaucratic consensus. The documents that formed the basis of the policy were among the most thoroughly vetted within the administration. Thus, to cast doubt on the administration's optimism was to declare war on the bureaucratic — and interpersonal — harmony that had arisen. This proved to be a fairly effective deterrent to dissent even as doubts mounted.

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supported every alternative to Camp David it could find and prepared one of its own. As the autonomy negotiations continue, Hussein is as aloof as ever.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The notion that Camp David supplemented by the Saunders mission, or the peace treaty itself supplemented by the Brzezinski mission, might persuade Hussein to join the peace process is evidence of the Carter administration's fundamental misunderstanding of the Jordanian position in inter-Arab politics. The administration apparently believed that its own assurances of support for Jordan would more than compensate for the risks that Hussein would have to take in moving away from Syria; that Hussein would accept territorial compromise in a final test; that Jordan was both willing and able to satisfy Palestinian national ambitions in a federal context; and that Saudi Arabia would underwrite all of this in the interest of stabilizing the region against Soviet encroachment.

But the United States overestimated the trust that King Hussein put in the United States and underestimated his problems. Jordan's internal political weakness, its geographical proximity to the rejectionists, and its ongoing confrontation with the PLO, demanded near foolproof assurances in advance that the United States could protect Jordan, not only from Syria, but from Iraq, the PLO, its own Palestinian citizenry, and Saudi Arabia. Recent history suggested to Hussein that there was very little the United States would do to deliver on such assurances. The United States ignored Jordan after 1973 and, after 1975, issued a steady stream of solicitations to the PLO, despite pledges that Washington would help Jordan fight the Rabat declarations and restore a Hashemite role in the conflict. The United States had no power over Syria, Iraq, and the PLO and less influence than it thought over Saudi Arabia and Israel. Under such conditions, and with Hussein's pessimism about the prospects for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, the chances that Jordan would join the talks were always remote.

The belief that Jordan would, in the end, consider a territorial compromise suffered from a double flaw. First, Jordan's vulnerabilities to Syrian, Saudi, and Iraqi displeasure — which can include military pressures — are mammoth and inescapable. Second, Hussein has had ample opportunity, in public and in confidence, to express a willingness to compromise, but he has never done so. While it may seem reasonable that the king would prefer half a loaf to

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none, this confidence ignores Jordan's fragile domestic balance. Would the Palestinian majority of Jordanian citizens on the East Bank calmly accept yet another Hashemite-approved partition of their homeland? Could the Hashemite hierarchy, in many respects a military elite, support a compromise that openly ratifies the military humiliation of 1967? Even if Hussein would consider territorial compromise, demilitarization, or force-limitation schemes in the long run, he is unlikely ever to agree to a functional segregation of administrative, military, and political control of the West Bank as proposed in the current autonomy negotiations. Such an arrangement would bring upon Jordan the onus of administering an area over which it has no real sovereignty. Hussein will not accept a purely administrative role in any of the West Bank unless other parts of it are returned outright to Hashemite control. The king will certainly not take the considerable risks implicit in any negotiation with Israel if the *best* he can achieve would weaken, rather than strengthen, the throne. The conditions under which Hussein can safely regain the West Bank are exacting ones; the various autonomy schema do not meet them nor does any conceivable amendment that would be acceptable to Israel.

Finally, U.S. expectations of Saudi "moderation" and support for Egypt never materialized, making Jordanian participation in the negotiations all but impossible. Sadat's charge that the Saudis bought off the Arabs — notably Jordan — is not entirely groundless.[56]

In this light, the Carter administration's post–Camp David effort to bring Jordan into the negotiations was particularly curious. Although failure was so eminently predictable, Washington failed to see that no other important party really wanted Hussein to join the talks — not Israel, not the PLO, not Egypt (after Camp David), not Syria, and not Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Washington's willingness to turn the screws on Israel in order to produce concessions had the effect only of convincing Hussein that he had more to gain by staying outside the negotiations than by joining them. American advocacy aimed at attracting Jordan forced an escalation of Egyptian demands and a sharp stiffening of Israeli positions. The result was that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty faced very serious trouble and would have been in even *more* serious trouble had the administration succeeded in roping Hussein.

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[56] See FBIS, May 2, 1979, pp. D1-D17 (esp. p. D12). More than Saudi Arabian aid, Iraqi money plays a very large role in Jordan's economy. According to *Business Week*, November 10, 1980, "More than half of the Jordanian budget comes from foreign payments — more than 75 percent of military aid is included."

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Over the past two years, Jordan has constructed a fairly coherent strategy to deal with the current situation, one that insures safety no matter how the autonomy talks turn out. It would be incorrect, however, to imply that Hussein's position is enviable. The calculus of risks and benefits indicates that the chances of Hussein's returning soon to the West Bank are slim. Hussein's pessimism about the willingness of this or any Israeli government to withdraw from any substantial part of the West Bank remains intact as does his doubt that the United States will ever exercise sufficient influence over Israel to force it to do so. Meanwhile, Hussein still has much to lose from antagonizing the rejectionists.

Hussein's concern for maintaining good relations with the rejectionists carries its own special problems, particularly as a new Syrian-Iraqi rift has developed.[57] Hussein, unlike Sadat, cannot endure a protracted "isolation"; he is also somewhat more vulnerable to domestic pressures. Though he needs his "neighbors," Hussein must not allow Jordan to be swallowed by political tendencies that may ultimately destroy the monarchy. In the longer term, Hussein needs his relationship with Egypt and the United States as well. Nevertheless, in order to offset the risks to his reign, Hussein requires a near assurance of success before he joins any negotiations. Unless he is certain of unequivocal U.S. support for the basic Jordanian position and of American willingness to push its views on Israel as it has never done before, he cannot imagine obtaining an acceptable offer from Jerusalem. Until and unless he receives such assurances, Jordan's good relations with the rest of the Arab world will remain both a necessity and a challenge. If, in addition, Hussein can continue to maneuver the United States into carrying his interests by proxy, then so much the better.

The bottom line, then, is that Hussein is very unlikely to bring Jordan into the peace process governed by the U.S.-sponsored Camp David accords. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine *any* aegis that could attract *both* Jordan and Israel at the present time. The more that Hussein is offered to join the talks — at Israel's expense, more often than not — the greater the benefits of remaining aloof. Perhaps the only incentive that could attract the king into the current peace process is a negative one: namely, the prospect that the autonomy negotiations might lead to a genuinely independent Pales-

[57] Hussein seems to have placed his bets on Iraq, and done so more radically than ever before. Aside from openly supporting Iraq against Iran — while Syria supports Iran — Hussein seems to have assisted the Muslim Brotherhood and others in their effort to overthrow the Assad regime. Since summer 1980, Syrian-Jordanian relations have deteriorated drastically.

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tinian state in the West Bank. But since Israel is also determined to prevent such an outcome, such an incentive is not likely to arise. Beyond that, unless and until the context of Jordanian foreign policy undergoes vast changes, particularly in respect to the obstacles posed by Saudi, Syrian, and Iraqi policies, Hussein's strategic options will remain quite limited.

American diplomatic leverage in the Middle East derives from its ability to mediate between adversaries who are willing and able to come to terms with each other, not from a questionable capacity to bludgeon the parties into violating their own vital interests as they see them. Washington can force Israeli concessions but it cannot fully "deliver" Israel even to the U.S. position. Despite the enduring centrality of Jordan to a comprehensive settlement, the blocking position that Hussein seems destined to play limits the realm of the possible in the near term. Washington can exert pressure on Jordan to join the negotiations, but it cannot force Hussein to do so. Moreover, the United States alone cannot bridge the gap between Joardanian and Israeli positions even if such negotiations begin.

Whether there is a realistic midpoint in the positions, and whether it was ever worth risking the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to find it, are questions for the old administration and historical postscription. The best balance of realism and vision in fitting Jordan into U.S. Middle East diplomacy is what the new Reagan administration must find.

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LIBERIA'S FLAG OF CONVENIENCE: ROUGH WATER AHEAD

by Rodney Carlisle

Liberia's April 12, 1980, coup d'etat came as a shock to observers who had grown used to a tradition of stable government in the small West African republic. Though autocratic and sometimes corrupt, the administrations of W. V. S. Tubman, from 1944 to 1970, and of William Tolbert, from 1970 to 1980, brought stability that earned the country the international reputation of civilian-ruled quiescence in an area abounding in coups, crises, and military regimes. Before the coup, there had been only a few cracks in the peaceful façade, such as the April 1979 food riots in Monrovia. To Americans who hoped to find in Liberian stability a source of pro-American international political behavior, there had been a few earlier unsettling indications that Liberia aligned itself with other African states, even when those positions ran counter to American policy.

For much of the world, Liberia's significance derived from its status as the principal provider of a flag of convenience. In recent months, that open-registry system for shipping has faced a new and serious challenge, not from the sudden domestic changes in Liberia, but from an attack on the system mounted by other less-developed countries (LDCs) through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). That attack goes to the heart of the contemporary international infrastructure for the transport of petroleum by sea.

Together, Liberia and Panama have now registered one-quarter of the world's shipping, when measured by tonnage. Liberia alone registers some 20 per cent of the world's tonnage, and 28 per cent of the world oil-tanker fleet fly the Liberian flag.[1] (See Table I.)

The ships under Liberian registry are owned by nationals of many European, American, and Asian states; but the large tanker

[1] Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., *Open Registry Shipping: Some Economic Considerations* (London: EIU, 1979), pp. 13, 14, 17.

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TABLE I

OPEN REGISTRY FLEETS, 1960-1978

	1960	*1965*	*1968*	*1970*	*1975*	*1978*
Liberia						
No. ships	977	1,287	1,613	1,869	2,520	2,523
Tonnage *	11,282	17,539	25,720	33,297	65,820	80,191
Percentage of world tonnage	8.7	10.9	13.2	14.6	19.2	19.8
Panama						
No. ships	607	692	798	886	2,418	3,640
Tonnage *	4,236	4,465	5,097	5,646	13,667	20,749
Percentage of world tonnage	3.3	2.8	2.6	4.8	4.0	5.1
World						
No. ships	36,311	41,865	47,444	52,444	63,724	69,020
Tonnage *	129,770	160,392	194,152	222,490	342,162	406,002

* In thousands.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., *Open Registry Shipping: Some Economic Considerations* (London: EIU, 1979).

operations of the transnational oil companies constitute the backbone of the fleet. Of Liberia's 80 million tons of shipping, oil tankers account for some 50 million tons and other bulk ships, such as grain, ore, chemical, and combination carriers, account for another 25 million tons. Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, and Mobil all maintain large Liberian fleets through subsidiaries, and the registry system serves the interests of these corporations, the largest owners of tanker and bulk shipping. Originally designed in 1949 by Americans, the Liberian open-registry system has since then been operated by an American-based corporation, Liberian Services, Incorporated (owned by the International Trust Company, which in turn is owned by the International Bank of Washington), headquartered in New York City and in Reston, Virginia. The officers of this corporation are appointed deputy commissioners of maritime affairs by the Liberian government. The corporation's revenues derive from a 20 per cent charge against the tonnage fees of Liberian registry. Thus, a 100,000-ton vessel pays a $120,000 registry fee, of which $24,000 represents company revenue and $96,000 represents revenue to the republic.[2]

[2] For a review of the origins of the Liberian law, see Rodney Carlisle, "The American Century Implemented, Stettinius and the Liberian Maritime Code," *Business History Review*, Summer 1980. The revenue of the company was previously 32.5 cents for every

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Shortly after the coup, Dr. Frank Wiswall, an American citizen serving as a deputy maritime commissioner of Liberia and vice-president of Liberian Services, Inc., said that the first word he received from Liberia was that the new government would "continue to maintain the Liberian maritime program on a non-political basis." While Liberian Services had reason to expect the world shipping community to express some degree of adverse reaction in the months following the coup, officials in the registry-service company anticipate that the effect of the political disruption upon registry and revenue figures will be minor and transitory.[3] Indeed, after the coup, revenues from the program continued to flow to the Liberian treasury.

Though Liberians and the service company officials choose to regard the shipping system as unrelated to the coup and, generally, as a nonpolitical institution, never in its thirty-year history has the system been free of controversy. It is precisely *international politics*, through UNCTAD, that, once again, has recently threatened the system. Since its origin, however, the system has weathered several storms, each time emerging somewhat stronger than before.

As the system of open registry has run into opposition from labor, from European shipowners registered under the flags of their home states, and from American flagship operators who have found the competition from Liberian-registered vessels a dangerous threat, it has been defended by an association of American shipowners registered under the Liberian flag. Formed in 1958 in response to a worldwide boycott of flag-of-convenience shipping that was organized by the International Transport Workers Federation, the American Committee for Flags of Necessity (ACFN) was first headed by Erling Naess, a Norwegian shipowner who had built a large, independent tanker fleet. The ACFN later changed its name to the Federation of American-Controlled Shipping (FACS), now headed by Philip Loree. FACS, while representing a large number of shipowners, tends to follow the interests and policies of the largest, most efficient operators, specifically the major oil companies. Thus, when the Liberian system has come under international attack, it has been defended by attorneys hired by this business association, as well as by the American managers of Liberian Services, Inc.[4]

Several examples will serve to illustrate the variety of

$1.20 per ton of new tonnage registered; in 1976, the company share was reduced to 24 cents per $1.20.

[3] Interview with Frank Wiswall, May 13, 1980.

[4] Erling Naess, *The Great PanLibHon Controversy* (Epping: Gower, 1971), pp. 58-59.

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those defenses. In 1962-1963, as American organized labor sought the right to organize workers aboard flag-of-convenience ships owned by American companies, Liberia and Panama protested directly to the U.S. Supreme Court by filing amicus curiae briefs against such an extension of the National Labor Relations Act. Those protests were assisted and supported by briefs and presentations by the ACFN. In the aftermath of the 1967 *Torrey Canyon* tanker disaster off Cornwall, Great Britain, hearings held by the Liberian Maritime Commission were directed by the American officers of Liberian Services in their capacity as deputy maritime commissioners. That inquiry demonstrated that the grounding of the vessel was the result of the miscalculation and error of the ship's master, not to any improper equipping of the vessel by its American owners or to any improper licensing decisions by the Liberian Maritime Commission. In 1974 and again in 1977, when the U.S. Congress considered legislation that would require a minimum proportion of imported oil to be brought on American flagships, FACS helped oppose this legislative attack on the system of Liberian ship registry.[5]

Thus, Liberian ship registry — dominated by large corporations, and defended by them in court, in legislative settings, and from attacks by the press — is intimately connected to the modern world political economy. The arguments in defense of the open-registry system are not always "conservative" in nature; on occasion, those arguments take on a progressive, reformist quality. In the aftermath of the *Argo Merchant* shipping disaster off Nantucket, Massachusetts, in 1976, FACS advocated a series of reforms of the Liberian ship-registry system that would increase safety measures, require divulgence of ownership, and stiffen licensing requirements for officers. To a large extent, Liberia implemented those safety and licensing reforms, making the system more efficient, more suitable for the largest and best-funded shipowners, and less attractive to the marginal owners, whose operation of ships like the *Argo Merchant* threatened to give the system a bad name. In recent years, the safety rec-

[5] *Briefs of the Supreme Court*, 272 U.S. 10. The *Torrey Canyon* disaster spawned a literature of its own: Richard Petrow, *In the Wake of the Torrey Canyon* (New York: McKay, 1968), pp. 228-232; E. Cowan, *Oil and Water: The Torrey Canyon Disaster* (New York: Lippincott, 1968), pp. 188-192; Vaisseau D. Oudet, *In the Wake of the Torrey Canyon* (London: Royal Institute of Navigation, 1972), pp. 24-27. Each of these authors pointed out the role of the commission in deflecting criticism from Liberia and from the owners. For information on proposed congressional legislation, see U.S. House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, *Hearings*, on H.R. 8093, in 1974, and on H.R. 1037, in 1977.

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ord of Liberian registry has been superior to that of many traditional maritime states.[6]

At UNCTAD meetings during the past few years, the Liberian open-registry system has confronted new challenges that have placed the Republic in a difficult position, torn between allegiances to two separate, sometimes opposed, systems. In UNCTAD, representatives of the developed and underdeveloped states meet to discuss ways to resolve the problems of development and modernization faced by much of the "Third World." In fact, UNCTAD recognizes, in its own structure, not three "worlds," but four: Group A consists of ninety-one African and Asian states; Group B consists of the modernized European states, together with the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, for a total of thirty nations; Group C consists of twenty-eight Latin American and Caribbean states; and Group D consists of the ten socialist states of the Soviet bloc. Groups A and C, the less-developed countries, make up the "Group of 77," which, despite its name, now includes well over a hundred nations. Operating on the premise that mutual cooperation between the developed and less-developed states is required if development is to go forward, UNCTAD arrives at its final positions through compromises acceptable to all four groups.[7]

Since 1974, UNCTAD has debated a plan with regard to shipping that has met with severe divisions among the various groups. The Group of 77 has supported a plan to "phase out" open-registry shipping and supplant it with a new system based on General Assembly resolution 3203 (S-VI) of May 1, 1974, which called for more equitable participation in world shipping. The UNCTAD Secretariat prepared a series of studies on the legal mechanisms to be employed in phasing out open registry and on the economic effects of requiring a genuine link between the country of registry and the vessels. The UNCTAD plan, intended to go into effect gradually over the 1980s, would require a link based not on ownership of the vessels by the nationals of the flag state, but on the composition of the crew. Thus, both Liberia and Panama would have to divest themselves of most of their shipping, leaving only a small proportion crewed by nationals of the two countries. The plan envisions an

[6] Erling Naess, *Autobiography of a Shipping Man* (Colchester: Seatrade, 1977), p. 238, notes the political function of the *Argo Merchant* disaster in easing the drive of efficient owners to control marginal ones. For more information about the reforms, see *FACS Forum* (newsletter), March 1977.

[7] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Open Registry Shipping*, pp. A1,1-4. On efforts to achieve a consensus at UNCTAD, see UN, "Working Group Ends Discussions on Possible Phase-Out of Open Registry Shipping," press release, TAD/INF/1131, January 23, 1980.

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increasing proportion of nationals required in ship crews, and the development of a host of new merchant flags flying over vessels owned by transnational corporations and crewed by citizens of the new flag states.[8]

UNCTAD Secretariat planners worked on the premise that the current system of open registry through a small number of countries (most notably Liberia and Panama, but also Cyprus, Singapore, and the Bahamas) had adversely affected the development and competitiveness of the fleets of the other developing countries. While the UNCTAD Secretariat found it difficult to predict exactly what effects the plan would have on the international economy, it was clear that the new system could benefit the LDCs as a whole only if coupled with a cargo-preference plan. In its report on the economic consequences of phasing out open registry, the UNCTAD Secretariat noted that vessel transfers to developing countries would be partly motivated by requirements to carry cargo aboard national flag fleets. The measure, the report indicated, would be "likely to affect primarily transnational corporations which operate vertically integrated operations, especially those which involve regular shuttle movements of tankers or bulk carriers." In other words, the seven major oil firms and a few other transnational corporations would be *required* to transfer shipping to the developing flag states by cargo-preference legislation enacted in oil-exporting states, compelling the companies to do so if they wished to carry export cargos.[9]

As the fleets of Panama and Liberia declined, the remaining vessels under those flags would be crewed by nationals of the flag states, thus providing employment, taxation, and other side benefits that would help make up for the decrease in revenues from the system of registry. In the case of Liberia, the revenues from open-registry shipping have been considerable, representing 5 to 12 per cent of the government's revenue. (See Table II.) A vast increase in personal income taxes or in foreign assistance would be needed to offset the lost revenue.[10]

The phasing out of open registry would be implemented by a variety of laws enacted by individual countries over the period

[8] UNCTAD, *The Repercussions of Phasing Out Open Registries*, TD/B/C.4/AC.1/5, September 24, 1979; UNCTAD, *Legal Mechanisms for Regulating the Operations of Open Registry Fleets During the Phasing Out Period*, TD/B/C/.4/AC.1/6, September 27, 1979.

[9] UNCTAD, *The Repercussions of Phasing Out Open Registries*, p. 10.

[10] International Maritime Associates, *Economic Impact of Open Registry Shipping* (Washington: IMA, 1979), pp. iii-14. While the revenue percentage appears to have declined in the late 1970s, an added requirement that shipping firms *incorporate* in Liberia have added a source of revenue from incorporation fees that may bring total revenues from the open-registry system back to the 10-12 per cent range.

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TABLE II

SHIP REGISTRY REVENUES FOR LIBERIA
($ millions)

Year	Revenues	*Total Government Receipts*	*Revenues as Percentage of Receipts*
1971	6.1	68	9.0
1972	7.2	75	9.6
1973	8.6	89	9.7
1974	9.4	109	8.6
1975	15.6	125	12.5
1976	13.9	157	8.9
1977	11.2	173	6.5
1978	11.0	191	5.8

Source: International Maritime Associates, *Economic Impact of Open Registry Shipping* (Washington: IMA, 1979).

1980-1991. Current "host" countries, including Liberia, would establish and increase a requirement for manning by nationals. "Home" countries, such as the United States, would require that shipowners register vessels only in states with a "labor link" between flag and ship. Labor-supplying countries, such as the Philippines, would set up open registries and discourage their crew members from employment under other foreign flags. Other states would establish ship registries including a labor-link clause. The mechanism of an international convention or treaty would not be tried at this time.[11]

It should come as no surprise that this proposal has been opposed by FACS, shipowners, Liberian Services, Inc., and the Liberian government (both before and after the 1980 coup). Part of this opposition so far has taken the form of technical reports supplied by FACS and Liberian Services. Indeed, Liberian Services hired a maritime consulting firm in Washington to produce a well-argued booklet, which shows that the current system is of considerable benefit to other underdeveloped countries, by providing employment in large numbers to such states as Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. FACS chairman Philip Loree, who is also shipping representative on the International Chamber of Commerce, commissioned a study in the name of the Chamber of Commerce by the Economist Intelligence Unit in London. This booklet argued that the proposals

[11] For the El Salvador resolution, which introduced the plan to phase out open registry, see UN, TD/B/C.4/AC.1/CRP 3. That resolution cited UNCTAD, *Legal Mechanisms,* which spelled out the plan's methods.

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for phasing out open registry that were to be put forth by the LDCs at the January 1980 UNCTAD conference in Geneva were not well thought-out or well-prepared and that many LDCs were in no position to take on the expense of opening a new registry. The booklet was completed in time for the Geneva meeting and became part of the intensive lobbying campaign by FACS, and by Loree personally, against the plan to phase out open registry. At that meeting, it was decided to postpone action on the plan, and the UNCTAD deadlock over the issue was formally recognized.[12]

Two resolutions were introduced at Geneva in January 1980: the plan to phase out open registry, as developed by the Secretariat and the planning committees, was proposed in a resolution by El Salvador, for the Group of 77; a modified plan, suggesting retention of the current system with some minor reforms, was presented by West Germany, from Group B. The Group-B proposal called for "greater transparency about the ownership of vessels under open registry or other flags" — a FACS-supported reform. Further, the Group-B resolution called for the elimination of unfair advantages that accrue from noncompliance with international safety and social regulations. On such counts, the largest shipowners, through FACS, have long argued for controls, hoping that reforms would bring pressure on marginal operators, as had occurred in the wave of public reaction following the *Argo Merchant* disaster. It appears that the January 1980 Group-B plan at Geneva reflected this sort of corporate-approved progressive reform.[13]

Both Panama and Liberia voted with Group B rather than with their own groups (A and C). Thus, Panama and Liberia had to vote against sharing the shipping resource with their fellow LDCs.[14]

It is clear that the system of open registry, although thought of by Liberian officials and company officers as simply an

[12] The report *Economic Impact of Open Registry Shipping,* prepared by the International Maritime Associates, was, as indicated in the report, commissioned by the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs and filed with the U.S. Department of Justice as a propaganda document. The Economist Intelligence Unit's report *Open Registry Shipping: Some Economic Considerations* indicates that it was commissioned by the International Chamber of Commerce; however, *FACS Forum,* January 1980, shows that Loree is shipping representative on the International Chamber and that the report is available through FACS headquarters, New York. For information about Loree's activities, see "Selling Snake Oil in Geneva," *FACS Forum,* January 1980. For the postponement resolution, see UN, TD/B/C/AC.1/L.4, January 22, 1980.

[13] See UN, *Draft Resolution Submitted by El Salvador on Behalf of States Members of the Group of 77,* TD/B/C/AC.1/CRP 3, January 18, 1980, and UN, *Draft Conclusions and Recommendations Submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on Behalf of a Majority of States Members of Group B,* TD/B/C.4/AC.1/CRP 4, January 18, 1980.

[14] *FACS Forum,* January 1980; interview with Todd Stewart, U.S. Representative, Economics Branch, Maritime Affairs, U.S. State Department, March 1980.

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international service that yields revenue, with no political overtones, does entail embarrassing political and diplomatic dilemmas. Liberia is placed in the position of deciding between allegiance to its corporate clients, on the one hand, and to its leadership position among the LDCs, on the other. In the aftermath of the April 1980 coup, itself conducted in the name of eliminating corruption, Liberian officials may be even more sensitive to the pro-Western implications of their open-registry system and to the dangers it poses to their credibility in Africa and among the LDCs.

Liberia's position as an LDC that offers services to transnational corporations has been sorely tested before. In October 1973, during the Yom Kippur War between Israel and her Arab neighbors, President Tolbert issued an executive order that prohibited the transport of arms to Israel aboard Liberian-registered ships. The OPEC states, at the same time, embargoed oil deliveries to U.S. naval forces. The conjunction of these two events suggested to American military observers that Liberian registry was not a reliable system of strategic supply in military conflicts in which the Afro-Asian loyalties of Liberia ran counter to the U.S. position. In the light of protests from American shipowners about the political damage that his order was generating, Tolbert quietly issued a clarification, indicating that the prohibition on arms carriage did not apply to ships with a prior commitment to the United States. The war ended before any specific shipments were interdicted by the Tolbert order.[15]

Nevertheless, this event had weakened support for the flag-of-convenience system among American military men. Many had always doubted the workability of the plans (devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947-1948) that treated American-owned ships registered under Liberian and Panamanian flags as under the United States' "effective control." Tolbert's 1973 executive order seemed to provide proof of the dangers of that policy; the April coup can only exacerbate those doubts.[16]

Open-registry or flag-of-convenience shipping has created ties between Liberia and the West that are intimate, long-standing, and very lucrative. While Liberia has long been willing to "market" its flag for strictly commercial ends, the political overtones and dip-

[15] U.S. House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, *Hearings*, on H.R. 8193, in 1974, pp. 329, 670-763.

[16] The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to regard Panamanian, and, later, Liberian registry as allowing "effective control" of American-owned vessels is reviewed in documents JCS 1454/1-1454/45 in Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, D.C. For a full analysis of the policy and the debates about it, see Rodney Carlisle, *Sovereignty For Sale: The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian Flags of Convenience* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming 1981).

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lomatic considerations involved in allowing its flag to enter various conflicts around the world cannot be permanently ignored. In the modern world, the close connections between international economics and international politics are avoided at peril. One cannot expect a purely commercial transaction, the registry of an oil tanker for the resulting revenue of one hundred or two hundred thousand dollars, to stop at that. When that tanker supplies or does not supply certain other states, when it passes through the territorial waters of other states, when it competes with the shipping of other developing countries, when it conforms or does not conform to labor standards and safety standards of the world maritime community, matters of commerce become matters of international politics, despite Liberian and company efforts to regard such issues as nonpolitical. Those political considerations will continue to pose serious problems for Liberia in the coming decade.

The UNCTAD attack on the system of open registry reflects certain long-range global trends in our time. The OPEC states, in their rebellion against the petroleum companies, have decided to begin their own programs of shipping. Much of the profit of the petroleum business has long been directed to the shipping subsidiaries of the major oil companies. By charging themselves high rates, the companies transfer profits from the highly taxed environments of the West to the tax-free environments of Panama and Liberia. But the Saudis and other exporters are now beginning systems of shipping in order to gain positions in this part of the oil profit picture.[17]

While that process is difficult, since shipping expertise is hard to acquire or develop, no one can argue that the OPEC states will lack the capital required for purchasing tankers. With export-quota requirements, the OPEC states will be in a position to guarantee cargos to their own fleets. By then establishing a system of "flag preferences," the exporting states would soon be able to establish which of the other new and upcoming flag states would be allowed to carry their cargos. The study commissioned by Liberian Services noted this threat to Liberia's position: "OPEC does not need the proposed UNCTAD . . . Resolution to carry out this action. The only advantage of the resolution would be to legitimize, in an international arena, actions the OPEC cartel could initiate unilaterally."[18]

[17] H. P. Drewry Associates, *The Involvement of the Oil-Exporting Countries in International Shipping* (London: Drewry Associates, 1976).

[18] International Maritime Associates, *Economic Impact of Open Registry Shipping*, pp. iv-20.

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The conflict in UNCTAD over whether or not to phase out flags of convenience in favor of the alternate system proposed can thus be seen as an aspect of the larger battle between the energy-exporting countries and the corporations that have, until recently, controlled those sources of energy.

Liberia is in an especially difficult position in this battle, since it provides a vital service to the oil corporations and, yet, has legitimate aspirations to a leadership role vis-à-vis the LDCs — a role that it will undoubtedly continue to exercise in the post-Tolbert period. Thus, for the 1980s, Liberia must steer a course amid troubled waters, reconciling the needs of the Group of 77, the transnational oil companies, as well as its own interests. Can the new government apply the same skills with which Liberia survived the colonial struggles of the nineteenth century, and the rising tides of anticolonialism, pan-Africanism, and awakened national consciousness of recent decades? Liberia's history of diplomatic survival suggests to this observer that the country will find a way to meet the challenges it faces. We shall see.

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reviews

The Growth of Hunger: A New Politics of Agriculture. By René Dumont and Nicholas Cohen. Boston: Marion Boyars, 1980. 229 pp. $7.95.

India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives. By Marcus Franda. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. 306 pp. $17.50.

Global Food Interdependence: Challenge to American Foreign Policy. By Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 214 pp. $20.00 ($7.50, paper).

Political Investments in Food Production. Edited by Barbara Huddleston and Jon McLin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. 242 pp. $19.95 ($10.95, paper).

U.S. Food: Making the Most of a Global Resource. By David W. McClintock. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 122 pp. $20.00.

Food Trends and Prospects in India. By Fred H. Sanderson and Shyamal Roy. Washington: Brookings, 1979. 162 pp. $4.95 (paper).

Food for War–Food for Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context. By Mitchel B. Wallerstein. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980. 312 pp. $30.00.

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Thematic review essays certainly present a great challenge to the reviewer. The above-listed books added considerably to my factual knowledge and understanding of global and U.S. food policies and institutions, but synthesis and evaluation did not easily flow therefrom. Nevertheless, this essay will focus on whether it is possible

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for the United States to develop a better food policy, one that is likely to improve world food conditions.

Presumably, there is a consensus among the knowledgeable and the interested that this is a very important question, deserving of serious and intelligent analysis. Human decency would seem to dictate no other response. Somewhere in the range of 500 million to over 1 billion human beings suffer from severe malnutrition, and most of those people live in a state of absolute (not relative) poverty. The statistics vary considerably, to be sure, but few would argue that the statisticians are lying. After all, person counting, compounded by the problem of gross hunger counting, is an immensely complicated task. Note the problems of the U.S. Census Bureau in simply trying to determine the size of the population of the United States.

"Overcoming world hunger" (to use the title of the recent report by the Presidential Commission on World Hunger) is more than an issue of morality, however. According to the commission's study, U.S. food and agricultural policies relate directly to U.S. national security and economic interests. To simplify a very complicated history, the North American breadbasket (Canada playing an important role but subordinate to that of the United States) has come to be the dominant factor in world food trade and food aid. A near revolution in U.S. agricultural exports occurred in the 1970s — from over $7.2 billion in 1970 to more than $40 billion in 1980 (not adjusted for inflation). Roughly half of U.S. food and feed grains (plus abundant amounts of cotton and tobacco) are now exported. Some 46 per cent of the world's wheat exports and 25 per cent of world rice exports are produced in the United States. The consequent impact on U.S. international trade politics and U.S. domestic politics has been both profound and disturbing. Although most of the media's attention seems to be on the unexpected shortfall in grain production in the Soviet Union, an event of equal, if not greater, importance is the past year's 18 per cent decline (from 1979) in U.S. feed grain production; the November 1980 issue of *Wallaces Farmer* headlined one report as follows: "Grain Supplies Falling Dangerously Low." Weather is, of course, the principal unknown variable in forecasts of food production. Indeed, the weather/climate debate has brought forth an abundance of conflicting and confusing theories and predictions. Presumably, one or more of them will prove to be reasonably accurate, but take your choice.

With respect to U.S. congressional politics, the world

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food issue is of almost immediate import. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 expires in September 1981, and a Republican president and Senate, along with an election-shocked House of Representatives, will need to survey, analyze, and act on the central question raised in this review. These books were not written, as the saying goes, "to teach the senators wisdom," but no one would wish to foreclose that option.

For an overall perspective of global and U.S. food politics and policies, the study by Hopkins and Puchala is clearly the best of the lot. In some 200 pages, including footnotes and index, they have done a really fine job of describing, analyzing, assessing, and prescribing. Their central thesis is that "the global food system has not been performing satisfactorily to solve outstanding problems in recent years." (p. 30.)

As they see it, "five problems are posed by existing world food conditions" (p. 3): (1) the threat of chronic food shortages, notably in South Asia and Africa; (2) unstable production and distribution arrangements; (3) the consequent insecurity of food imports for some countries; (4) low agricultural productivity in many developing nations; and (5) chronic malnutrition among the poor in certain countries and regions. From a liberal–left-of-center political position, Hopkins and Puchala review the commercial and aid aspects of U.S. food trade. They then suggest how the U.S. executive branch could be (modestly) reorganized so that matters concerning U.S. involvement in global food interdependence might be acted on more systematically and rationally. Their concept of interdependence seems to assume that a positive-sum strategy can and should be implemented (i.e., not only would U.S. interests be served, but so also would those of allies and potential allies). The authors reassess the U.S. role in international food organizations: we should be critical, they contend, but also more positive and constructive. Their rather novel chapter on "assessing alternative risks" acknowledges that there is a substantial degree of unpredictability — owing to weather, insects, and viruses — in the "global food system," complicating planning and decisionmaking by U.S. policymakers. They then formulate seven goals that would "serve American interests without intruding upon or abusing other countries" (p. 171), and they review the numerous recommendations they have offered for reassessing and redirecting U.S. food policies. The authors conclude by summarizing a set of principles that the United States "ought to stand for . . . in global food affairs." (p. 185.) Those principles

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are (1) development should be the paramount priority of food diplomacy; (2) nutrition should be a central concern of food diplomacy; (3) adequate diet is a human right and should be a diplomatic concern; (4) food aid is both a right and an obligation; (5) agricultural information should flow freely; (6) the stability of food markets should be enhanced; and (7) global food interdependence is real and acceptable, and its orderly management must be enhanced. (pp. 185-187.)

My review does not do justice to Hopkins and Puchala's efforts "to clarify the role of American policy in the context of global food affairs." (p. xv.) *Global Food Interdependence* is an excellent study, and all who read it will be wiser for their endeavor. The book is not without flaws, however. The authors' utopianism and idealism are evident. Although I am in very considerable agreement with their values, recommendations, and admonitions, I am also aware that utopianism is both an occupational delight and a disease with academicians. We need these philosopher-kings and their counsels of perfection regarding justice and efficiency. Nonetheless, the American political system, is simply not constructed so that even a national food policy, much less an international food policy, could be enacted and implemented in accord with the book's recommendations. In addition, the authors assume, as do many students of U.S. food politics, that farm products, once produced, constitute a special type of public good, available for distribution and consumption as dictated by public policy. Again, we miss the cold, calculated realities of American politics — even more, I would argue, of human nature. If I read the Iowa farmer correctly, that bushel of corn is his until he agrees to the terms that make it yours (i.e., the U.S. government's), and those terms have always been difficult to negotiate. Future negotiations will likely prove even tougher.

It is not intended as criticism that I mention only briefly the volume by McClintock. In just over 100 pages, he examines the many policy implications of the food issue, and does so concisely and admirably. Much is left unsaid, necessarily, but this study would be an excellent introduction for anyone who desires a basic understanding of world food problems, as viewed in the context of U.S. food politics.

During and since World War II, the United States has been involved in food assistance, first to its allies, then to the defeated nations, and soon thereafter and now to the developing nations.

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The major event in the history of U.S. food assistance was the passage of the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (usually referred to as P.L. 480). Since 1954, the implementation of P.L. 480 has cost the U.S. government over $30 billion, and if total reimbursement costs to the U.S. treasury were included, the figure would be much higher. Begun primarily as a surplus-disposal operation, rationalized and widely defended as humanitarianism in action (as often it was), P.L. 480 has fathered a number of offspring (see Wallerstein, chap. 4) and was the model for the UN's World Food Program.

For anyone who wishes a comprehensive knowledge of P.L. 480, the interesting and objective study by Mitchel Wallerstein is mandatory reading. It is, by far, the best policy study we have of U.S. food assistance programs, and it treats of the UN's World Food Program, as well. (Chap. 3 in the Hopkins and Puchala study is also a very useful survey of P.L. 480.) Wallerstein documents, case by case, the use of U.S. food as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Though he restricts his discussion of "food aid as an instrument of diplomatic and strategic leverage" to a single chapter (chap. 6), the next four chapters deal indirectly, if not directly, with the same theme. Wallerstein is evenhanded and analytical in his assessment: "when employed *selectively,* and with restraint, food aid does offer certain advantages as an instrument of foreign policy leverage." (p. 146.)

During the 1970s, food aid increasingly became less important to the U.S. food system (farmers, agribusiness, shipping interests, etc.). Regular sales have pushed concessional sales or outright food grants far into the background. Today, P.L. 480 costs would amount to 2-3 per cent of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports, with an annual appropriation of around $1-1.2 billion. Even so, the United States has certain strategic and humanitarian obligations that will have to be fulfilled both through P.L. 480 and (multilaterally) through the World Food Program. Wallerstein's richly documented, prudently reasoned study will surely prove to be of value to policymakers, though future food aid policies can be based only in part on those of the past. That is, in the near future, the tough policy questions will be: To whom will we sell? Whom will we turn away? Economic interests and the real politics of diplomacy will not be easily reconcilable, as the Afghanistan war and the quasi embargo of grain seem to be proving.

Another area of consensus within the "Establishment"

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(of foreign-assistance experts) is that the world food problem, with respect to both production and distribution, will have to be confronted principally by the developing nations themselves. Development assistance from the OECD and OPEC member states is a *necessary but not a sufficient condition. The heroes and heroines of* this decade and the next will be the peasant farmers who are able to grow two, preferably three, blades of wheat or rice where only one grew before, though substantial amounts of foreign assistance will be necessary if such developments are to take place.

The American Universities Field Staff study, edited by Barbara Huddleston and Jon McLin, is a collection of valuable case studies (Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, the Philippines, China, and Japan), supplemented by insightful chapters by Jon McLin and Richard Stryker, and capstoned by a prescient overview by Barbara Huddleston. This study, too, can teach the senators wisdom. Each case study is unique, of course, but the common thread is the search for a workable strategy that will enable the agricultural-rural sector of a particular country to play a significant role in the development of that country's economy. The real problem is to convince the urban-oriented elite in each country that such a strategy should be adopted and aggressively pursued (China and, perhaps, Japan being exceptions). Even that reformulation does not adequately generalize the kinds of conflict situations that will occur; Keith Griffin's foreword constitutes a provocative and perceptive statement of the "food problem" as perceived by the developing nations.

Viewed as a kind of North-South political controversy, the global food issue seems to be marked by growing insistence on the part of the North that continuing financial assistance must be predicated on the South's adopting a "basic needs" strategy, allowing for growth with equity — a larger pie but with the new pieces to be earned and enjoyed by the poorest of the poor. From a humanitarian perspective, this seems to be only elemental justice; but viewed as a policy that must be conceptualized and faithfully implemented by a developing nation the task seems overwhelming, if not foreboding. Even the new China appears to be veering toward its own unique form of capitalism, which is oriented more toward a "trickle-down strategy" rather than a "bubble-up strategy." Moreover, as Huddleston clearly points out, even when the strategy is "successful" what tends to occur is that a new breed of small, commercial farmers (each owning perhaps 2-5 hectares) is created; food production increases, but so do the numbers of those who are in a condition of absolute or near-absolute poverty. In addi-

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tion, Stryker seems to question the motives of the World Bank leadership, and by implication those of the regional banks, by his speculation that their recently found humanitarianism may be primarily concerned with the interests of Western agribusiness.

What should the 97th Congress do about this seminal matter? At a minimum, its New Directions legislation, mandated in 1973 and predicated on a basic needs strategy, should be carefully scrutinized. In one sense, this is a dangerous suggestion; Congress and, presumably, the nation's citizens are already willing to "economize" by scrimping on new funding for the World Bank, the regional banks, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Even the financial solvency of the recently established International Fund for Agricultural Development may be placed in jeopardy as it seeks its first replenishment. Development assistance will be a policy controversy of momentous importance throughout the 1980s.

The two volumes on India's food and rural-development policies provided a great deal of new information for me. The excellent study by Marcus Franda (of the American Universities Field Staff) is concerned primarily with the rural-development policies of the Janata government after it took office in March 1977. Since then, of course, another round of national elections has been held and the Congress Party, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, has returned to power. It would be fruitless to try to draw any hard-and-fast generalizations out of the maelstrom of Indian politics. One must wonder, however, why the American elite and media are so overwhelmed by the new China — admittedly impressive in its accomplishments but still totalitarian — while so neglectful of the Indian federal and democratic republic.

Complementing the Franda study is Sanderson and Roy's book, which is up to the usually high Brookings standard. The authors prove that India can successfully produce food sufficient to feed a population of one billion, a figure that India's population will reach in about the year 2000. Food distribution problems will still be in evidence, but presumably the talented Indian civil service can work out those hitches, too, assuming that the conglomeration of Indian political parties can negotiate the necessary policies of distribution and redistribution. My guess is that once again logic will prove not to be the law of life and that what Sanderson and Roy claim could be won't be. Even so, one must be impressed by their persuasive calculations and hopeful that political wisdom will prevail sufficiently so that economic analysis will be used in the interests of those who have not.

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The study by René Dumont (who has written extensively in the area of food and nutrition in the Third World) and Nicholas Cohen brings together many historical and anthropological references. Though the insights the authors draw are often thought-provoking, I was left somewhat dissatisfied. I found the study to be both too timid and too superficial. There is much to be angry about when one reflects on the horrors of poverty and hunger, but I prefer the anger and vitriol of, say, Susan George in her *How the Other Half Dies;* one feels that George is a radical who comes out swinging and will not be put down. Dumont and Cohen's choice of "revolutionary strategies for the future" (chap. 11) — "less conventional foods," "an appropriate agriculture," "fair exchange," "peasants in command" — strike me as neither revolutionary nor "strategic." They are tepid revolutionists and inadequate social scientists, an unworkable combination.

Obviously, it is possible that the 97th Congress may enact wiser legislation than that which now exists, but that outcome is far from certain. The well-worn, widely criticized, perhaps outmoded American political practice of "muddling through" will likely prevail again. Not many years ago, Georg Borgstrom observed that "there is every reason to believe that U.S. agriculture with its food producing potential will emerge within the near future as the nation's most important economic asset."[1] Possibly the new Congress will accept and act on that proposition. One might now yearn for a return to those halcyon days of surpluses, for how can one successfully muddle through when there is so little room to maneuver?

[1] *The Hungry Planet* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), quoted in David W. McClintock, *U.S. Food: Making the Most of a Global Resource* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 100.

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